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11.  The engines of the creative response: 
the introductory framework
Cristiano Antonelli
1. INTRODUCTION
The Schumpeterian notion of creative response provides a consistent 
framework in which it is possible to articulate a comprehensive and coherent 
account of the endogenous determinants of the introduction of innovations. 
Firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions try to react to unexpected 
conditions of product and factor markets, and hence levels of profitability 
and performances away from the normal. Their reaction can be either adap-
tive or creative. When adaptive responses prevail, firms can only change 
their techniques in the existing map of isoquants: the system converges to 
equilibrium. When their response is creative firms can actually introduce 
new technologies that change the existing map of isoquants. The chances 
that the reaction is creative and the introduction of innovations successful 
are contingent upon the amount of knowledge externalities the system in 
which the firms are embedded is able to provide. The availability of external 
knowledge at costs below equilibrium levels supports their creative response 
and makes the introduction of productivity-increasing innovations possible.
The introduction of innovations feed further out-of-equilibrium condi-
tions that in turn push firms towards creative responses that may succeed, 
again with the eventual introduction of new innovations, provided the 
dynamics has not reduced the quality of knowledge governance mecha-
nisms. In this case the system enters a positive loop of feedbacks where all 
the components –out-of-equilibrium conditions, knowledge generation, 
knowledge governance and innovation – are endogenous. The tools of 
evolutionary complexity apply.
When the system is not able to provide access to knowledge spillovers at 
low costs, the response of firms is doomed to be adaptive. When the system 
does not provide the necessary access at low costs to the stock of quasi-
public knowledge, firms can try to change their techniques rather than 
their technologies: the system gravitates around equilibrium conditions 
without growth and change. The tools of equilibrium economics apply.
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When the response of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions is creative 
and strong, and the system supports them with persistent knowledge 
externalities that provide access to the stock of the existing quasi-public 
knowledge at low costs, the system is able to foster the rate of technological 
change and reproduce out-of-equilibrium conditions that may last until 
the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms stays put (Antonelli, 
2008, 2011, 2015a, 2017a, b).
The dynamics of the innovation process is fully endogenous to the 
system and exhibits the typical characteristics of an emergent system prop-
erty (Arthur, 2007, 2009, 2014; Foster and Metcalfe, 2012). The successful 
introduction of innovation is in fact the result of the interaction between 
individual action and the properties of the system (Roberts et al., 2017).
This chapter contributes to the framework outlined so far with analysis 
of the role of: i) the levels of reactivity of firms to out-of-equilibrium 
conditions; ii) the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms at work 
within economic systems that define the actual amount of knowledge 
externalities available to reactive firms in assessing the rate of technologi-
cal change.
Section 2 explores the evolutionary complexity of the interaction 
between endogenous out-of-equilibrium conditions, creative response and 
knowledge externalities that can be elaborated from the foundations laid 
down by Schumpeter’s essay ‘The creative response in economic history’. 
Section 3 analyses the relationship between out-of-equilibrium conditions 
and firms’ responses, focusing on the levels of firms’ reactivity. Section 4 
recalls the role of knowledge externalities in making the creative response 
possible and effective, focusing on the endogenous dynamics of knowledge 
governance mechanisms. Section 5 presents a simple model that enables us 
to explore the systemic and endogenous dynamics of the creative response. 
The conclusions summarize the results and explore their implications for 
both economic and policy analysis.
2.  THE EVOLUTIONARY COMPLEXITY OF 
ENDOGENOUS INNOVATION
In ‘The creative response in economic history’, published in the Journal of 
Economic History in 1947, Joseph Schumpeter provides a synthesis of the 
alternative views about the relationship between performances and innova-
tion he presented in 1939 and 1942 in Business Cycles and Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (Antonelli, 2008, 2015a, 2017a, b).
In Business Cycles Schumpeter elaborates the view that firms are 
induced to introduce innovations to cope with decline of performance. 
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His historic analysis of innovation flows shows that the introduction of 
innovations peaks in the years of depression that follow the exhaustion of 
opportunities provided by previous gales of innovation. Firms are exposed 
to a decline in performance: the growth of output is weak; profitability 
falls below the average; and, ultimately, even actual losses emerge. The 
survival of firms is actually engendered. The introduction of innovations 
is regarded as a necessity to contrast the fall of performance below the 
average and possible risks of failure and exit. The generalized condi-
tions of declining performance shared by many firms induce a collective 
innovation process that eventually leads to the emergence of new gales 
characterized by the complementarity and interoperability of a variety 
of new technologies. Business Cycles elaborates the ‘failure inducement’ 
mechanism, eventually articulated by Nelson and Winter (1982), according 
to which innovations are more likely to be introduced where profits and 
performance are below equilibrium and/or average levels.
A few years later, Capitalism Socialism and Democracy provides an 
alternative framework where the relationship between performances and 
innovation is reversed. Firms that enjoy extra profits are more likely to 
engage in risky undertakings such as research and development (R&D) 
activities that are at the origin of the possible introduction of innovations. 
Firms with profits and performance above average and above equilibrium 
levels are more likely to introduce innovations also because they can 
fund the necessary research with internal financial resources. Profits 
above equilibrium reduce levels of risk aversion and liquidity constraints. 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy the foundations of the well-known 
Schumpeterian hypothesis according to which rates of innovation are 
faster in oligopolistic markets characterized by the rivalry between large 
corporations with performances well above equilibrium levels.
The analysis of Capitalism Socialism and Democracy contrasts that 
of Business Cycles. Although the focus and level of the analyses differ – 
the  former elaborates at the aggregate level and focuses on the working 
of  the system while the latter is typically microeconomic and impinges 
upon the theory of the firm – the relationship between performance and 
innovation is negative in the former and positive in the latter. The 1947 
essay ‘The creative response in economic history’ seems to provide a syn-
thesis: firms try to innovate when they try to cope with out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. In turn, out-of-equilibrium conditions take place both when 
performance is below and above equilibrium levels.
The intuition of ‘The creative response in economic history’ enables us 
to implement four important contributions that synthesize the different 
strands of literature that impinge upon the separate readership of the 
Schumpeterian legacy:
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1.  It introduces the reactivity function whereby innovation takes place as 
a response to out-of-equilibrium conditions that can be both negative 
(as in Business Cycles) and positive (as in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy).
2. It enables us to operationalize the notion of procedural rationality.
3.  It stresses the crucial role of the context in which the response takes 
place.
4.  It provides the framework to grasp the endogenous relationship 
between out-of-equilibrium conditions and innovation.
Let us consider these in turn.
The Innovative Response
The introduction by Schumpeter (1947) of the reactivity function can 
be regarded as a major contribution to economics. It encompasses and 
generalizes a variety of approaches: from the induced technological change 
approach to the demand pull and the oligopolistic rivalry, including the 
very basic notion of technical change of microeconomics as well as the 
evolutionary approach. In basic microeconomics firms ‘react’ to changes 
in factor markets and in inputs costs, searching for new existing techniques 
on the ‘given’ map of isoquants. The notion of reactive response finds 
here its foundations. The notion of innovative response can be regarded 
as a direct extension of the reactive technical change when technological 
change is no longer exogenous but is regarded as the endogenous outcome 
of firms’ conduct. In the demand pull approach, firms react to changes in 
demand for their products, enhancing the division of labour that enables 
them to introduce innovations. In the induced technological change 
approach, firms react to changes in input costs and innovate, changing the 
map of (no longer given) isoquants.
Since the seminal contribution of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) corporate 
decision-making regarding R&D has been analysed within the framework 
of the typical reaction function of oligopolistic rivalry. The evolutionary 
approach elaborated by Nelson and Winter (1982) assumes that firms 
change their routines when their performance falls below average levels: the 
attempt to innovate is viewed as a way of coping with emerging failures. 
Lazonick (2007: 27) provides quite an interesting and well-synthesized 
framework:
The rise of new competition poses a challenge to the innovating firm. It can seek 
to make an innovative response or, alternatively, it can seek to adapt on the basis 
of the investments that it has already made by, for example, obtaining wage and 
work concessions from employees, debt relief  from creditors, or tax breaks or 
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other subsidies from the state (see Lazonick, 1993). An enterprise that chooses 
the adaptive response in effect shifts from being an innovating to an optimizing 
firm. How the enterprise responds will depend on not only the abilities and 
incentives of those who exercise strategic control but also the skills and efforts 
that can be integrated in its organization and the committed finance that, in 
the face of competitive challenges, can be mobilized to sustain the innovation 
process.
Lazonick (1993) limits the source of out-of-equilibrium conditions to the 
rise of new competition. In our approach, instead, changes in both factor 
and product markets, at the firm and the system level, do engender out-of-
equilibrium conditions.
As a matter of fact the recent literature on the widespread surge of green 
technologies relies systematically on the notion of innovative reaction, 
stressing the positive role of the upsurge of oil prices, carbon taxes and 
environmental constraints as well as the strong increase in demand for 
low-emission-production processes, capital goods and final products as 
determinants of the creative reaction of firms pushed to introduce new 
energy-saving and green technologies by unexpected out-of-equilibrium 
conditions (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Newell et al., 1999; Acemoglu 
et al., 2012; Aghion et al., 2016). Yet this literature reveals three major 
limits:
●● It fails to elaborate explicitly an integrated notion of innovative 
response that is able to frame into a single and comprehensive con-
text that includes different sources of out-of-equilibrium conditions.
●● It portrays the relationship between out-of-equilibrium conditions 
and innovative response as automatic and deterministic, as if  all 
firms facing unexpected changes in their product and factor markets 
might actually innovate.
●● It assumes that the shocks to which firms react are exogenous, and is 
not able to grasp their endogenous determinants.
The Response as a Form of Procedural Rationality
Schumpeterian decision-making is far from Olympian rationality. Firms 
make plans on the basis of their limited knowledge of the actual and 
expected conditions of product and factor markets. When their expecta-
tions fail, they try to elaborate responses that are highly contextual and 
constrained by sunk costs. The response is a form of procedural rationality. 
The Schumpeterian notion of creative/adaptive response complements and 
enriches Herbert Simon’s analysis of the intrinsic limits of knowledge and 
the role of bounded and procedural rationality (Simon, 1947, 1979, 1982).
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The Role of Externalities
The outcome of the Schumpeterian response is not deterministic but 
strictly conditional on the availability of knowledge externalities. The 
response of firms may be creative, and leads to the actual introduction of 
innovations only if  and when substantial knowledge externalities are avail-
able. When the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms and stocks 
of quasi-public knowledge are low, the actual provision of knowledge 
externalities falls below critical values, the reactive attempt of firms fails to 
be innovative and the response is just adaptive: technical change replaces 
technological change.
The response of firms to out-of-equilibrium changes in both their 
product and factor markets consists in mobilizing research activities. 
Such activities are necessary both to search for existing techniques that fit 
better with the changed conditions of product and factor markets and to 
introduce new technologies – that is, techniques that do not exist and do 
not belong to the existing map of isoquants. The search for and identifica-
tion of existing techniques, new to the firm but already known, are not 
free and entail specific costs. In appropriate conditions determined by the 
properties of the system that provide substantial knowledge externalities 
and hence access to the stock of quasi-public knowledge at low costs, 
research activities enable the generation of additional knowledge that may 
eventually lead to the introduction of new technologies. The differences 
in outcome – whether it is just adaptive, as in the identification of new 
viable techniques among the many already available on the existing map 
of isoquants, or actually creative so as to enable the introduction of new 
technologies that reshape the map of isoquants – are determined by the 
amount of knowledge externalities available in the system, and hence by 
the bottom-line access and use costs of external knowledge (Antonelli, 
2017a, b).
The Endogenous Relationship between Out-of-Equilibrium Conditions and 
Innovation
The introduction of innovation as the outcome of the creative response 
of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions, contingent upon the quality 
of knowledge externalities available in the system, is itself  the cause of 
further out-of-equilibrium conditions. Out-of-equilibrium conditions are 
not the result of exogenous shocks, but the endogenous consequence of 
the innovative response of firms. Not only are out-of-equilibrium condi-
tions endogenous to the system, but the quality of knowledge externalities 
is also determined within the system and may increase as well as decrease. 
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The response of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions, in fact, consists 
in the generation of additional technological knowledge that is necessary 
to introduce innovations. The additional knowledge spills into the system 
and affects the size and the quality of the stock of quasi-public knowledge 
available for the generation of new technological knowledge. At the same 
time the levels of access costs to the stock of quasi-public knowledge are 
determined by the systems of knowledge interactions and transactions 
between firms and other knowledge-intensive agents.
3.  LEVELS OF REACTIVITY AND RESEARCH 
EFFORTS
It seems now useful to make a step forward in analysing the crucial role of 
the levels of reactivity of firms that try to cope with out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. Decision-making is based upon procedural rationality: on 
one hand firms do not command the understanding of all the possible 
alternatives; on the other they are able to explore unchartered waters and 
introduce innovations and change their routines. At each point in time they 
try to cope with the changing conditions of product and factor markets 
under constraints of sunk costs and past decisions. Their ability to cope 
with changing economic conditions is the outcome of a variety of factors, 
including: the type of structure and organization; the role of shareholders 
and stakeholders; industrial relations and levels of entrepreneurship of top 
managers. Figure 1.1 compares research effort (R) with performance levels 
both above and below the average (Π). It exhibits two levels of reactivity. 
Around equilibrium levels, at the intersection of the two axes, firms do 
not try to change their production processes. Liquidity constraints and 
risk aversion restrain research efforts. The further away from equilibrium, 
the stronger is the likelihood that firms try to change their production 
R
∏
Figure 1.1 Performance and research effort: levels of reactivity
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 processes either by searching for new existing techniques or by actual 
research activities that, provided substantial knowledge externalities are 
available, may enable the introduction of new technologies.
Two mechanisms are at work in this process: the failure inducement 
articulated by Schumpeter in Business Cycle and the success inducement 
analysed in Capitalism Socialism and Democracy. Let us consider them 
in turn. Firms try to innovate to cope with the high risks of failure in 
the right quadrant where losses are greater, performance is worst and 
research efforts stronger. The negative conditions of performance and the 
high risks of failure reduce the risk aversion. The substitution of tangible 
investments with intangible ones and the increase in research activities are 
the last chance to try to cope with threats to survival. In the left quadrant, 
instead, the larger the profits, the better the performance and the stronger 
the research efforts. Firms can fund a larger budget of research activities 
that may put them in a position to try to innovate because of an abundance 
of internal cash. Large internal cash reserves reduce liquidity constraints, 
avoid the credit rationing of external finance and reduce the levels of 
risk. The possible failure of innovative undertaking does not put at risk 
the entrepreneurial managers who have already secured high levels of 
profitability for their shareholders and stakeholders. The success of the 
risky undertakings may yield further growth and larger profits that would 
benefit the managers.
Relationships between out-of-equilibrium conditions, however, can take 
place with different levels of elasticity. Figure 1.1 exhibits two levels of 
reactivity. The bold line represents low levels of reactivity: firms are reluc-
tant to change their levels of innovative efforts. The dotted line represents 
high levels of reactivity.1
The key point is that the extent to which the change in the levels of 
(relative) performance affects the levels of research efforts. The bold line 
represents high levels of reactivity stemming from high levels of entrepre-
neurship. Firms guided by managers with high levels of entrepreneurship 
are more likely to exhibit high levels of reactivity to changing levels of 
profitability and performance at large. Firms guided by managers with low 
levels of entrepreneurship are less reactive.
Figure 1.2 compares levels of reactivity with levels of research effort: 
on the horizontal axis ΔΠ measures in absolute terms the differences 
between profitability and performance of each firm and the normal and/
or average profitability and performance of all the firms in the system; on 
the vertical axis R measures levels of research effort. The levels of reactiv-
ity play an important role in assessing the amount of research carried 
out in order to cope with out-of-equilibrium conditions. Large research 
budgets may implement a creative response and introduce innovations 
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when large knowledge externalities that reduce access costs to the stock 
of quasi-public knowledge are made possible by the quality of knowledge 
governance mechanisms at work within the system.
Figure 1.2 shows that the same level of out-of-equilibrium conditions 
measured by the difference in absolute terms between profitability and 
performance and the normal levels of profitability and performance (ΔΠz) 
there are two quite different levels of research efforts: RA with low levels of 
reactivity and RB with high levels of reactivity. The levels of reactivity play 
a major role in assessing the elasticity of the system to out-of-equilibrium 
conditions.
The implications of this analysis are important to assess the actual 
determinants of the innovative efforts of an economic system. The amount 
of research is likely to be larger in systems characterized not only by 
widespread out-of-equilibrium conditions than in systems where all firms 
operate near equilibrium and the variance of profitability and perform-
ance at large is small, but also by high rather than low levels of reactivity.
These implications can be amplified when we measure out-of- equilibrium 
conditions in terms of variance with respect to average profitability and 
performance rather than with respect to normal profitability and perform-
ance. When average profitability and performance is taken into account 
as the relevant measure of out-of-equilibrium conditions we expect that 
in systems with average profitability and performance above normal levels 
but low levels of variance the reactivity is always lower than in systems 
where out-of-equilibrium conditions are measured with respect to normal 
profitability and performance. The greater the variance with respect to 
the average, the larger the chances that firms try to react. When the out-
of-equilibrium conditions of each firm refer to average profitability and 
performance it becomes immediately clear that the larger is the variety 
R
RB
RA
A
| ∆ ∏z | | ∆ ∏ |
B
Figure 1.2 Levels of reactivity and research effort
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and heterogeneity of firms, the larger the innovative efforts. With greater 
research efforts, and given levels of knowledge externalities, there are 
greater chances of faster rates of introduction of innovation and increase 
of total factor productivity and ultimately economic growth.
The results of the replicator analysis, according to which the greater the 
variety of firms the larger the growth rates, are confirmed, overcoming 
the Darwinistic and exogenous assumptions of the replicator analysis 
(Metcalfe, 1998).
The replicator analysis, in fact, assumes the heterogeneity of firms in 
terms of given and exogenous, or randomly determined, differences in fit-
ness among species competing for scarce resources in a given environment. 
The larger the variance in terms of levels of fitness, the larger the rates 
of growth simply because the eventual survival of the species with higher 
fitness parameters and the exit of the weaker ones leads to a larger popula-
tion and faster rates of growth along the substitution process.
In the approach outlined far, instead, the larger is the variety and het-
erogeneity of firms, the larger are the research efforts that may eventually 
lead, with high levels of knowledge externalities provided by the system, 
to a faster rate of introduction (and creative adoption) of technological 
innovations, and hence larger rates of increase in total factor productiv-
ity (TFP). The positive relationship between heterogeneity, variety and 
variance of profitability, performances and rates of growth is confirmed. 
The determinants of the relationship, however, are completely different. 
In the standard replicator analysis, innovation is exogenous. Growth is 
determined by the diffusion of the exogenous innovation. In the analysis 
implemented so far, innovation is endogenous.
4.  LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE AND 
THE CREATIVE RESPONSE
The creative response of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions is con-
tingent upon the actual costs of knowledge. Knowledge costs are deter-
mined by the knowledge externalities available in the system. Knowledge 
externalities are pecuniary and diachronic. They make possible the use 
of knowledge spillovers at costs that are below the equilibrium levels 
of knowledge as a standard good. In turn the amount of knowledge 
externalities available in a system depends upon the quality of knowledge 
governance mechanisms at work in a system (Antonelli, 2017a, b).
Knowledge governance consists in the structure of knowledge gen-
eration activities; the organization of the architecture of knowledge of 
interactions and transactions; and the institutional set-up that makes the 
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accumulation of the stock of quasi-public knowledge possible and enables 
the use of that knowledge at low costs (Ostrom and Hess, 2006).
Because of the limited appropriability of knowledge, inventors can 
retain full control of the economic benefits stemming from the new tech-
nological knowledge they have generated only for a limited stretch of time. 
After that appropriation window, technological knowledge becomes a 
quasi-public good and contributes to the accumulation of a stock of quasi-
public knowledge that third parties can try to access as an indispensable 
complementary input in the recombinant generation of further knowledge 
(Weitzman, 1996).
High-quality knowledge governance mechanisms favour knowledge 
interactions along the vertical stages of the inter-sectoral division of labour 
with effective user–producer interactions that also include final markets, 
effective knowledge transmission between public and private research cen-
tres. They also reduce the exclusivity of intellectual property (IP) rights so 
as to support both the necessary rewards of knowledge producers and the 
widespread secondary uses of proprietary knowledge for the recombinant 
generation of new knowledge (Antonelli, 2015b).
The quality of knowledge governance mechanisms at work in the system 
plays a central role in this process on two counts: first, accumulation of 
the knowledge spilling from ‘inventors’ into the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge is contingent upon the quality of the knowledge governance 
mechanisms. In systems with poor knowledge governance mechanisms 
the uncontrolled spillover of knowledge dissipates in the atmosphere 
and results in slow rates of accumulation of the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge. In contrast, knowledge spillover effectively adds to the existing 
stock of quasi-public knowledge in systems endowed with high-quality 
knowledge governance mechanisms and low levels of dissipation. Second, 
access to and use of knowledge spilling from third parties accumulated in 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge is not free. Relevant absorption costs 
are necessary in order to search, identify, decode, access and finally (re)
use the knowledge available in the system. Knowledge absorption costs 
are reduced by effective knowledge governance mechanisms that favour 
search, screening and access to existing knowledge for new uses.
The actual levels of knowledge externalities, and hence of the costs of 
external knowledge, are determined by the amount of quasi-public knowl-
edge and the amount of absorption activities that are necessary to benefit 
and use it. When high-quality knowledge governance mechanisms are at 
work, firms can access external knowledge at low costs, far below equilib-
rium levels, both because of low absorption costs and the large amount of 
quasi-public knowledge. Productivity-enhancing innovations depend upon 
the actual access to knowledge spillovers that make external knowledge 
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indispensable in the recombinant generation of new knowledge, available 
at costs that are below equilibrium levels. In these systems, consequently, 
firms that try to cope with out-of-equilibrium conditions have more 
chances to implement creative responses and introduce technological 
innovations that reshape the map of isoquants.
Firms embedded in systems with poor knowledge governance mecha-
nisms experience high absorption costs of knowledge spillovers. The 
final costs of external knowledge are larger, actually close to the levels of 
knowledge costs if  it were a standard economic good. These firms cannot 
take advantage of knowledge externalities. Their response to emerging out-
of-equilibrium conditions is consequently adaptive. They try to cope with 
out-of-equilibrium conditions by means of technical changes that enable 
them to move on the existing map of isoquants.
The introduction of productivity-increasing innovations is strictly con-
tingent upon the properties of the system. For given levels of reactivity, 
the response of firms is actually creative according to the amount of 
knowledge externalities available in the system and their success – in 
terms of actual introduction of productivity enhancing innovations – is 
ultimately determined by: i) the actual costs of the external knowledge that 
is an indispensable input strictly complementary to the research efforts in 
the recombinant generation of new knowledge; and ii) the actual bottom-
line costs of the knowledge that enters the technology production function 
as a complementary input alongside the traditional tangible ones such as 
capital and labour.
Hence, for given levels of reactivity, a system and each agent within 
the system have more chances to select a creative rather than an adaptive 
response to out-of-equilibrium conditions, according to costs of access to 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge that, in turn, depend upon the quality 
of knowledge governance mechanisms at work in the system.
This result complements the outcome of the previous section according 
to which, for given levels of knowledge externalities, the larger the levels of 
reactivity, the larger the research efforts and hence the rate of introduction 
of innovations.
The analysis also makes it clear that the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanisms is fully endogenous: it is continually shaped and reshaped by 
firms’ conduct, by their levels of reactivity and by the actual rates of 
generation of new technological knowledge and eventual introduction of 
innovations. The quality of knowledge governance mechanisms may stay 
put through time, as well as improve and deteriorate. These processes are 
typically non-ergodic and yet far from deterministic: typically path rather 
than past dependent.
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5.  THE DYNAMICS OF THE CREATIVE RESPONSE: 
A GRAPHIC EXPOSITION
The elements introduced so far to explore the role of the engines of creative 
response can now be nested into a fully fledged system of interdependence 
that relates creative response to levels of reactivity, and hence to the actual 
amount of research that takes place in a system, the consequent amount of 
technological knowledge that can be generated taking into account levels of 
knowledge externalities and, consequently, the extent to which the response 
is creative and its effects in terms of the rate of introduction of innovations 
and the amount of output and TFP that can be achieved (see the Appendix).
Quadrant I of Figure 1.3 (starting from northwest) reproduces simply 
Figure 1.2. Starting with a given level of ΔΠ, the margin of actual profit-
ability and performances with respect to normal (average) profitability, this 
quadrant shows the effects of different levels of reactivity. With high levels 
of reactivity, firms are induced to the innovative effort RB clearly larger 
than RA that would take place with low levels of reactivity.
Quadrant II represents knowledge generation activities.2 Knowledge 
generation activities are far more productive when they can rely upon 
strong knowledge externalities that enable firms to access the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge at low costs. The innovative efforts yield a larger 
knowledge output (T), respectively found in F and G for more and less reac-
tive firms. When knowledge externalities do not support the generation of 
technological knowledge and access costs to the stock of the  quasi-public 
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Figure 1.3 The dynamics of the creative response
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knowledge are close to the equilibrium levels of knowledge – that is, as if  
it were a standard economic good with high levels of exhaustibility and 
appropriability3 – output is lower: respectively D and C for more and less 
reactive firms.
Quadrant III shows production activities. Technological knowledge 
(T) enters the production function as an input alongside the traditional 
tangible inputs, capital and labour. Assuming fixed levels of  capital and 
labour, this quadrant shows the effects of  the larger amount of  techno-
logical knowledge generated in Quadrant II on the production of  output 
(Y). For given levels of  reactivity, when T is larger than in equilibrium 
because of  the positive effects of  knowledge externalities, Y is larger than 
it would be when T matches equilibrium levels. As Quadrant III shows, 
when reactivity levels are high (RB) and knowledge externalities are effec-
tive, knowledge output TF is larger than TD at the levels that take place 
when knowledge externalities do not support the generation of  knowl-
edge at costs that are below equilibrium levels. By the same token, when 
reactivity levels are low (RA) and knowledge externalities are effective, 
knowledge output TG is larger than TC at the levels that take place when 
knowledge externalities do not support the generation of  knowledge 
at costs that are below equilibrium levels. The distances on the inferior 
vertical axis – (TG TC) and (TF TD) – measure the effects of  the lower costs 
of  technological knowledge on output Y and, as such, provide a reliable 
clue to the effects of  knowledge externalities on total factor productivity.
It is clear that a system endowed with high levels of both the reactivity 
of firms and the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms is better 
able to increase not only its rates of growth but also, and most importantly, 
its rates of increase of TFP: (TG TC) > (TF TD).
Firms’ levels of reactivity to out-of-equilibrium conditions and the qual-
ity of knowledge governance mechanisms that defines the actual amount 
of knowledge externalities are the drivers of the creative response. The 
larger the reactivity of firms and the higher the quality of the knowledge 
governance mechanisms, the larger the rates of introduction of innova-
tions, as measured by the amount of technological knowledge generated, 
and the growth of both output and TFP.
The system of interdependencies framed in Figure 1.1 provides the 
building blocks to explore Quadrant IV and to study the dynamics of the 
system. It is in fact clear that:
●● The larger the variance of profitability and performances levels, the 
higher the reactivity levels and the larger the amount of research 
efforts.
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●● The larger the amount of research efforts and the lower the costs of 
accessing and using the stock of quasi-public knowledge, the lower 
is the actual output of the knowledge generation activities. With 
a given budget firms that enjoy relevant knowledge externalities 
can take advantage of costs to access the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge that are below equilibrium levels and can generate more 
knowledge at costs that are below equilibrium.
●● The larger the knowledge output, the lower its costs and the larger 
the output Y of the technology production function and the levels 
of TFP.
●● The dynamics of the system for given and invariant levels of the qual-
ity of knowledge governance mechanisms exhibits the typical traits of 
a self-sustained process supported by positive feedback.
●● Because of the working of diachronic knowledge externalities 
according to which the flows of proprietary knowledge add to 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge, after a limited window of 
appropriation the larger the knowledge output at each point in time 
and, for invariant levels of knowledge governance, the larger the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge. Hence the lower are its costs and, 
consequently, knowledge costs are lower and the chances that firms 
are able to implement an effective creative response are higher.
●● The faster innovations are introduced and the larger the growth of 
TFP, the larger are likely to be the unexpected changes in factor and 
product markets that are at the origin of out-of-equilibrium condi-
tions levels of variety within the system. Variety and heterogeneity are 
more likely to be persistent, and actually may amplify in systems char-
acterized by fast introduction of innovation. A virtuous self-feeding 
process of creative disorder can actually enter in place, provided the 
quality of knowledge governance mechanisms is also persistent.
●● The lower the rates of introduction of innovation, due to low-quality 
knowledge governance mechanisms, and hence slow accumulation 
of the stock of quasi-public knowledge and high costs to access it, 
the lower the chances that creative responses actually can take place. 
The prevalence of adaptive responses reduces the heterogeneity of 
firms. The typical Marshallian search for equilibrium displays fully 
its effects: worst-performing firms are sorted out and the benchmark 
quality of outstanding ones is rapidly imitated by all the other firms. 
At the end of the Marshallian process heterogeneity is substituted by 
homogeneity, and equilibrium conditions prevail.
The quality of knowledge governance mechanisms is fragile and fully 
exposed to events that may take place along the process and change it. The 
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generation of new technological knowledge and the introduction of new 
technologies, at each point in time, can change (sometimes radically) the 
structure of the system, the organization of knowledge interactions and 
transactions, the architecture of knowledge networks and the institutional 
setting that qualify the knowledge governance mechanisms. Consequently, 
the system dynamics is path dependent, as opposed to past dependent, as 
it exhibits strong historic, non-ergodic elements, such as the amount of 
quasi-public knowledge, that depend upon the accumulation of generation 
flows. At the same time it is also exposed to possible degeneration of the 
quality of knowledge governance mechanisms brought about by the very 
dynamics of the process.
The decline in quality of knowledge governance mechanisms can easily 
stop the system dynamics, with two distinct negative effects: first, it reduces 
the rates of accumulation of the flows of new technological knowledge, 
and hence the increase in the stock of quasi-public knowledge. This has 
direct negative effects on the rates of reduction of the access costs of 
external knowledge that firms use as a necessary complementary input 
in the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge. Second, 
it increases the levels of absorption costs, and thus may actually lead to 
an increase in the cost of external knowledge. The consequences are clear. 
The likelihood that firms cam implement creative, rather than adaptive, 
responses declines with the consequent reduction in rates of technological 
change and increase in total factor productivity.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The notion of creative response is at the same time the synthesis of the 
Schumpeterian legacy and the foundation stone of a comprehensive plat-
form that uses the tools of evolutionary complexity able to accommodate 
in a coherent framework the understanding of endogenous innovation 
as an emergent system property. The notion of creative response enables 
us to go beyond the limitations and shortcomings of the evolutionary 
approaches that build upon biological metaphors. Innovation can be 
analysed as the outcome of the interdependence between individual 
decision-making and the properties of the system in which it takes place. 
The outcome of individual decision-making – the actual introduction of 
innovations – depends upon the characteristics of the system. The latter in 
turn is influenced by the outcomes of individual decision-making.
This chapter has explored the engines of the creative response: the levels 
of firms’ reactivity to out-of-equilibrium conditions and the properties 
of the system that support the creative response with the provision of 
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knowledge externalities that enable innovating firms to access and use the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge to generate new knowledge at costs that 
are below equilibrium levels.
The analysis has shown that low levels of reactivity reduce the amount 
of innovative efforts a system is able to mobilize. At the same time, high 
levels of reactivity without the support of appropriate levels of knowledge 
governance favour the rapid return to equilibrium levels, but not the 
actual introduction of innovations. High-quality knowledge governance 
mechanisms coupled with low levels of reactivity lead to slow rates of 
introduction of innovations and slow rates of increase in output and total 
factor productivity. In contrast, a system characterized by high levels of 
reactivity and high levels of knowledge governance enables firms to imple-
ment creative responses that lead to rapid introduction of innovation and 
fast rates of increase in output and TFP.
Systems characterized by high-quality and consistent knowledge gov-
ernance mechanisms and reactive managerial styles are likely to experience 
rapid introduction of innovations that feeds persistent growth via: i) the 
recreation of out-of-equilibrium conditions; ii) the accumulation of the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge; iii) the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanisms; and iv) the persistence of knowledge externalities. In such 
systems creative disorder is persistent and may last as long as the quality 
of knowledge governance mechanisms is able to cope with the dynamics of 
the system and is fortified rather than damaged by it. An endogenous loop 
of positive feedback supports the growth of the system and the persistence 
of out-of-equilibrium conditions.
Systems characterized by low-quality knowledge governance mecha-
nisms and managerial styles with low levels of reactivity are doomed to 
converge rapidly to equilibrium. The Marshallian search for equilibrium 
prevails when adaptive responses prevail over creative ones. The adaptive 
response prevails when the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms 
is poor, and, consequently, the amount of knowledge generated at each 
point in time is small and cumulates slowly, the access and secondary use 
costs of the stock of quasi-public knowledge are high, and search activities 
enable firms to engage in technical rather than technological changes. The 
variance of firms is quickly reduced by the exit of the worst-performing 
ones and the imitation of the advanced ones. Variety decreases together 
with variance and the slowdown of the rates of innovation, of increase in 
total factor productivity and in growth of output.
The implications for economic policy are clear. First, a managerial style 
able to integrate high levels of entrepreneurship helps improve system 
performance. The dichotomy between entrepreneurs and managers, where 
the former are associated with small firms and start-ups and the latter 
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with incumbent corporations, should be abandoned. Creative managers 
of large corporations are just as necessary as competent entrepreneurs in 
small firms and newcomers. Second, the quality of the knowledge govern-
ance mechanisms that rule the accumulation of the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge and its access and secondary use at low costs is a central asset 
of an economic system that assigns a central role to the rate of introduc-
tion of technological and organizational innovations.
Public policy should care about: the architecture of inter-sectoral flows 
of knowledge along the multi-stage user–producer interactions; the quality 
of the public research infrastructure; the interface between public and pri-
vate research centres; the mobility of skilled personnel among and between 
firms and the public research system; the working of the knowledge 
markets; the role of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS); the 
exclusivity of intellectual property rights so as to favour at the same time 
the appropriation of economic benefits stemming from the introduction 
of innovations as well as the useful dissemination and secondary uses of 
existing technological knowledge.
NOTES
1. In Figure 1.1 the quadratic relationship is symmetric: the response of firms to perform-
ances above and below the average is specular in shape. Internal financial constraints and 
credit rationing might reduce the ability of firms with below average performance – and 
even more below normal levels of profitability – to fund the necessary research activities. 
At the same time, however, firms performing above the average may use part of their 
profits to pay higher dividends to shareholders and higher wages to employees, and to 
fund other stakeholder benefits, reducing the amount of resources that can be used to 
fund internal R&D. The actual shape of the quadratic relationship is determined by the 
institutional set-up of financial markets, intellectual property rights, industrial relations, 
and product and factor markets.
2. The geometric representation posits contant returns to scale in knowledge generation 
activities. Diminishing returns to scale might be easily accomodated with a negative 
second derivative without altering the basic relationship.
3. Arrow (1962) identifies the special features of knowledge such as limited appropriability 
and exhaustibility, substantial indivisibility, cumulability and complementarity, and low 
costs of reproduction by confronting knowledge with respect to standard economic 
goods. The negative effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge on the incentives 
to its generation, with high-quality knowledge governance mechanisms and substantial 
levels of knowledge cumulability and indivisibility, can be more than compensated for 
by their positive effects in terms of spillovers and the consequent reduction in costs of 
knowledge below equilibrium levels.
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APPENDIX: A SIMPLE MODEL
Following the literature that impinges upon the constructionist design 
methodology (CDM) approach (Crépon et al., 1998), analysis of the 
engines of the creative response can be framed in a simple system of 
equations: i) the research function; ii) the knowledge generation function 
and its cost equation; iii) the external knowledge cost equation; and iv) the 
technology production function. Let us introduce them in turn.
The research function summarizes the relationship between out-of-
equilibrium conditions as measured by ΔΠ, that is, the difference between 
the levels of profitability and performance of each firm and normal ones 
in absolute terms – in other words, taking into account both profit and 
performance above and below the norm:
 R = f  (j ΔΠ) (1A.1)
where j measures the levels of reactivity.
The knowledge generation function formalizes the relationship between 
research efforts (R) and the actual output of knowledge (T) taking into 
account the stock of quasi-public knowledge (SQPT) available in the 
system, where m and n are their output elasticity. The Cobb–Douglas 
specification of the knowledge generation function makes explicit the strict 
complementarity between the stock of external knowledge drawn from 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge available in the system and the flow 
of internal research efforts. The cost equation includes on the left-hand 
side the amount of the research budget (R) that has been determined by 
equation (1A.1) and, on the right-hand side, the unit costs (r) of (R&D) 
activities and the search costs (u) that enable firms to access and use the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge:
 T = h (Rm SQPAn) (1A.2)
 R = rR&D + uSPQT (1A.3)
The size of the stock of quasi-public knowledge is fully endogenous. 
Because of diachronic knowledge externalities, in fact, it depends on the 
amount of knowledge flows that have been generated in previous time 
periods and the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms (KGM) that 
rule their accumulation process:
 SQPT 5 l aKGM, aaNt5nTtbb  (1A.4)
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The costs of accessing and using the stock of quasi-public knowledge are 
also endogenous as they depend on its size (SSPQT) and KGM:
 u = m (SSPQT, KGM), where h'< 0 (1A.5)
The unit cost of technological knowledge (z) is now fully endogenous:
 z = R/T (1A.6)
Finally, the technology production function specifies the relationship 
between output (Y), the standard inputs capital (K) and labour (L) and 
knowledge (T) produced in the upstream knowledge generation function, 
with their respective output elasticity a, b and g. Next to it is the standard 
cost equation, where r measures capital user costs, w wages and z the 
actual level of the cost of knowledge generated upstream that takes into 
account the effects of knowledge externalities. Equation (1A.7) includes 
the measure (A) of total factor productivity:
 Y = A (Ka Lb Tg) (1A.7)
 C = rK+ wl + zT (1A.8)
Because zT = R, it is evident that, for endogenous levels of R the lower 
the endogenous levels of z, the larger is T. Hence the levels of TFP are 
determined by the difference between the equilibrium levels of the cost of 
knowledge (g) that would take place if  it were a standard economic good 
and the actual costs of knowledge (z) that take into account the effects of 
upstream knowledge externalities:
 A = n (g − z) (1A.9)
When z = g firms are not able to introduce productivity-enhancing inno-
vations. The introduction of  such innovations takes place only when g > 
z, when the generation of  technological knowledge can rely on effective 
knowledge externalities that reduce the cost of  external knowledge (u) 
below equilibrium levels so that also the costs of  technological knowledge 
(z) as an intermediary and yet indispensable input in the technology 
production function are below equilibrium levels g (Antonelli, 2013, 
2017a, b).
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2.  Innovation as an emergent system 
property
Cristiano Antonelli and Gianluigi Ferraris
INTRODUCTION
The chapter develops an agent-based simulation model (ABM) of innova-
tion considered as an emerging property of a complex system. It explores 
how architectural, organizational and institutional variables – such as the 
spatial distribution of firms and intellectual property rights regimes – have 
an impact on innovative behaviours. Firms are considered as myopic 
agents that may react creatively to unexpected events. Their reaction may 
be adaptive or creative, according to the localized context of action. The 
reaction of agents may lead to the introduction of productivity-enhancing 
innovations if  and when the organization of the system is such that the 
reactive agents can actually take advantage of external knowledge available 
within the innovation system in which they are embedded. In this approach 
external knowledge is an indispensable factor, together with internal 
research activities, in the generation of new knowledge.
Our approach contributes a line of enquiry of evolutionary economics 
that emphasizes the role of interactions among agents within the organ-
ized complexity of economic systems. This approach differs from evolu-
tionary analyses of Darwinistic ascent where innovation is spontaneous 
and occurs randomly, in-house capacities are considered unique sources 
of novelty-creating activities and markets are credited with the role of 
selecting alternative novelties (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
In our approach innovation is an emerging property at the system level 
that takes place when the actions of individuals and the organization of 
the system match. Knowledge interactions among heterogeneous agents 
and the organization of the knowledge flows within the system play crucial 
roles in assessing the chances of individual firms actually introducing 
innovations. Access to external knowledge, together with internal learning 
and research, is viewed as indispensable for the generation of new knowl-
edge. The introduction of innovations is analysed as the result of systemic 
knowledge interactions between myopic agents that are credited with an 
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extended procedural rationality that includes forms of reaction. Such 
reactivity can be either adaptive or creative. The reaction of agents can 
be creative so as to engender the introduction of productivity-enhancing 
innovations when a number of contextual conditions that enable access to 
external knowledge are fulfilled (Anderson et al., 1988; Lane et al., 2009; 
Zhang, 2003; Antonelli, 2011).
The aim of the chapter is to show that, because of the relevance of 
external knowledge for the generation of new knowledge, the organization 
of the system articulated in the different institutional and architectural 
settings of the structure in which knowledge interactions take place affects 
the rate of new knowledge generation and the introduction of technologi-
cal innovations (Bischi et al., 2003). Using ABM methodology, the chapter 
shows that innovation is likely to emerge faster and better in organized 
complex systems characterized by high levels of dissemination and acces-
sibility to knowledge externalities.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section 
elaborates the theoretical framework and presents the building blocks of 
an approach that integrates the economics of innovation and complexity. 
We then present the ABM of the innovation system and the results of the 
simulation, focusing on an alternative hypothesis about the institutional 
and architectural features of the innovation system. The penultimate sec-
tion elaborates the policy implications of the results before the conclusions 
summarize the main results and put them into perspective.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents the basic assumptions and hypotheses about an 
economic system where innovation is characterized as the emergent prop-
erty of the system dynamics of knowledge interactions. The introduction 
of innovations is analysed as the possible result of systemic interactions 
between heterogeneous and myopic yet learning and reactive agents when 
and if  they can take advantage of external knowledge to make their reac-
tions creative as opposed to adaptive.
A Behavioral Approach Enriched by Creativity
There are direct links between the Schumpeterian legacy and the behav-
ioural theory of firms that have been poorly appreciated so far. Schumpeter 
(1947) in a landmark contribution introduces the notion of creative reac-
tion as a conclusive point of his theoretical elaboration. Schumpeterian 
firms are portrayed explicitly as myopic agents that are unable to foresee 
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all possible events and are occasionally surprised by unexpected events. 
Schumpeterian firms are myopic but have the ability to react and to rely on 
external resources in their reaction. Their reaction to changing economic 
environments can be either adaptive or creative. If  their reaction is adap-
tive, equilibrium conditions prevail and lead to traditional price/quantity 
adjustments with no innovation. Their reaction becomes creative, as 
opposed to adaptive, when knowledge interactions supported by a viable 
organization of the system makes it possible to access external knowledge 
in favourable conditions.1 Creative reaction engenders out-of-equilibrium 
conditions and, with appropriate external conditions, feeds a virtuous 
cycle of growth and change (Antonelli, 2011).
This Schumpeterian legacy is fully consistent and actually complemen-
tary with the basic assumptions of organizational behavioural theory 
elaborated by Jamie March and Herbert Simon (1958). In classic behav-
ioural theory firms are myopic: their rationality is bounded, as opposed 
to Olympian, because of the wide array of unexpected events, surprises 
and mistakes that characterize their decision-making and business conduct 
in a ever-changing environment. Firms, however, are endowed with an 
extended procedural rationality that includes the capacity to learn. Agents 
are intrinsically heterogeneous. They have distinctive and specific char-
acteristics that qualify their competence, the endowment of tangible and 
intangible inputs and their location in the space of interactions (Cyert and 
March, 1963; March, 1988, 1991).
In our approach agents can do more than adjust prices to quantities, and 
vice versa: they can try to react to changing conditions in their economic 
environment by means of the generation and exploitation of technological 
knowledge through the introduction of technological innovations. To 
innovate, firms mobilize their slack resources consisting in tacit knowledge 
and competence accumulated by means of internal learning processes 
(Leibenstein, 1976). Internal slack resources, however, are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to innovate. Reaction becomes creative only with 
the support of an organized complexity of the system in which firms are 
embedded.
A behavioural theory of a myopic but learning firm enriched by 
Schumpeterian creativity provides the basis for implementing a model of 
the economic complexity of technological change. In our approach firms 
try to innovate when their performance differs sharply from the average. 
Clear causality between performance, both negative and positive, is estab-
lished. When performance is below average firms are dissatisfied and try 
to change their routines. When performance is above average firms have 
more opportunities to fund risky activities. This out-of-equilibrium causal 
link, in a typical satisfying approach between performance and attempts 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   23 19/02/2018   13:42
24 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
to innovate, marks a clear difference from the approach post-Nelson and 
Winter where no causality is introduced and innovation is viewed as the 
spontaneous result of the behaviour of firms considered as individual 
agents.
Innovation and Knowledge
The introduction of technological and organizational innovations requires 
the generation of new knowledge. The generation of knowledge is charac-
terized by specific attributes: knowledge is simultaneously the output of a 
specific activity and an essential input in the generation of new knowledge. 
Because of knowledge indivisibility, access to existing knowledge at any 
point in time is a necessary condition for the generation of new knowledge. 
No firm can command all available knowledge; hence no firm can generate 
new technological knowledge alone. The twin character of knowledge 
as output of research and input in the generation of further knowledge 
stresses the basic complementarity and interdependence of agents in the 
innovation process: innovation is inherently the collective result of the 
interdependent and interactive intentional action of economic agents 
(Blume and Durlauf, 2001, 2005).
The structure of the system and its continual change, following Simon 
Kuznets’s analysis, play crucial roles. The system’s organization and 
structure affect the architecture of knowledge externalities, interactions 
and transactions and play crucial roles in access to external knowledge, 
and hence in defining the actual chances of agents implementing their 
reactions and making them creative as opposed to adaptive (Silva and 
Teixeira, 2009).
Technological knowledge is viewed as the product of recombining exist-
ing ideas, both diachronically and synchronically. The generation of new 
knowledge stems from the search and identification of elements of knowl-
edge that had not been considered previously, and their subsequent active 
inclusion and integration in the pre-existing components of each firm’s 
knowledge base (Weitzman, 1996, 1998; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001).
Marshallian externalities as implemented by the notion of generative 
interactions play a central role in this approach (Lane and Maxfield, 
1997). The amount of knowledge externalities and interactions avail-
able to each firm influences their ability to generate new technological 
knowledge, hence the actual possibility to make their reaction adaptive 
rather than creative and able to introduce localized technological changes. 
Each myopic agent has access only to local knowledge interactions and 
externalities; that is, no one agent knows what every other agent in the 
system at large knows. Because of the localized character of knowledge 
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externalities and interaction, location in a multidimensional space, in 
terms of distance between agents and their density, matters. Interactions 
in fact are localized as opposed to global. At each point in time agents are 
rooted within networks of transactions and interactions that are specific 
subsets of the broader array of knowledge externalities, interactions and 
transactions that take place in the system. In the long term, however, they 
can move in space and change their location in the networks. In so doing 
they change the organization of the system.
Contingent Factors Influencing Innovative vs. Adaptive Behaviours
Appropriate structural and institutional characteristics of the system 
upgrade the reaction of firms and help make it actually creative, and hence 
engender the introduction of productivity-enhancing innovations. Only 
when the role of such external and complementary systemic conditions is 
taken into account can the role of innovation as the productivity-enhancing 
result of an intentional action be articulated. System organization plays a 
key role as it shapes access to external knowledge. When the role of the 
external context is properly appreciated, it becomes clear that innovation 
is not only the result of the intentional action of each individual agent; it 
is also the endogenous product of system dynamics. Individual action and 
the organization of the system conditions are crucial and complementary 
ingredients in explaining the emergence of innovations (Lane et al., 2009).
Positive feedback takes place when the external conditions in which each 
firm is localized qualify the access to external knowledge so as to make 
the reaction of firms creative as opposed to adaptive. When the access 
conditions to local pools of knowledge enable the actual generation of new 
technological knowledge and feed the introduction of innovations, actual 
gales of technological change may emerge. The wider the access to local 
pools of knowledge, the greater the likelihood that firms are induced to 
react. The larger the number of firms that react and the better the access 
conditions to external knowledge, the stronger the chances that their 
reactions are creative: technological change becomes a generalized and 
collective process (Arthur, 1990, 1994, 2009).
In such a context innovation is an emergent property that takes place 
when complexity is ‘organized’, that is, when a number of complementary 
conditions enable the creative reaction of agents and make it possible to 
introduce innovations that actually increase their efficiency. The dynamics 
of complex systems is based upon a combination of agents’ reactivity, 
caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions, and features of the system in 
which each agent is embedded in terms of externalities, interactions and 
positive feedback that enables the generation of localized technological 
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change and leads to endogenous structural change (Anderson et al., 1988; 
Arthur et al., 1997; Lane et al., 2009).
Innovation is the endogenous result of system dynamics: it does not 
fall from heaven, as standard economics suggests; neither is it the result 
of random variation, as some evolutionary approaches –with their with 
strong Darwinistic traits where mutation take place randomly – consist-
ently contend. Agents react and succeed in their creative reactions when 
a number of contingent external conditions apply at the system level. 
Innovation is the result of the collective economic action of agents:
innovation is a path-dependent, collective process that takes place in a localized 
context, if, when and where a sufficient number of creative reactions are made 
in a coherent, complementary and consistent way. As such innovation is one 
of the key emergent properties of an economic system viewed as a dynamic 
complex system. (Antonelli, 2008a: 1)
Appreciation of the systemic conditions that shape and make innovations 
possible, together with their individual causes leads to the identification of 
innovation as an emergent property of a system. Our approach provides 
a solution to the conundrum of an intentional economic action whose 
rewards are larger than its costs. This can happen only if  the complexity 
of the system is appreciated. The introduction of innovations that make 
it possible to enhance the productivity and efficiency of the system can 
in fact take place only as the emergent property of an organized system 
complexity, and in turn organized complexity, is explained as an endog-
enous and dynamic process engendered by the interactions of rent-seeking 
agents trying to cope with the ever-changing conditions of their product 
and factor markets (Antonelli, 2009, 2011).
Architectural and Institutional Trade-Offs
In this context, because of the twin character of knowledge as output of 
research and input in further knowledge, two knowledge dissemination 
trade-offs take place. The first relates to the structure of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regimes; the second relates to the distribution of 
knowledge generation activities in economic, regional and knowledge 
space. Let us analyse them in turn.
The intellectual property rights trade-off
The structure of IPR regimes– the scope of patents, their duration, 
assignment procedures and their exclusivity – plays a crucial role. Strong 
IPR regimes increase the appropriability of technological knowledge 
as they limit leakage of information and delay uncontrolled knowledge 
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dissipation. Innovators can secure for a longer period of time the benefits 
stemming from the generation of new technological knowledge and the 
introduction of new technologies. Strong IPR regimes increase the innova-
tors’ opportunities to exploit technological knowledge. Consequently 
strong regimes enhance incentives to the generation of new knowledge and 
hence help increase the amount of resources that would be committed to it. 
Strong IPR regimes, however, reduce both the static and the dynamic effi-
ciency of economic and innovation systems. Strong regimes increase the 
duration of monopolistic power in the product markets and the appropria-
tion of consumer surplus by innovative suppliers. These regimes, however, 
reduce the dynamic efficiency of innovation systems because they prevent 
and delay access to existing knowledge as an input in the generation of 
new knowledge, and hence reduce the efficiency of the recombination 
process that leads to the generation of new technological knowledge. The 
combined effect of strong property rights regimes in fact is to increase the 
incentives to generate research, and hence resources; but there is a reduc-
tion in their efficiency because at each point in time available knowledge 
cannot be used to recombine and generate new knowledge and must be 
reinvented. Strong IPR regimes risk increasing the replication of research 
efforts and slowing the pace of recombinant generation of technological 
knowledge. This knowledge trade-off  requires the fine-tuning of intellec-
tual property rights with the identification of the proper mix of protecting 
appropriability on the one hand and disseminating available knowledge on 
the other.
The architectural trade-off
The architectural characteristics of the network of interactions that 
qualify each economic system have powerful consequences for the actual 
capability of each economic agent to generate new technological knowl-
edge. The distribution in regional and knowledge space of knowledge 
generation activities has important effects. Because of the pervasive role 
of external knowledge in the recombinant generation of new technological 
knowledge the regional concentration of knowledge generating activities 
may increase the pace of technological advance. Proximity, in fact, helps 
the identification of useful external knowledge, and hence reduces search 
and exploration costs. Proximity in regional space helps reduce the risks 
of opportunistic behaviours because of increased interaction, and hence 
helps limit transaction costs; and, finally, proximity increases the homoge-
neity of codes and favours the absorption of external knowledge. Excess 
concentration may favour the forging ahead of small but effective clusters 
of highly innovative groups of firms strongly interconnected and able to 
interact quickly. At the same time, however, excess concentration might be 
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identified where the rest of the system is cut off  from the flows of creative 
interactions and the dissemination of new knowledge is delayed. Excess 
concentration risks reducing knowledge variety and the related oppor-
tunities for knowledge recombination. The dissemination of knowledge 
generating activities may help stimulate the recombinant generation of 
new knowledge because of the wider participation of a larger number of 
heterogeneous agents in the collective endeavour that leads to the genera-
tion of new knowledge. Once more it is clear that a knowledge trade-off  
between the concentration and dissemination of knowledge generating 
activities takes place with important policy implications for the best alloca-
tion of additional research resources and activities through regional space 
(Page, 2011).
Agent-based models can help structure the dynamic properties of the 
system in a rigorous framework of analysis so as to provide a context in 
which the implementation of simulation techniques can exhibit the differ-
ent results of alternative structures of knowledge interaction mechanisms 
and IPR regimes.2 This exercise can contribute to an approach that adapts 
complex system dynamics to economics where technological change is the 
central engine of the evolving system dynamics and the result of the crea-
tive response of intentional agents embedded in an evolving architecture 
of market, social and knowledge interactions (Aghion et al., 2009; Terna, 
2009).
Modelling an economic system where technological change can take 
place implements the basic intuitions of complexity theory and innovation 
economics. The model will enable firms to identify proper solutions to the 
two knowledge trade-offs identified with respect to the structure of IPR 
regimes and the regional distribution of knowledge generation activities.
Let us now turn our attention to analysing the building blocks of our 
agent-based simulation model. The following section shows how the use 
of the basic tools of ABM can implement a rigorous representation of the 
dynamics of a fully fledged economic system where agents can generate 
technological knowledge and technological innovations, provided a condu-
cive architecture of network interactions and an effective IPR regime are 
implemented.
THE SIMULATION MODEL
The system of interactions and transactions that qualify the simple but 
articulated economic system outlined in the previous section can be 
explored by means of ABM in order to investigate the dynamics of the 
innovation process at the system level. ABM provides us with the oppor-
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tunity to explore the full range of implications of a multilevel structure of 
interactions and transactions as framed in the previous section and to take 
into account the outcomes of the decisions taken by each heterogeneous 
agent (Pyka and Werker, 2009; Terna, 2009).
The ABM implemented in this section operationalizes, through inter-
actions among a large number of objects representing the agents of 
our system, a typical complex process characterized by the key role of 
Marshallian externalities and augmented by the Schumpeterian assump-
tion that firms can try to innovate according to their performance levels 
and local contexts (Dawid, 2006).
The model assumes that firms are boundedly rational but endowed with 
procedural rationality enriched by the ability to react and innovate when 
and if  a number of external circumstances are provided. The rationality of 
their behaviour is objective as opposed to subjective. Firms do in fact react 
to the dynamics of both product and factor markets, but never maximize. 
Their reaction includes the possibility to innovate instead of merely adjust-
ing quantities to prices.
In the ABM supply and demand meet in the market place; production 
is decided ex ante; firms try to sell their products in the market, where 
customers spend their income. The matching of demand and supply sets 
temporary prices that define firms’ performance. According to the levels 
of their performance and the availability of external knowledge firms can 
fund dedicated research activities to try to innovate (Lane et al., 2009).
In the simulation, heterogeneous firms produce homogeneous products 
sold into a single market. In the product markets households expend rev-
enues stemming from wages (including research fees) and the net profits of 
shareholders. In the input markets the derived demand of the firms meets 
the supply of labour provided by workers, including researchers. For the 
sake of simplicity, no financial institutions have been activated, and nor 
can payments be postponed. Shareholders supply the whole capital of the 
firms and all the commercial transactions are immediately cleared (Figure 
2.1).
Market clearing mechanisms based exclusively upon prices maintain 
perfect equilibrium between demand and supply. Such equilibrium is 
ensured for both the product and the factor market: the quantities deter-
mine the correct price to ensure the whole production is sold. No friction 
or waiting times are simulated; factors are assumed to be immediately 
available. Here joint reference to the Marshallian and Schumpeterian lega-
cies plays a key role in understanding the working of such markets. At each 
point in time the market equilibrium is typically Marshallian as opposed 
to Walrasian. Here exchanges occur after production. Production has been 
taking place according to the plans based upon the expectations, beliefs 
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and technological competence of each agent. For each transient market 
price, because agents are heterogeneous, some make profits and others 
incur losses. Following the Schumpeterian traits of our model, however, 
no convergence can take place as long as firms introduce innovations and 
hence keep changing the attractors.
The production function is very simple in order to avoid matters related 
to different production processes, input availability, warehouse cycles and 
so on: output depends exclusively on the amount of employed work and 
productivity. Both labour and productivity vary among firms: labour 
depends on the entrepreneur’s decision about the growth of the produc-
tion; productivity is a function of the technological level the firm achieved 
through innovation.
The entire output is sold in the single product market, where rev-
enue equals the sum of wages, dividends and research expenses and price 
depends on liquidity. According to temporary price levels, profits are com-
puted as the difference between income and expenses, no taxes are paid 
and no part of the profit can be retained in the enterprise. Shareholders 
will either receive the profits or reintegrate the losses.
Heterogeneous firms are localized in an economic structure represented 
as a regional and technological space. Both spaces are managed as grids 
divided into cells, each of which can host an unlimited number of firms. 
Position in the regional grid determines the neighbourhood in which firms 
can observe their competitors, comparing results. The position of each 
firm in the technological grid measures its productivity and defines the 
possibility to access quasi-public knowledge. The distribution in the two 
space dimensions is not consistent: firms technologically very close could 
Capital, payment for products
Workers
Shareholders
Researchers
Consumers
Work, research Factors market
Products market
Fluxes into the simulated economy
Enterprises
Products
Wages, dividends
Figure 2.1 Fluxes in the simulated economy
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be positioned in far distant cells of the regional space, and vice versa. In 
this way the absorption of technological knowledge spilling from firms 
based in regional and technological proximity may enable the introduction 
of an innovation with positive effects in terms of productivity growth.
The localization of agents in both space dimensions is the result of 
their past activities, and yet it can be changed at each point in time. The 
results obtained during a production and consumption cycle influence the 
strategies the agents will take during the next cycle. Hence the dynamics 
of the model is typically characterized by path dependence: the dynamics 
in fact is non-ergodic because history matters and irreversibility limits 
and qualifies the alternative options at each point in time. At each point 
in time, however, the effects of the initial conditions may be balanced by 
occasional events that may alter the ‘path’, that is, the direction and pace 
of the dynamics (David, 2007).
The firms in the model, in fact, are always comparing their performance 
in terms of profits to their neighbours’ average results, with the difference 
between own figures and neighbours’ averages increasing the motivation 
to innovate. Transparency is clearly local: the ray within which firms can 
observe the conduct of other firms is limited accordingly by a parameter 
value. Beyond that ray information is scarce and costly. The further profit-
ability is from the average, the deeper the out-of-equilibrium conditions. 
Firms can innovate if  the results are below average, to improve their per-
formance, as well as when results are above average, to take advantage of 
abundant liquidity and reduced opportunity costs for risky undertakings. 
Innovation is viewed as the possible result of intentional decision-making 
that takes place in out-of-equilibrium conditions. The further away the 
firm is from equilibrium, the stronger the likelihood for innovation to take 
place. Hence we assume a U-relationship between levels of profitability 
and innovative activity, as measured by the rates of increase of total factor 
productivity (Antonelli and Scellato, 2011).
Summarizing, a firm increases its motivation to innovate each time its 
performance is found to be far enough from the average. Such a motivation 
becomes stronger and stronger if  the enterprise’s relative position remains 
outside a band for several and consecutive production cycles: after a 
parametrically set number of consecutive cycles the enterprise performs an 
innovation trial.
Simulation of the Innovation Process
ABM enables us to explore in detail the innovation process and the role 
within it of the external factors that shape the recombinant generation of 
technological knowledge. At each point in time firms can react so as to 
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try to increase their productivity. Hence they can move and change their 
regional and technological localization by means of research costs. The 
research costs are directly related to the actions performed by each firm to 
innovate, namely:
●● mobilizing internal slack competence;
●● absorbing external knowledge spilling from neighbours;
●● moving to other location in order to exploit more developed 
neighbours.
We assume a sequence of innovative steps. At first firms try to mobilize 
their own internal slack competence. Firms with insufficient potential try 
to absorb the external technological knowledge spilling from a neighbour 
and, if  knowledge absorption is not possible, they can move randomly to 
another location in the physical space. Let us consider these actions in turn.
Mobilization
Firms can mobilize their internal slack competence accumulated by means 
of learning processes. The firms in the model are endowed with the ability 
to learn better ways of performing their production cycles. After every 
production cycle firms acquire and cumulate some technological potential. 
Such potential can be transformed into actual innovation only by means 
of appropriate research activities and access to external knowledge. Firms 
are able to build up competence by means of learning processes. The 
accumulation of experience proceeds at a specific internal ‘learning rate’ 
that is biased by the impact of external ‘learning factors’ that reflect the 
competence level of the enterprises’ locality, measured as the average pro-
ductivity of neighbouring enterprises. The competence can be transformed 
into real innovation when a parametrical threshold is reached, at a cost. 
Because the internal slack competence is seldom sufficient to support the 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge, and hence the 
actual introduction of a productivity-enhancing innovation, firms explore 
their local technological and regional space and try to access and absorb 
the knowledge of their neighbours (March, 1991).
Absorption
Absorption enables firms to take advantage of technology introduced by 
other firms; because of absorbing costs, however, this is not free. Effective 
access to external technological knowledge requires substantial resources 
in exploration, identification, decodification and integration into the inter-
nal knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Moreover, because 
of bounded rationality, firms can observe only other firms in a certain 
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neighbourhood whose extension depends on a ‘view’ parameter; this value 
limits the number of positions all around the agent it can explore. Due to 
the fact that the simulated world is managed as a grid the agent’s position 
can limit this view: agents in a corner have less possibility to observe than 
others located in the middle of the grid, whereas agents in a very crowded 
neighbours have more information than isolated firms. Note that a single 
position on the grid could contain several agents, so simply by exploring its 
cell an agent may find other firms to observe.
The view parameter determines only the number of cells the agent can 
access; the real number of other firms it can observe depends on the evolu-
tion of the agent’s distribution and constitutes an emerging phenomenon 
that continuously evolves during the simulation. When the agent is located 
near the end of the grid its capability falls dramatically.
A major constraint to the possibility to take advantage of and absorb 
others’ technologies is represented by intellectual property rights. In 
order to model a credible IPR regime we allow enterprises to patent their 
technology and hence retain exclusive exploitation rights for a certain 
number of cycles (Reichman, 2000). By observing other firms each firm 
knows the latest technological level they apply that is not covered by a 
patent licence. The key parameter ‘patent expiration’ (pe) is used to test 
different scenarios; its value determines the number of production cycles 
each innovation remains hidden from competitors. It is plausible to expect 
that the longer the patent period value of the patent expiration parameter, 
the higher will be the research effort: unless enterprises are given the 
exclusive possibility to exploit the research results, no private firms would 
be interested in investing money because their discovery would be imme-
diately available to competitors. In the model, even with patent expiration 
equal to zero, the new technology is exploited exclusively by the innovating 
enterprise for almost one cycle.
Observed technologies can be absorbed only if  the distance between 
them and the firm’s own is less than a parametrical value, the so-called 
‘knowledge absorption threshold’. This limitation has been introduced 
to avoid dramatic jumps in the productivity of firms that would be not 
plausible. Knowledge absorption has a cost equal to the named distance. 
Because the possibility to observe neighbours depends on the position of 
each enterprise in the physical space, when knowledge absorption gives 
poor or null results enterprises could decide to move to another location in 
order to meet better technological conditions.
Relocalization
The third way to improving productivity levels consists in moving around 
the physical space in order to reach more interesting neighbours. When 
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the mobilization of competence and knowledge absorption are not viable 
solutions, firms can try to move randomly to another location in the hope 
of finding better-developed zones. Movement is limited by a parameter 
called ‘jump’, whose value determines the maximum number of cells the 
firm can go through (vertically, horizontally, backwards or forwards). The 
effective number of cells the enterprise will move is determined randomly 
in this range, which constitutes a von Neumann neighbourhood. Moving 
costs are directly related to the distance between the original and the new 
location.
Here we see how the structure of the system influences in several ways 
the innovation chances of an enterprise: learning is faster for firms that 
operate in a well-developed neighbourhood, and imitators have better 
opportunities to observe and copy if  they operate in a crowded and tech-
nologically advanced environment (Ozman, 2009).
Firms are endowed, at the start of the simulation, with a competence 
and a technological level randomly chosen for each in the lowest quarter of 
possible values, following a uniform probability distribution. The simula-
tions started with low-skilled firms with uniform distribution among them, 
both to give each firm the possibility to express its own development path 
and a similar starting situation to analyse the different development paths.
In the real world, knowledge centres such as universities, technical and 
management schools and so on are located unevenly in the geographical 
territory, with clear effects. A large amount of evidence confirms that firms 
operating in geographical regions with a high density of such organizations 
have better chances to access higher levels of knowledge. To introduce these 
aspects in the simulation model we have represented geographical regions 
by physical spaces where competence is distributed following different con-
figurations, from full concentration in a limited space to well-disseminated 
distribution. Knowledge centres are represented by firms with a very high 
technological level (so-called ‘genius’) whose initial knowledge endowment 
is randomly tossed within the highest quarter of the possible values, 
whereas ‘normal’ agents are given values in the lowest one.
Neighbours can take advantage of the external knowledge spilling 
from the ‘genius’ firm within the boundaries of the knowledge absorption 
threshold value set up for the simulation. Hence the higher the knowledge 
absorption possibility, the stronger is the influence of the genius on its 
neighbours. Patent duration does not slow the effect because the initial 
knowledge is assumed to be an old and public one.
In order to experience different scenarios the number of genius firms is 
parametrically managed and could be set to zero to exclude this effect. The 
distribution in space of agents is random at the beginning of the process, 
but it becomes fully endogenous as agents are credited with the ability to 
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move in regional space, searching for access to external knowledge spilling 
in the proximity of ‘genius’. Hence the dynamics of the regional distribu-
tion of agents exhibits the typical traits of path dependence. The process is 
non-ergodic but not past dependent: small variations can exert important 
effects in terms of the emergence of strong clusters or, conversely, progres-
sive dissemination in space (D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 2006; Antonelli, 
2008).
RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS
The strength of the ABM consists in the possibility to assess in a coherent 
and structured framework the systemic consequences of alternative struc-
tural configurations of the system properties. Simulation techniques allow 
us to explore the outcomes of different hypotheses concerning key issues 
of the model within a structured and consistent framework that takes into 
account the full set of direct and indirect effects of the interactions of 
agents (Pyka and Werker, 2009).
The results of the simulation confirm that the model is consistent and 
able to mimic the working of a complex system where rent-seeking agents 
react to the changing conditions of the product and factor markets. Hence 
the results confirm that the set of equations is able to portray the working 
of a complex system based upon a large number of heterogeneous agents 
on both the demand and the supply side that are price takers in product 
markets. Markets clear with temporary equilibrium price. Replication of 
the temporary equilibrium price in the long term confirms that the model 
is appropriate to explore the general features of the system when the 
reaction of firms is adaptive and consists in price to quantity adjustments. 
In the extreme case where firms cannot innovate for the lack of internal 
competence to be mobilized and external knowledge to be absorbed, the 
system mimics effectively the working of static general equilibrium in 
conditions of allocative and productive efficiency, but with no dynamic 
efficiency. The markets sort out the worst-performing firms and drive 
prices to the minimum production costs. This result is important because 
it confirms that static general equilibrium is the simple and elementary 
form of complexity that takes place when agents cannot innovate. As soon 
as agents try and succeed in their reaction to changing market conditions 
with the introduction of innovations, the equilibrium conditions become 
dynamic and all the key features of the system – such as prices, quantities, 
efficiency and structure – keep changing (Antonelli, 2011).
Innovation is effectively an emerging property of the system because it 
takes place when the external conditions and the structure of the system 
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provide access to the external knowledge that is crucial to feed the effective 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge, and hence the 
actual introduction of productivity enhancing innovations by firms that 
try to cope with the changing conditions of the system by doing more than 
merely adjusting prices to quantities.
Access to external knowledge is necessary to achieve the effective 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge and to eventually 
introduce new technologies. The structural characteristics of the system 
in which firms are embedded are crucial to enable the reaction to become 
creative, and hence to introduce innovations that increase their productiv-
ity. The simulations provide key information about the two knowledge 
trade-offs and enable us to assess the systemic effects in terms of dynamic 
efficiency of alternative configurations of the IPR regimes and architec-
tures of the network interactions We have explored the consequences of 
two sets of hypotheses: i) the effects of different durations patents; and 
ii) the effects of different architectural properties of the system in terms 
of the distribution of firms with high levels of technological competence.
The effective recombinant generation of technological knowledge and 
the consequent introduction of technological innovations is tracked and 
quantified in terms of productivity growth, measured as the ratio of input 
to output. Firms that are able to take advantage of knowledge externalities 
to successfully generate new technological change, and hence to introduce 
better technologies, will experience an increase in the general levels of 
efficiency of their production process and will experience higher mark-ups 
with evident positive consequences on productivity levels.
The changes in productivity levels affect the system dynamics not only 
in terms of average growth rates but also in terms of variance. Growth-
cum-technological change is far from a steady increase. On the contrary, 
it exhibits fluctuations that are typical of the long-term Schumpeterian 
process of creative destruction. Occasionally the majority of firms incur 
major losses due to mismatch between their current cost conditions and 
the performance of a few radical innovators able to introduce break-
through innovations. In a typical Schumpeterian process we see that the 
introduction of radical innovations engenders occasional phases of decline 
in output. It is interesting to note that the fluctuations are sharper when 
the pace of technological change is higher and, more specifically, in the 
configurations of spatial distribution and appropriability regimes that 
increase the rates of introduction of technological innovation, and hence 
of productivity growth.
Let us now consider in turn the alternative results that are obtained with 
different structural configurations of both IPR regimes and the spatial 
distribution of firms.
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The First Knowledge Trade-Off: Intellectual Property Rights Regimes
The first question the simulation has been employed to investigate con-
cerns the role of patent protection in promoting and sustaining innovation. 
The well-known IPR trade-off  can now be investigated (Harison, 2008; 
Vandekerckhove and De Bondt, 2008).
Intellectual property rights enable firms to secure exclusive rights 
on the technological knowledge they have generated. By means of IPR 
enterprises can exclude competitors from the exploitation of such new 
technologies and consolidate an effective competitive advantage. At the 
micro-level patent protection reinforces the motivation to innovate, giving 
an enterprise the possibility to exploit its own innovation in an exclusive 
way (hereafter ‘reinforcing effect’).
Moving from our basic assumption that the introduction of innovations 
builds upon in the recombination of existing knowledge, it is clear that 
patent protection has a negative effect: the longer the protection lasts, the 
slower the new technologies can spread among firms (hereafter ‘slowing 
effect’) (Gay et al., 2008). This research investigates both effects, focusing 
on the influence they have on the innovation process. The simulations were 
run using the following set-up:
●● All the firms (agents) operated in a common market and district.
●● All the firms started from a similar technological level, randomly 
tossed into the first quarter of the achievable technologies following 
a uniform distribution.
●● Each firm was given high capability to observe neighbours and 
absorb external knowledge.
●● The unique parameter that varied among the simulations was ‘patent 
expiration’ – the time, in production cycles, that a new technology 
was owned by the innovator and not available to the other agents in 
the system.
●● The probability of firms trying to innovate even if  their results are 
similar to their neighbours’ is positively correlated to patent expira-
tion if  its is less than 100; for values greater than 100 no innovation 
at all is pursued by the firms unless their results differ greatly from 
their neighbours’.
Two sets of experiments were executed, both based upon observation 
of the average productivity level the agents achieved after a determined 
number of production cycles. In the model productivity is positively 
correlated to the technology, so the more a firm innovates the higher is its 
productivity. By observing the dynamics of the productivity it is possible to 
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study the effects of the institutional and regional context on the innovation 
strategy of the firms.
The first set of  experiments consisted in benchmarking the innova-
tion to explore the difference in the results in terms of  productivity 
levels obtained with several different patent protection durations and 
a benchmark figure represented by the productivity level the agents 
achieved with patent expiration set to one. To ensure the results were 
robust and systematic, each simulation was run ten times by varying, for 
each run, the seed employed to generate pseudo-random numbers; the 
result of  each experiment was computed as the average of  the ten runs. 
The second set of  experiments consisted in correlating innovation and 
patent expiration: 50 simulations were run, varying each time both the 
random seed and the patent expiration parameter; the value was ran-
domly tossed following a uniform distribution into the interval:]1255[. 
The described approach ensured both the robustness of  the results and 
the independence of  the parameters set up from any researcher’s mental 
schemata.
Benchmarking the productivity
Figure 2.2 shows the average results obtained in five different based upon 
diverse values for the patent expiration parameters. The results of the first 
one (patent expiration set to one) constitute our benchmark. Each experi-
ment consisted in running for several times (ten in this case) a simulation 
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Figure 2.2 Histogram representing the results of the simulations
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covering 500 whole production–consumption cycles, with a determined 
value for the patent expiration parameter and different random seed. The 
results of each simulation have been summarized by means of the average 
productivity value computed tacking the reached values of each firm into 
the population of the model.
The distribution of  those average values exhibited a very low vari-
ance, allowing their use as the representative values and suggesting that 
the results were robust and fully independent of  the different random 
number distributions generated for each simulation starting from a 
diverse seed.
Figure 2.2 shows that the four scenarios 8, 55, 144, 233 were not able 
to achieve the benchmark (scenario 1); because the productivity level 
directly depended on the achieved technological level, it would mean that 
the reinforcing effect was systematically weaker than the slowing one. In 
sum, the results confirm that the stronger the IPR protection (the more 
extended in time the patent protection was), the slower the innovation 
process proceeded.
Figure 2.3 shows in more detail that in all the simulations the results 
were systematically higher the lower the patent expiration.
Figure 2.4 better shows the trend of the phenomena by drawing on the 
minimum and maximum results obtained in each experiment.
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Figure 2.3 Results reached in each of the ten simulations
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Correlating innovation and patent expiration
Figure 2.5 shows an early correlation between patent duration and 
productivity levels that the simulated economy reaches by grouping each 
set of five simulations, picking the first, second and so on of each experi-
ment under different values of patent expiration. The results obtained by 
running 50 simulations, 500 production cycles long with random values 
for patent expiration demonstrate the existence of a negative correlation 
between patent rights and innovation.
The longer the patent right, the less the productivity level grows, as 
graphically illustrated by Figure 2.6. The obtained correlation index is 
about −0.9; the distribution of the obtained results shows a remarkable 
relative difference between the best case (patent expiration = 6) and the 
worst (patent expiration = 214).
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 illustrate, respectively, the distribution of 
average productivity values and distribution of  the relative difference 
between each value and the worst case. The productivity difference 
(dp) was computed as dpi = pi/min(p) – 1, where pi represents the 
max.
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Figure 2.4  Results of the experiments related to the patent expiration 
parameter
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productivity of  the i-th experiments and min(p) the minimum produc-
tivity level achieved in all the experiments. A similar algorithm was 
employed to compute the patent expiration difference (dpe): dpei = pei/
max(pe) – 1.
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The Second Knowledge Trade-Off: The Regional Dissemination of 
Knowledge
The second issue addressed by the simulations concerns the role of the 
distribution in regional space of knowledge generating institutions such as 
research laboratories, universities and so on in promoting and sustaining 
innovation.
We want to test the hypothesis that the dissemination of knowledge 
favours system growth. This very first stage of the research has been 
focused on the influence that different architectural distributions of the 
knowledge producers (KPs) have on the dynamic of the innovation proc-
ess. The distribution in regional space of KPs is a valuable source of the 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge as they provide 
the opportunity to all the other co-localized agents to access part of their 
proprietary knowledge in the form of knowledge spillovers (Ozman, 2009).
In order to maintain the model at a useful level of simplicity, the KPs 
have been dummied by some highly evolved firms whose distribution will 
affect the possibility of other firms taking advantage of the technological 
knowledge spilling from them.
The distribution of knowledge has been simulated by inserting a small 
number of firms endowed with a high level of technological knowledge 
(genius) into an environment populated by a wide set of less-developed 
firms. The different distributions and numbers of genius firms have been 
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Figure 2.7 Distribution of relative differences versus the worst case
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studied in several scenarios, that is, under diverse set-up of some basic 
parameters that determine the quality of information available, the limits 
of the physical relocation, the ability to observe and copy others’ strategy 
and so on.
Four different distributions for knowledge producers have been com-
pared by observing their effects on the evolution of productivity; to ensure 
the distributions were stable knowledge producers were not allowed to 
change their position in the physical space. In the four spaces we find 250 
normal firms and a certain number of knowledge-intensive ones (KPs). In 
each space the distribution of the high-tech firms is set up as follows:
●● one high-knowledge district (hkd): all the KPs are placed very close 
together in a small area at the centre of the space;
●● two hkds: the total number of KPs is split between two areas, one at 
the centre of the right upper quarter of the space and the other at the 
centre of the left lower one;
●● four hkds: the KPs are distributed around four points at the centre 
of each quarter the whole space could be divided into;
●● no hkds: each KP is assigned a random position in the space and 
lives alone.
The basic population of each region (about 250 agents due to the fact each 
agent is assigned a random space tossed following a uniform distribution) 
is randomly spread in the space.
Each set of experiments has been based on a different combination of 
four parameters (scenarios), designated as follows:
●● Optimum: the scenario devoted to recreating the theoretical condi-
tion of perfect information and mobility. Here agents have a large 
view, knowledge is fully available and moving is always possible.
●● Typical: here the capabilities of the firms are limited to plausible 
amounts in order to take in account the typical limits existing in the 
real world.
●● Mixed: the parameters are randomly set up for each simulation, 
choosing their values in an assigned range that includes ‘typical’ 
values.
For each scenario three different experiments were done using 4, 16 and 64 
KPs for each space. By varying the number of KPs the difference between 
each KP distribution model could be differently stressed: with four KPs 
for each space there is little difference between their diverse distribution 
and, practically, four hkds is one of the possible distributions of the no 
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hkds scenario. The more the number of KPs is increased, the greater the 
difference between the four distributions.
Each experiment was repeated for 50 times, always changing the random 
number distribution to simulate different dynamics and validate the 
robustness of the obtained results. Random numbers were used to simulate 
some decisions, to pick up neighbours spilling relevant external knowledge 
and to determine in which direction and how far to move. For the mixed 
scenario random numbers were used to toss the parameters’ value, each 
within the appropriate range, as illustrated in Table 2.1 where parameters 
for each scenario and simulation are shown.
At the end of each experiment the average productivity level for each 
region and for the whole population have been computed; at this very first 
stage of the research these were the only data it was decided to concentrate 
on.
Since the initial endowment of the firms in each region was set to the 
same amount, the market was unique both for factors and products. It is 
possible to assume differences in the reached level of productivity were 
mainly due to the different distribution of the KPs, as shown in Figure 2.8.
Results of the Optimum Scenario
The optimum scenario was set up to validate the model under the classic 
assumption of perfect information and mobility: provided that each 
regional space is simulated by a square lattice 100 cells wide, jumping 
in each direction of 50 cells means having perfect mobility. In addition, 
because the maximum distance between the worst and the best technology 
Table 2.1 Parameter configurations for each experiment
Scenario Parameters Number  
of KPs
Experiment
View Jump Imitation 
threshold
Patent  
expiration
Optimum 15 50 999 1 4 Optimum 4
16 Optimum 16
64 Optimum 64
Typical 4 4 4 5 4 Typical 4
16 Typical 16
64 Typical 64
Mixed ]0,8[ ]0,8[ ]1,9[ ]1,15[ 4 Mixed 4
16 Mixed 16
64 Mixed 64
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has been limited in these simulations to 200 and knowledge absorption 
threshold of 999 means that each technology could be copied. Patent 
expiration set to one means that each adopted technology becomes quasi-
public in the successive production cycle, so each technology could be 
copied as soon as it has been adopted.
The value of the view parameter would have been set to 50 too, as for the 
jump one, but 15 was demonstrated to be enough to allow a good circula-
tion of information and guarantee the majority of the enterprises reached 
the higher technological level in a very short time.
Under the optimum conditions, the concentrated distributions of KPs, 
such as the one hkd and two hkds seem to give some advantages, as shown 
by the results briefly summarized in Table 2.2. Here are reported, for each 
experiment, the average results (first row) obtained during 50 runs, with 
different random distributions, each of them 250 whole production cycles 
long; the variance is reported too, in the second row.
With high levels of information quality, mobility and capability of firms 
to absorb technological knowledge from each other, and no patent protec-
tion, the concentrated distribution of knowledge centres seem to give 
No hkdsFour hkds
Different distributions of the KPs
Two hkdsOne hkd
Figure 2.8 Configuration of the spaces for the simulations
Table 2.2 Synthesis of results obtained by running the optimum scenario
Experiment Function One hkd Two hkds Four hkds No hkds
Optimum 4 Average 0.959782 0.939995 0.875459 0.858535
Variance 0.001633 0.013787 0.031749 0.026233
Optimum 16 Average 0.991779 0.993152 0.984252 0.971355
Variance 0.000074 0.00002 0.000630 0.001899
Optimum 64 Average 0.994997 0.994967 0.994451 0.993284
Variance 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000022
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better results than the disseminated one, even if  the advantage becomes 
smaller and smaller when the number of KPs grows.
Starting from the scenario with only four KPs the disseminated region 
reached only 0.85 productivity after 250 production cycles, whereas the 
fully concentrated one reached 0.95, with an advantage of about 0.1; but 
this difference fell to 0.02 and 0.001 respectively with 16 and 64 KPs.
The trend shown by the average values systematically appears in each 
single simulation, as Figure 2.9 illustrates for optimum 64: the graph 
reports the final results of each of the 50 simulations.
Results of the Typical Scenario
This configuration set was obtained by giving the four parameters realistic 
and plausible values. The regional neighbourhood of each firm was pre-
sumed to be 64 cells wide, about 1/100 the whole extension of the simulated 
world, where each cell was able to host more than one enterprise. Assuming 
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
0.85
0.95
1
10
20
30Simulation number 40 50
One hkd
Two hkds
Four hkds
No hkds
hk
ds
Experiment optimum 64
Figure 2.9 Results of several simulations of the experiment optimum 64
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this neighbourhood to be the maximum extension a firm would have been 
able to reach, the possibility to move was limited to the same amount.
Innovation cannot be done too fast; the absorption and recombination 
of external technological knowledge implies the modification of products 
and production processes and upgrading of the skills of the staff; it is not 
plausible that an enterprise can absorb unlimited amounts of external 
technological knowledge. The limit of four represents 1/50 of the maxi-
mum technology a firm can reach in the whole evolution, and 400 times 
the ability each enterprise is assumed to acquire each cycle by means of 
‘learning by doing’.
It is also plausible that new techniques could be protected by licences. 
Usually technical patents last for five years because each step of the simula-
tion is assumed to last one year, so the expiration of patent rights has been 
set to five. Practically each firm can observe and absorb other technologies 
only if  they are five cycles old. All these limitations reduced the speed 
of evolution, so experiments for this scenario were based on simulations 
1000 cycles long, even though the enterprises reached productivity levels 
less than obtained in the (non-realistic) optimum scenario. The interesting 
result is that, under more realistic conditions relevant indications about the 
better distribution of KPs seem to appear, as in Table 2.3, where are shown 
the average results of 50 runs for each experiment using the typical scenario.
In all the three set-ups of KPs, the disseminated distribution provides 
better results and the distance becomes higher the higher the number of KPs.
Analysing the four regions it is evident that the more the KPs are spread, 
the better the results become: the advantage grows significantly, passing 
from the one hkd scenario region to the no hkds one, reaching, for 64 KPs, 
0,16. Figure 2.10 shows the results obtained during the 50 simulations for 
the experiment typical 64.
More disseminated distribution of the KPs seems to be more effective 
in facilitating innovation and in promoting technical progress. A plausible 
explanation could be that more disseminated distribution allows a major 
Table 2.3 Synthesis of results obtained by running the typical scenario
Experiment Function One hkd Two hkds Four hkds No hkds
Typical 4 Average 0.455182 0.480327 0.501641 0.508746
Variance 0.005142 0.007908 0.008847 0.007251
Typical 16 Average 0.656397 0.695474 0.738526 0.78994
Variance 0.003172 0.001373 0.001982 0.001805
Typical 64 Average 0.796893 0.844447 0.906629 0.957159
Variance 0.001475 0.000630 0.000102 0.000059
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number of firms to access knowledge. Similar configurations, like four 
hkds and no hkds in the presence of four KPs only, gave very close results, 
confirming this explanation.
Results of the Mixed Scenario
The mixed scenario was built to test the results obtained into the typical 
one. Here the parameters set-up is always changing; values are randomly 
tossed in ranges that are distributed around the typical parameters value.
The results, reported in Table 2.4, confirm those obtained by running 
the typical scenario, so the previous reasoning about the importance of 
a disseminated distribution for KPs seems to be reinforced, as well as the 
observation about the similarity between the distribution four hkds and no 
hkds in the presence of four KPs only.
The difference among the four distributions is less strong, due to the 
fact the combination of parameters allowed configurations closer to the 
optimum scenario than the typical one. The phenomenon is clearly shown 
in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.10 Results of several simulations of the experiment typical 64
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   48 19/02/2018   13:42
 Innovation as an emergent system property  49
Taking advantage of  the array of  experimental configurations that agent-
based simulations offer, we have generated a wide set of  alternative sce-
narios. For a comparative summarization it is possible to refer to Figures 
2.12 to 2.14, where the data shown above are mixed in bar diagrams.
Whereas in the optimum scenario results are very similar for the three 
different distributions, the advantage of the no hkds distribution is clear in 
the typical and mixed scenarios.
Table 2.4 Synthesis of the results obtained by running the mixed scenario
Experiment Function One hkd Two hkds Four hkds No hkds
Mixed 4 Average 0.444593 0.456321 0.476576 0.474556
Variance 0.023025 0.025162 0.026424 0.02444
Mixed 16 Average 0.573829 0.599636 4.507638889 0.697282
Variance 0.023182 0.01804 0.019603 0.018044
Mixed 64 Average 0.771741 0.799501 0.84245 0.895232
Variance 0.023435 0.019453 0.017576 0.014354
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Figure 2.11 Results of several simulations of the experiment mixed 64
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The bar diagrams show also that the performance of the disseminated 
distributions are better the higher is the number of KPs, reinforcing the 
argument about the similarity of distributions in the presence of few KPs.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The implications for research and innovation policy are important: better 
access conditions to technological knowledge and better dissemination 
of existing technological knowledge enable firms to better find their way 
toward technological enhancement so as to become more competitive and 
profitable. Let us consider them in turn.
Intellectual property rights regimes should be designed so as to increase 
the possibility for imitators and users of external knowledge to take 
advantage of existing proprietary knowledge. The implementation of non-
exclusive IPR might favour the dissemination of technological knowledge. 
The enforcement of compulsory royalty payments for all use of proprietary 
knowledge should prevent the reduction of appropriability conditions, and 
hence the decline of incentives to funding research activities.
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The demise of ‘intramuros’ research activities concentrated within the 
research laboratories of large corporations and the implementation of 
open innovation systems that favour the outsourcing of the recombinant 
generation of technological knowledge to specialized knowledge-intensive 
businesses (KIBs), and academic departments might help the dissemina-
tion of technological knowledge.
Access to technological knowledge should be increased, favouring the 
distribution of universities and public research centres across the system 
so as to improve the proximity of firms to the available pools of public 
knowledge and reduce the distance of peripheral regions from the knowl-
edge spillovers. In a similar vein the inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the location of advanced multinational companies should be 
favoured as tools for local firms to access the spillovers of higher levels of 
technological competence.
The dissemination of existing technological knowledge should become 
the object of dedicated policy tools. The strengthening of relations 
between the business community and the public research system, specifi-
cally between firms and universities, might help the effective dissemination 
of knowledge and knowledge generating competence. Public policy should 
support all interactions between academics and firms, favouring the 
actual creation of additional pecuniary knowledge externalities with the 
provision of subsidies and fiscal allowances to all contracts between firms 
and the academic system. The dissemination and implementation of a 
fabric of good-quality public research centres and universities throughout 
the system is likely to generate better results than the concentration of 
centres of worldwide excellence in a few spots. For the same reasons, the 
mobility of skilled and creative scientists and experts among firms and 
between firms and research institutions at large can become the target of 
dedicated research policy interventions aimed at spreading competence 
and technological expertise.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has implemented an evolutionary approach that integrates 
strong Marshallian and Schumpeterian traits with the recent advances in 
the economics of complexity. Innovation can be considered as an emerg-
ing property of an economic system that takes place when its structural 
characteristics provide access to external knowledge as an indispensable 
input in the generation of new technological knowledge. Building upon 
the Marshallian legacy, external knowledge is considered an indispensable 
input, together with internal research activities, in the recombinant genera-
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tion of new knowledge. The reappraisal of the Schumpeterian notion of 
innovation as a conditional result of a form of reaction to unexpected 
events led us to articulate the hypothesis that the reaction of myopic but 
creative agents that try to cope with the changing conditions of their 
product and factor markets may lead to the effective recombinant genera-
tion of new technological knowledge, and hence the actual introduction 
of productivity enhancing innovations when they are embedded in an 
organized complexity where they can actually take advantage of the 
external knowledge available within the innovation system in which they 
are embedded.
In this context ABM enabled us to explore the effects of alternative insti-
tutional, organizational and architectural configurations of the knowledge 
structure of the system in assessing chances to pursue effectively the 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge and to introduce 
technological innovations. The introduction of innovations is analysed as 
the result of systemic interactions among learning agents. The reaction of 
agents may become creative, as opposed to adaptive, so as to lead to the 
introduction of productivity enhancing innovations when external knowl-
edge can be accessed at low costs and used in the recombinant generation 
of new technological knowledge. Building upon agent-based simulation 
techniques, the chapter explored the roles that alternative configurations 
of intellectual property right regimes and architectural configurations of 
the system play in assessing these costs, and hence the chances to perform 
effectively the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge.
The results of the ABM confirm that a system characterized by high 
levels of knowledge dissemination is actually more effective in promoting 
the rates of introduction of technological innovations. The results, how-
ever, show that systems characterized by high levels of concentration could 
offer advantages in terms of faster discovery, due to the close relations that 
could be established among the knowledge producers. The implementation 
of ABM has enabled the rigorous framing of a complex system dynamics 
where innovation is the emerging property that takes place when a number 
of complementary conditions qualify the reaction of firms and make them 
creative. The simulation model can be applied to control the implications 
of an array of alternative settings and hypotheses concerning appropri-
ability conditions, IPR regimes, knowledge generation routines and, most 
important, policy interventions that can alter the structure of knowledge 
flows so as to increase the levels of organization of the complexity of a 
system.
Taking inspiration from Schumpeter and Marshall, and recent develop-
ments in the analysis of  the economic complexity of  technological change, 
the ABM has shown the systemic conditions that make  innovation 
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 possible. Innovation is an emergent property of  the organized complexity 
of  a system because innovation is the outcome of a situated and localized 
reaction when it can take advantage of  a collective and situated process 
embedded in institutional as well as structural settings, and involving 
the combination of  in-house and external knowledge and capabilities. 
Additionally, the uncertain outcome of these endeavours is portrayed as 
stochastic functions (lotteries), emphasizing that there is no automaticity 
as regards success in both activities. In this context an important aspect 
of  the present elaboration is that the spatial distribution of  innovation 
activities is explained endogenously from the interaction of  competing 
firms.
Summarizing the results of the present simulation, it seems possible to 
assume that the more the knowledge producers such as universities and 
advanced science-based corporations are spread throughout a territory, 
the faster and more effective the innovation process becomes. Myopic 
but creative firms coping with the changing conditions of their product 
and factor markets are better able to improve their reaction and make it 
creative, as opposed to adaptive, when technological knowledge is dissemi-
nated in the regional, institutional and technological spaces.
NOTES
1. Schumpeter (1947: 149–50) makes the point very clear: ‘What has not been adequately 
appreciated among theorists is the distinction between different kinds of reaction to 
changes in “condition”. Whenever an economy or a sector of an economy adapts itself  
to a change in its data in the way that traditional theory describes, whenever, that is, an 
economy reacts to an increase in population by simply adding the new brains and hands 
to the working force in the existing employment, or an industry reacts to a protective 
duty by the expansion within its existing practice, we may speak of the development 
as an adaptive response. And whenever the economy or an industry or some firms 
in an industry do something else, something that is outside of the range of existing 
practice, we may speak of creative response. Creative response has at least three essential 
characteristics. First, from the standpoint of the observer who is in full possession of 
all relevant facts, it can always be understood ex post; but it can be practically never be 
understood ex ante; that is to say, it cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules 
of inference from the pre-existing facts. This is why the “how” in what has been called the 
“mechanisms” must be investigated in each case. Secondly, creative response shapes the 
whole course of subsequent events and their “long-run” outcome. It is not true that both 
types of responses dominate only what the economist loves to call “transitions”, leaving 
the ultimate outcome to be determined by the initial data. Creative response changes 
social and economic situations for good, or, to put it differently, it creates situations from 
which there is no bridge to those situations that might have emerged in the absence. This 
is why creative response is an essential element in the historical process; no deterministic 
credo avails against this. Thirdly, creative response – the frequency of its occurrence in 
a group, its intensity and success or failure – has obviously something, be that much or 
little, to do (a) with quality of the personnel available in a society, (b) with relative quality 
of personnel, that is, with quality available to a particular field of activity relative to the 
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quality available, at the same time, to others, and (c) with individual decisions, actions, 
and patterns of behavior.’
2. Empirical investigations and tests of specific hypotheses can complement and support 
agent-based simulations. See Antonelli and Scellato (2011) and Antonelli et al. (2011).
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3.  The microfoundations of 
evolutionary complexity: from the 
Marshallian search for equilibrium 
to Schumpeterian dynamics
Cristiano Antonelli and Gianluigi Ferraris
1. INTRODUCTION
The identification and appreciation of the Marshallian foundations of 
evolutionary thinking in economics is necessary to identify and overcome the 
limits of the biological evolutionary framework of analysis and to contribute 
to the new emerging evolutionary complexity with a consistent microeco-
nomics of endogenous innovation that implements the reappraisal of the 
Schumpeterian notion of ‘creative response’ (Arthur, 2009; Kirman, 2016).
The Schumpeterian notion of creative response has received very little 
attention so far and yet is indispensable to go beyond the shortcomings 
of biological evolutionary approaches (Antonelli, 2015a, 2017b). Indeed, 
Schumpeter (1947: 150) provided a founding framework to grasping the 
endogenous microeconomic determinants of innovation. Innovation is the 
result of a creative response to unexpected events conditional to the availabil-
ity of substantial externalities. Schumpeter defines the creative response as 
‘something that is outside of existing practice’ by highlighting three essential 
characteristics: ‘it cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules of 
inference from pre-existing facts. . . [it] shapes the whole course of subse-
quent events and their long-run outcome. . . its intensity and success or fail-
ure has . . . to do . . . with the socio-economic context.’ The notion of creative 
response – and its contrast with the adaptive one – enables us to articulate an 
evolutionary complexity that puts the microeconomic determinants of the 
decision to innovate at the centre of the analysis. In so doing, reappraisal of 
the notion of creative response enables us to articulate an endogenous model 
of the innovation process that can be enriched and implemented by the 
explicit identification and appreciation of the Marshallian legacy (Antonelli, 
2008, 2011, 2017a; Antonelli and Ferraris, 2011).
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Specifically, this chapter articulates the view that analysis of the 
Marshallian and Schumpeterian microfoundations of endogenous inno-
vation enables us to elaborate a clear analytical separation between the 
evolutionary approaches based upon biological metaphors and the new 
emerging evolutionary complexity overcoming the limits of the former and 
contributing to the latter. The integration of Marshallian notions of imita-
tion externalities and selection processes with the Schumpeterian notion 
of creative as opposed to adaptive response provides a rich and coherent 
microeconomic analysis of the determinants of the innovation process at 
the firm level that is able to take into account the effects of the system in 
which the individual decision-making of heterogeneous agents takes place.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 spells out the 
basic ingredients of the Marshallian and Schumpeterian frameworks of 
analysis, and shows how their integration provides coherent microfounda-
tions for the dynamics of evolutionary complexity. Section 3 presents an 
agent-based simulation model (ABM) to test the coherence of the analysis. 
Section 4 explores the implications of the results. The conclusions sum-
marize the main results of the chapter and confirm the central role of the 
creative response in the introduction of innovation based upon the use of 
knowledge externalities as the basic mechanism of an effective and micro-
founded evolutionary dynamics able to move away from the ambiguities of 
biological evolutionary approaches.
2.  FROM THE MARSHALLIAN SEARCH FOR 
EQUILIBRIUM TO SCHUMPETERIAN 
DYNAMICS: THE BASIC ROLE OF 
EXTERNALITIES
In his essay in honour of Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter (1941) 
acknowledges the many contributions of the Marshallian legacy to his own 
understanding of the role of selective competition among heterogeneous 
firms. The Marshallian approach has been a fundamental and constant 
source of inspiration for Schumpeter, from The Theory of Economic 
Development (1911–34) to the ‘The creative response in economic his-
tory’ (1947).1 The Marshallian approach, in fact, can be regarded as the 
foundation not only of these early contributions but also and primarily of 
Schumpeter’s 1947 attempt to provide an endogenous understanding of 
the innovation process able to integrate the analysis at the firm level with 
the appreciation of the role of externalities embedded in the system.
The Marshallian model rests on three building blocks: i) exogenous 
innovations; ii) no appropriability; and iii) imitation externalities. Let us 
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consider them in turn. In the Marshallian framework innovations are the 
starting point. For unknown reasons they are introduced occasionally and 
randomly. Their exogenous introduction puts – and keeps – the system 
in motion. According to Marshall, knowledge cannot be appropriated 
by inventors, and spills freely like information so that everybody is 
immediately aware of details of the best practice. Perfect access to the best 
knowledge at each point in time is a key aspect of the notion of ‘normal’ 
cost: ‘But though everyone acts for himself, his knowledge of what others 
are doing is supposed to be generally sufficient to prevent him from taking 
a lower or paying a higher price than others are doing’ (Marshall, 1920, V, 
3, p. 199). As a matter of fact Marshall introduced the notions of limited 
appropriability and spillover well before Arrow (1962) and Griliches 
(1979). The imitation of exogenous innovations introduced randomly is 
the focus of the analysis and the engine of the dynamics both in Marshall 
and biological evolutionary models. Marshall considers two types of 
externality: agglomeration and imitation. Agglomeration externalities 
have received much attention, while imitation externalities have not. Yet 
imitation externalities are at the heart of the Marshallian dynamics that 
leads from variety to homogeneity by means of selection and from out-of-
equilibrium to equilibrium. Marshall assumes that firms are heterogene-
ous: some firms perform better than others. Selective competition drives 
the system to generalize the competence of the best-performing firms. In 
Marshall, equilibrium is the result of a competitive process that reduces 
heterogeneity to homogeneity.2 Exogenous and random innovations, and 
consequently the variety of firms, are the cause of the Marshallian 
imitation externalities. Externalities and variety decline together, along a 
competition process – intertwined with a selection process – that accounts 
for system growth but reduces variety and consequently destroys the very 
origin of externalities. They display their effects along with the selection 
process and the reduction of heterogeneity to homogeneity. Marshallian 
imitation externalities are endogenous to the system and intrinsic to the 
Marshallian search for equilibrium. As such, however, they are bounded.
Marshall assumes that a variety of firms try to produce, enter and exit 
the market place with different levels of productivity and costs. At each 
point in time firms are confronted with partial equilibrium that unveils 
their heterogeneity in terms of production costs. Less-efficient firms are 
sorted out while more efficient ones can enjoy the benefits of transient 
rents and increase their size. In the Marshallian process, new entrants 
and poorer-performing incumbents, however, can imitate freely the best-
performing ones. The efficiency of best-performing firms spills freely in the 
system and can be accessed and shared by any other agent.3 The imitative 
entry of new competitors and the imitation of incumbents affect the 
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shifting position of the supply curve that engenders a sequence of lower 
market prices and larger quantities. The variance of profitability levels 
shrinks. In the long term the process leads to the eventual identification 
of the equilibrium price according to which only the most efficient firms 
can survive with normal profits. The identification of a stable equilibrium 
stops the endogenous generation of externalities. In equilibrium there is 
no growth. Growth lasts as long as the selection and imitation process that 
enables firms to push the allocation of inputs towards their most effective 
use is in place. Marshallian externalities are endogenous but bounded.
The influence of Marshall on The Theory of Economic Development is 
clear. The role of entrepreneurship is a first attempt to fill the Marshallian 
gap about the origin of innovations. Schumpeter however does not 
really provide an endogenous account of the origin and determinants of 
entrepreneurship. It remains unclear whether the flows of innovations 
introduced by entrepreneurs and their entry are steady through time and 
space, or exhibit relevant and systematic changes. As a matter of fact the 
evolutionary models that impinge upon Nelson and Winter (1982) are 
intrinsically Marshallian and are consistent with the legacy of Schumpeter 
(1911–34) where, following Marshall, innovations are exogenous as they 
are introduced by entrepreneurs that enter the economic system from out-
side without any economic causality, rather than the framework elaborated 
by Schumpeter in 1928 and 1942 and his great synthesis of 1947.4
The Marshallian dynamics of imitation externalities provides the foun-
dations for the path-breaking contribution of Schumpeter (1947). This 
framework can be regarded as a fully fledged evolutionary process based 
upon the notion of endogenous innovation as the outcome of a creative 
reaction able to reshape the existing map of isoquants that takes place in 
out-of-equilibrium conditions when firms’ plans do not meet the actual 
product and factor market conditions, provided the system is able to 
support their reaction with the provision of knowledge externalities.5 If  
knowledge externalities are not available the response of firms will be 
adaptive and consist only in the traditional movements on the existing map 
of isoquants.
The Schumpeterian dynamics elaborated in the 1947 essay differs from 
the Marshallian one for two key reasons: first, in Schumpeter, externalities 
are knowledge externalities rather than imitation externalities. Knowledge 
externalities make it possible for every firm to introduce productivity-
enhancing innovations that keep the system in a cost-reducing process 
further reinforced by the increased levels of generation of new technologi-
cal knowledge that is able to reinforce the further creation of endogenous 
knowledge externalities. Second, in Schumpeter the creative reaction of 
firms supported by the self-sustained dynamics of knowledge externalities 
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enables the introduction of innovations that are by definition the cause of 
unexpected changes in product and factor markets. Marshallian agents can 
imitate only from advanced firms. Advanced firms cannot take advantage 
of their transient competitive advantage to introduce new innovations. 
Schumpeterian agents, on the contrary, exhibit the distinctive features 
of entrepreneurship that enable them to react to both good and bad 
performance. In both cases, in fact, they will try to introduce innovations 
either to counter their decline and eventual exit or to take advantage of 
their competitive advantage and increase it with the introduction of new 
technologies. The levels of the actual reactivity of firms and of the quality 
of knowledge externalities provided by the system are the key variables 
of the Schumpeterian approach that enable firms to account for endog-
enous growth of output and productivity (Antonelli and Scellato, 2011; 
Erixon, 2016). Both are the results of implementation of the Marshallian 
framework. Identification of the Marshallian legacy enables us to better 
appreciate the strength of the late contribution by Schumpeter.
3. THE SIMULATION6
The typical bottom-up approach of interactions nested in a systemic context 
of ABM provides an excellent tool for theoretical investigations. This use 
of ABM, besides its traditional application in forecasting, seems to open an 
innovative field of investigation to validate the robustness and consistency 
of theoretical hypotheses (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007; Mueller and Pyka, 2016). 
ABM seems most appropriate to show how the implementation of a micro-
founded evolutionary complexity that integrates the legacies of Marshall and 
Schumpeter is able to overcome the microeconomic limits of the biological 
evolutionary framework with an endogenous account of the innovation 
process. By setting appropriate values for the key simulation’s parameters 
(imitation externalities, knowledge externalities, knowledge governance and 
reactivity), the ABM, in fact, enables us to compare alternative bottom-up 
system dynamics: the Marshallian and the full range of Schumpeterian ones 
determined by the varying levels of reactivity and knowledge governance.
The ABM used to compute the simulations reproduces a stylized 
economy where a variety of firms produce a unique output, useful both for 
investment and consumption. The simulated economy is closed – neither 
import nor export activities are allowed – and systematically reach a state 
of local equilibrium: the whole production is sold, firms fully redistribute 
profits and shareholders immediately contribute to cover losses. No 
form of accumulation either in savings or equity is allowed. The levels of 
capitalization of firms are given and are maintained by the shareholders 
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through immediate contributions to cover potential losses. Profits are 
always fully distributed, and do not eat/add capital funds of any kind.
Wages (w) are constant and there is an unlimited supply of labour. The 
cost of labour per unit is set by a simulation parameter. Provided that new 
technological knowledge is produced by employing labour, all the costs 
the firms afford produced a monetary transfer to the workers. The utility 
and demand functions of consumers, employees and shareholders are not 
simulated explicitly: their behaviour is summarized in the price equations 
of the goods. Output prices are set by a market maker that ensures that the 
entire, fixed, amount of money is allocated to consumption.
Because all remuneration (dividends, wages, contributions to research) 
will be used immediately to buy all the goods produced and money circu-
lates twice for each production cycle, demand for goods, in value terms, is 
equal to the amount of money in the system. The velocity of circulation 
of money (per cycle) is equal to 2; all the money is paid in the form of 
remuneration of workers, researchers and shareholders (either as a posi-
tive amount in the case of profits or a negative one in the case of losses). 
During the same cycle all the money is spent to buy goods.
At the aggregate level the model can be summarized as:
 Gs = +Yi (3.1)
where Gs represents the aggregate supply, and Y are the individual 
revenues;
 Gd = Gs  (3.2)
where Gd represents the demand of goods, both for investment or con-
sumption; and
 Gp = M/Gs (3.3)
where Gp represents the price of a single unit of production and M the 
entire amount of money circulating in the system. Note that the entire 
amount of M is always available for consumption: when enterprises are sub-
ject to losses, the aggregate expense for salaries is greater than the value of 
production, so shareholders receive negative profits, and vice versa. At the 
aggregate level the amount of money available for buying products sticks 
always to M. The aggregate production function could be expressed as:
 Y = (A)L (3.4)
where A is productivity and L the amount of labour the enterprise employs.
The productivity reflects both agglomeration effects and the purchase of 
knowledge as it may be influenced by the current amount of technological 
knowledge (T) that the firm is able to mobilize and by a small fraction (g) 
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of the amount of technological knowledge mobilized in past production 
cycles, as follows:
 A = ∑ [Li* (ai* (1+ ti0 + g* ∑ti − j)]/∑ Li (3.5)
Equation (3.5) makes explicit the work of knowledge externalities: Li 
represents the input the i-th enterprise employs; ai its labour productivity; 
ti the level of technological knowledge this enterprise has just bought; and 
∑ti − j the sum of past technological knowledge acquisition, weighted by 
a decay parameter (g) – the fraction the enterprise permanently acquires 
in its knowledge estate for each technological knowledge acquisition. 
New technological knowledge acquisition is a risky activity, so its effects 
on productivity levels take place with a risk coefficient (R): each new 
technological knowledge acquisition (ti0) could fail, and in that case the 
productivity of the single enterprise becomes:
 Ai = (ai* (1 + g* ∑ti − j) (3.6)
Under Marshallian restrictions, the contribution of technological knowl-
edge is zeroed. As a consequence productivity is limited and reaches a 
maximum that is given by the equilibrium level output in the system where 
all firms use the best technology. The productivity equation becomes:
 A = ∑ Li* ai /∑ Li. (3.7)
Each period ai can be upgraded by a fraction of the difference between 
its level and the productivity level of the best enterprise, due to imitation 
effects. This upgrade is subject to risk, too, in this way:
 Ai1 = ai0 + h (amax – ai0) | E > = R (3.8)
where amax is the productivity of the best in class enterprise; E is a random 
number tossed from a uniform distribution; and R measures the probabil-
ity the imitation fails. When E < R the productivity level of the enterprise 
remains at the latest reached level.
The cost equation includes the cost of both labour (w) and technological 
knowledge (z):
 TC = wL + zT (3.9)
where L is the single input labour and w are unit wages; z is the cost of a 
technological knowledge unit; and T is the amount of employed techno-
logical knowledge.
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Note that in equation (3.9) the effect of T on productivity is usually 
such that dY/dT = c > z, where c is the cost of technological knowledge if  
it were a standard good, while z is the actual market costs of technologi-
cal knowledge. There is an equilibrium level (c) of knowledge costs that 
reflects the equilibrium conditions for its generation. If  technological 
knowledge were a standard economic good its cost, c, would be equal 
to w, the cost of labour. The case for adaptive reaction takes place when 
technological knowledge is acquired at its equilibrium cost, c. The use of 
T will allow firms to introduce novelties without direct economic effects 
on output levels that are higher than the total cost of the technological 
knowledge acquired. There is no chance for firms to introduce innovations 
that enhance output beyond the levels of the costs incurred to purchase 
the technological knowledge. When z = c the value of the technological 
knowledge T matches the equilibrium value of its marginal product.7
If positive pecuniary knowledge externalities are at work the reaction 
applies successfully and becomes creative. This amounts to assuming that 
when the cost of technological knowledge falls below equilibrium levels (z < 
c), technological knowledge can be treated as a factor that enhances output 
beyond its costs. In this case, total factor productivity (TFP) increases 
because of the discrepancy between the equilibrium levels of technological 
knowledge costs and its actual (lower) levels. The economic effects of tech-
nological knowledge purchased at a cost z that is lower than the equilibrium 
cost c consist in the positive outcome of the reaction: the creative reaction 
takes place exactly in these circumstances. Firms can enjoy an ‘unpaid’ 
increase in productivity levels that is equal to the levels of pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities – i.e. the difference between the equilibrium levels of the 
technological knowledge costs and their actual levels as determined by the 
working of pecuniary knowledge externalities. When, instead, the actual 
costs of knowledge are in equilibrium the reaction of firms will be adaptive.
The stylized economy configuration depends on a wide set of parameters. 
The model allows different set-ups to compare the simulation outcomes 
of different theoretical frameworks. For each simulation some parameters 
have a key role and vary to configure different simulation scenarios, whereas 
others are usually set at fixed values. The configuration of the economy used 
for the simulations was based on: i) the presence of 1000 agents; ii) the avail-
ability of 10,000 units of money for the whole transaction; iii) a fixed labour 
price (one unit of money) and an infinite labour offer; iv) out-of-business 
enterprises were replaced by new entrants with 20 per cent probability, 
whereas enterprises went out of business when their demand for factor 
became less than one unit. In order to set up an initial variety of agents, the 
employed labour and the productivity at the start of the simulation have 
been tossed randomly: labour was allowed to vary in the range]1,10[and 
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 productivity in the range]0.001,0.2[. Some agents have been endowed with 
higher values: respectively labour was tossed in the range]10,20[and produc-
tivity in the range]0.2,1.0[; the number of such ‘smarter’ agents was set to 15 
per cent of the 1000 agents populating the economy. Agents were endowed 
with the capability to both adapt and react. Adaptation has been simulated 
by setting up the agents to increase or decrease the amount of the employed 
factor of 10 per cent if  the previous production cycle ended with a profit or 
a loss. In computing their results (either profits or losses) agents rounded the 
amount with a tolerance of 0.001 due to computation matters.
Externalities was simulated as productivity enhancement subject to a 
failure risk of 10 per cent; technological knowledge was set as suitable for 
one production cycle only, except for a small fraction (0.1 per cent in the 
simulations) that is added to the knowledge estate of the firms to mimic 
the learning process that always takes places both at the workers level and 
organizational level during the innovation exploitation. In fact the contri-
bution of new technological knowledge is immediately subject to a decay 
of 99.9 per cent (the parameter is named ‘techDecay’). The Marshallian 
imitation externalities have been simulated simply by granting each cycle 
each agent a labour productivity increase of 1 per cent (the value is set by 
the parameter ‘imitation’), the difference between their own productivity 
and that of the ‘smartest’ agents – i.e. the firms with the highest produc-
tivity in the whole simulated economy. As mentioned this upgrade may 
fail: the probability of success was set at 90 per cent. The Schumpeterian 
scenario was based on the possibility for the agents to buy technological 
knowledge instead of receiving labour productivity upgrades – the param-
eter ‘imitation’ was set to zero. The amount of technological knowledge 
each agent buys in each production cycle depended on two key parameters: 
‘techRate’, which measures the reactivity of firms as a percentage of 
the total output each agent would invest; and ‘governancePerformance’, 
which measures the quality of the knowledge governance by means of 
the discount factor applied for the price of technological knowledge, as in 
equation 3.10:
 z = ∂Y/∂T * (1 – governancePerformance) (3.10)
Note that if  governancePerformance is set to zero, the cost of technological 
knowledge becomes equal to its marginal contribution and no knowledge 
externalities are available in the system. In this way the behaviour of the 
agents cannot be reactive; they can only adapt their factor allocation. The 
computation of ∂Y/∂T has been based upon the production each agent is 
forecast to obtain at the end of the production cycle, in order to forecast 
the price the produced good will be sold at and set up a plausible base to 
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compute the productivity of the technological knowledge in monetary 
terms to set up a plausible base to compute z.
The amount each agent invests is subject to financial constraints: 
because, intentionally, no financial institution has been included in the 
model, the whole investment amount has to be covered either by profits or 
through savings obtained by reducing the input of factors. The amount an 
agent invests can be expressed as:
 I = min (Y−1 * techRate, profit) | profit > 0 (3.11)
or as
 I = min (Y−1 * techRate, labour − 1*0,1*w) | profit < 0 (3.12)
where I represents the investment the i-th firm is going to afford in the 
production cycle 0; labour and Y stand, respectively, for the labour the i-th 
agent employed in the previous production cycle and the output of the i-th 
agent in the previous production cycle. Schumpeterian agents are credited 
with the capability to react to out-of-equilibrium conditions: they invest 
and purchase new knowledge both when they enjoy extra profits (equation 
3.11) or face losses (equation 3.12).8
Table 3.1 exhibits the six simulation scenarios generated  by   alternative 
values of the three key parameters: imitation, techRate  and   governance
Performance. The single scenario devoted to Marshallian externalities is 
the first one, named ‘Imitation’; the second, named  ‘Zero Gov’, was run 
to demonstrate that the results achieved with no knowledge governance 
are close to those of the Marshallian scenario. The others explore the 
Table 3.1 Simulation scenarios
Scenario Parameter values
Imitation TechRate GovernancePerformance
Imitation 0.01 0.00 0.00
Zero Gov 0.00 0.05 0.00
Low Gov
Low React
0.00 0.01 0.01
Low Gov
High React
0.00 0.05 0.01
High Gov
Low React
0.00 0.01 0.95
High Gov
High React
0.00 0.05 0.95
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 different  combinations between high/low reactivity (techRate) and good/
poor knowledge governance (GovernancePerformance). The parameter 
‘techLife’ – which indicates how many production cycles, after the current 
one, the benefits of a technological knowledge acquisition lasts – was always 
set to 0; and ‘techDecay’ – which measures the fraction of the acquired 
technological knowledge that is lost after its usage – was always set to 0.999. 
Practically each knowledge acquisition gave a productivity advantage only 
for one production cycle, with the exception of the 0.1 per cent of the 
acquired technological knowledge that became a consolidated component of 
the knowledge of the enterprise.
The simulation process consists in repeating a sequence of actions, 
managed through a precise schedule, to control the information level of the 
agents and compute some statistics and aggregate figures. Before starting 
the simulations the model is charged to:
●● create the planned number of agents and assign each of them differ-
ent size and productivity;
●● create a random generator for each agent and assign one to each in 
order to avoid indirect and uncontrolled influence among agents;
●● create the market maker object that will manage exchanges and set 
prices for goods, factor and knowledge;
●● initialize common variables called theWatch used by agents and 
marketMaker to synchronize their actions.
Each simulation cycle mimics a whole production cycle as shown in a 
flow chart (not included here) that illustrates the sequence of orders the 
model gives the agents and other components each simulation cycle. To 
avoid single pseudo-random distribution that could pollute the results, a 
large number of simulations have been run for each scenario, and results 
summarized as average values, paying attention to variance that was not 
significant. The evolution of the simulated economy has been studied by 
means of the trend of the global output and productivity and by comput-
ing concentration indexes: i) sum of the relative contribution to the global 
output by the three larger firms (GB method); ii) sum of the contribution 
of the four larger firms (US method); and iii) Hall and Tideman aggrega-
tion index.
Tables 3.2–3.4 summarize the average results obtained during 100 
simulations, 2000 production cycles long, for each scenario.
All the simulations were executed under the same parameter configura-
tion but with different random distribution; the random seed was set ran-
domly for each run. The first evidence that comes out of the figures is that 
the results are not dependent on the random distributions, due to the fact 
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the variance figures are negligible and confirm the results are robust and 
due to the endogenous dynamic the model is able to mimic.
Productivity and output values show that the Marshallian scenarios 
were systematically able to reach the highest productivity value the 
system was initially endowed with. In each of the 100 simulations, under 
Marshallian dynamics, the economy reached a stable equilibrium. The 
results of the Schumpeterian scenarios demonstrate the role played by 
knowledge governance: with no governance at all or with poor  governance, 
Table 3.2  Productivity and output obtained during simulations of the 
different scenarios
Scenario Productivity Output
T1 Var T2000 Var T1 T2000
Imitation 0.254332 0.000100 0.994559 0.000022 1868 9946
Zero Gov 0.252382 0.000110 0.833257 0.000229 1858 9845
Low Gov
Low React
0.253934 0.000136 0.798269 0.000065 1871 10,010
Low Gov
High React
0.254936 0.000139 0.864955 0.000188 1877 10,229
High Gov
Low React
0.252215 0.000143 1.261606 0.004393 1851 15,654
High Gov
High React
0.254803 0.000150 7.177898 0.807940 1880 84,908
Table 3.3 Concentration
Scenario Concentration
H & T 
− T1
H & T 
– T2000
CR-USA 
− T1
CR-USA 
− T2000
CR-GB 
− T1
CR-GB 
− T2000
Imitation 0.003292 0.001845 0.038695 0.212997 0.029390 0.210496
Zero Gov 0.003279 0.044264 0.038486 0.941844 0.029220 0.938796
Low Gov
Low React
0.003297 0.047324 0.038533 0.944353 0.029270 0.943503
Low Gov
High React
0.003281 0.043585 0.038362 0.940119 0.029123 0.934742
High Gov
Low React
0.003280 0.045686 0.038758 0.942979 0.029453 0.942099
High Gov
High React
0.003281 0.036878 0.038203 0.926782 0.029004 0.890148
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either with high or low reactivity, the economy had a slow growth, achiev-
ing final figures close to those obtained under Marshallian simulation. 
No imitation was allowed in the Schumpeterian scenarios. Thus results 
confirm the importance of the quality of knowledge externalities. When 
knowledge governance is effective, externalities arise and both total 
output and productivity reach higher levels. The compound effect of good 
knowledge governance and high reactivity is able to push the system to 
overcome initial limitations by achieving productivity that is seven times 
higher than the highest level of the best firm, as endowed at the start 
of the simulation. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 and Figure 3.1 confirm, strong 
knowledge externalities and high levels of reactivity lead not only to fast 
growth, but also to higher concentration, configuring product markets 
with a few large firms and many small competitors. The results of the High 
Gov High React scenario shows that more than 90 per cent of the output 
was done by four firms (CR-USA value) and the three big ones cover 89 
per cent of the production (CR-GB value), providing they were able to 
spend a larger amount in investing to buy technological knowledge. Their 
higher productivity parallels a strong increase in total output.
In the Schumpeterian scenario the system is always in evolution, with 
a growth that, in the presented case, is 10 times larger with respect to the 
results obtained by the Marshallian hypothesis, where the output reached 
a stable level when the system went to equilibrium. The Schumpeterian 
dynamic implies the impossibility of reaching a stable equilibrium, with 
cycles of growth and decline and a total output that oscillates with a trend 
to grow. The interpolation of the output level could be represented by a 
simple linear function (the straight line called ‘Linear’ in Figure 3.1) in 
equation (3.13); the interpolation is quite good, the r-square value = 0.9005:
 8146.400 + 32.881x (3.13)
Figure 3.2 shows the output trend between the 500th and the 1000th cycles, 
in order to make easier the catching of the cycles: cycles where periods of 
Table 3.4  Correlation between productivity and concentration and the 
three key parameters
Scenario Correlation – productivity Correlation – concentration
Imitation TechRate Governance- 
Performance
Imitation TechRate Governance- 
Performance
Imitation 0.223784 n.a. n.a. −0.707532 n.a. n.a.
High Gov
High React
n.a. 0.806627 0.277358 n.a. −0.203093 −0.335518
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decay and growth alternate are clearly visible. In the Marshallian scenario 
the growth of output and productivity is larger the greater the variance 
of the given distribution of firms: growth is exogenous and bound to the 
maximum given level of productivity at the onset of the process. The vari-
ance of the distribution of firms, at the onset, instead, has no impact on 
the Schumpeterian scenario: growth is endogenous.
The robustness of the results was investigated by computing correlation 
indexes between key parameters and results. In order to exclude that the 
tolerance value, used only for computational matter, would affect the 
results a correlation was computed between its values and the correspond-
ing outputs. The named indexes were computed using the results obtained 
by dedicated batches of simulations, where the parameters under investiga-
tion were randomly tossed in each simulation and the others – including 
random distributions, with the exception of the distribution used to toss 
the parameter under investigation – were fixed in order to isolate the effect 
of each single investigated parameter. Table 3.4 reports the values of the 
correlation between the key parameters and output values.
Table 3.4 shows the weak correlation between imitation and the levels 
of productivity achieved at the end of the simulations (the weakness of 
the correlation is witnessed by the variance of the achieved output level, 
which was 0.0038 compared with an average value of 9822.104, even if  
the values for the parameter imitation were tossed in the range]0,0.5[). 
Imitation level matters for concentration indexes because it determines 
the speed for reaching equilibrium and the time better firms have to grow 
due to their adaptive reaction (highly productive enterprises make profits 
and each time upgrade their input by increasing it, so their production 
grows and the system becomes more and more concentrated). Under the 
Marshallian legacy enterprises are doomed to reach the best productivity 
due to the work of imitation, so the intensity of the phenomenon has 
influence only on the pattern the system follows to reach the results, not on 
the final result. As expected, TechRate and GovernancePerformance exert 
a positive and significant impact on the Schumpeterian-based simulations.
Table 3.5 shows that the ‘tolerance’ parameter do not affect the results 
Table 3.5  Correlation between the ‘tolerance’ parameter and results of the 
simulations
Scenario Correlation – tolerance
Output Productivity H & T CR-USA CR-GB
High Gov 
High React
0.045423 0.015503 0.040802 0.072391 0.001194
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of the simulations: the correlation between its value and the results have 
been computed through 100 simulations with configuration High Gov 
High React and tolerance values randomly tossed between 0 and 0.0011. 
The correlation values are meaningless and confirm that even with smaller 
or even null values for tolerance the results of  the simulations are the 
same.
No other correlations have been investigated as this chapter aims to 
highlight the differences in results stemming from alternative theoretical 
configurations rather than forecasting values: the results of the simulation 
support the hypotheses outlined without any need for empirical evidence 
about the parameters configuration.
4.  ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION
The results obtained running the simulation model under various con-
figurations (scenarios) and different random values for the key parameters 
demonstrated that the dynamics theorized by Marshall and Schumpeter 
is fully reproduced by the model. The results confirm the strong and 
effective role of the microeconomic foundations of the innovation process. 
The stronger the reactivity of firms and the more effective the role of 
knowledge externalities, the more dynamic the system is. The response of 
Schumpeterian innovative entrepreneurs to the unexpected mismatches in 
the product and factor markets supported by a rich environment enables 
them to secure the provision of high-quality knowledge externalities 
accounts for economic growth. Reactivity and knowledge governance 
are clearly the key parameters that enable the Schumpeterian scenario 
to outperform the Marshallian. These results of the ABM confirm the 
hypotheses and validate at the same time the proximity and yet discontinu-
ity of the Marshallian and the Schumpeterian analytical frameworks. The 
introduction of reactivity conditional to the quality of the environment is 
the element that distinguishes and qualifies the Schumpeterian approach 
from the Marshallian one. The results have proven to be robust because the 
described effects emerged independently of different values of innovation 
risks and possibilities that new firms can enter the market.
ABM enables us to explore the working of the system of interactions, 
transactions and feedback between individual actions and the structure 
of the system that qualify the simple but articulated Marshallian and 
Schumpeterian frameworks outlined in Section 3. ABM provides the 
opportunity to grasp the dynamics of competitive interactions among 
heterogeneous agents that, because of the working of endogenous exter-
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nalities, are able to affect the structure of the system itself. This approach 
is actually able to model in a parsimonious and simple way the intrinsic 
complexity of the nested interactions among agents and the endogenous 
changes in the structure of the system that lie at the heart of both the 
Marshallian and the Schumpeterian frameworks (Mueller and Pyka, 
2016).
ABM operationalizes, through the interactions among a large number 
of agents of our systems, the comparison between the working of a 
typical complex process characterized by the key role of Marshallian exter-
nalities and the Schumpeterian notion of creative reaction conditional 
to the actual availability of knowledge externalities (Schumpeter, 1947), 
enriched by the explicit assumption that the action of agents affects the 
structure of the environment, including the actual amount of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities (Lane, 2002; Lane et al., 2009). In so doing, ABM 
enables us to identify and highlight the complementarities, the sequential 
implementations and the theoretical differences between the Marshallian 
and the Schumpeterian frameworks. The Marshallian framework can be 
regarded as the case of zero reactivity and constrained externalities. The 
Schumpeterian framework starts as soon as reactivity is greater than zero 
and externalities affect the possibility to innovate.
The results of the Marshallian scenario show the high levels of firms’ 
output elasticity to distribution of productivity. The larger the initial vari-
ance, the larger is output growth. The results of the replicator analysis are 
fully confirmed. The results of the Marshallian scenario also confirm that: 
i) growth is driven by exogenous assumptions about the distribution of the 
heterogeneity of firms; ii) growth is bounded to the productivity of best-
performing firm. When all (surviving) firms reach it, growth stops. Growth 
can be resumed only by tossing new innovators with higher levels of 
productivity. Only the introduction of exogenous innovations enables the 
Marshallian scenario to generate further growth: this is exactly the basic 
engine of the biological evolutionary approach.9 The automatic introduc-
tion of exogenous innovations can take place either by entrepreneurs, as 
suggested by Marshall (1890/1920) and Schumpeter (1911–34), or by the 
unexplained upgrading of the routines of corporations, as in Nelson and 
Winter (1982). The hypothesis of exogenous innovation as the single pos-
sibility to keep the dynamics of the system, maintained by the evolutionary 
literature, is far from the approach eventually sketched by Schumpeter in 
1928, articulated in 1942 and fully elaborated in 1947.
The results of the Schumpeterian scenario, in fact, confirm that the 
dynamics of the system is fully endogenous: the larger is the reactivity 
of firms and the better the quality of knowledge externalities, the larger 
the output growth – growth that is endless, provided the system is able 
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to regenerate high-quality knowledge externalities. Table 3.6 provides a 
synthesis of the different Schumpeterian combinations of high and low 
levels of reactivity and poor and good knowledge governance that the 
ABM allows us to explore.
The results of the simulation make it possible to compare the 
Schumpeterian simulations and to appreciate their substantial comple-
mentarity, highlighting the key innovations introduced by Schumpeter 
(1947, 1928) and their implementation (Antonelli, 2008, 2011) in the 
Marshallian framework.
The results of the simulation of the Marshallian model confirm five 
relevant issues:
1.  Innovation is exogenous. Marshall, as much as Schumpeter, assumes 
that some firms and agents are occasionally and randomly able to 
introduce better technologies and more effective organizations.
2.  Limited knowledge appropriability was well known by Marshall. 
All existing firms can imitate the superior technology. In Marshall, 
however, imitation can benefit only laggards. Marshallian externalities 
consist in imitation effects. Imitation externalities augment and accel-
erate the reduction of variety brought about by the parallel selection 
process. The increase of output stems from the selection and imitation 
processes with the exclusion of poorer-performing firms and the 
progressive convergence of all production units to the best practice. 
When variety is erased and all the firms share the best practice, there 
is no longer room for growth and the positive effects of imitation level 
off.
3.  The Marshallian model is the first and most effective attempt to graft 
the Darwinian selection process in economics. Innovation is the exog-
enous source of variety. Variety is transient. Variety in fact exists at 
the onset of the process and is wiped out by the process itself. Growth 
is explained by the extent of variety and by the selection process itself. 
The larger is the variety at the onset of the process, the larger the rate 
of growth. Growth stems from the sorting process of the firms that 
Table 3.6 Ingredients of the different levels of Schumpeterian dynamics
Low reactivity High reactivity
Poor knowledge  
 governance z = c
Quasi-Marshallian  
convergence to equilibrium
Slow Schumpeterian regimes
Good knowledge  
 governance z < c
Slow Schumpeterian regimes High-powered Schumpeterian 
dynamics
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are less efficient and by the generalization of the best practice to all the 
surviving firms. The rate of growth declines together with the reduc-
tion of variety brought about by the selection process. Equilibrium, 
reduction of variety, exhaustion of endogenous externalities and the 
end of growth coincide. When the selection process is over, all firms 
are able to use the best practice, and the allocation of resources can 
no longer be improved. There is no endogenous mechanism in the 
Marshallian process by means of which variety can be reproduced.
4.  The replicator dynamics introduced eventually both in biology and 
in economics is clearly at work in the Marshallian model (Foster and 
Metcalfe, 2012). The evolutionary applications of the Marshallian 
model however make clear its intrinsic limitations: in the replicator 
dynamics variety is exogenous.
5.  Biological evolutionary economics impinges upon the Marshallian 
legacy much more than currently assumed; and, in any event, it exhib-
its stronger elements of continuity with the Marshallian framework 
than with the Schumpeterian approach.
In the scenarios that build upon Schumpeter (1947) innovation is the 
endogenous source of variety: it is path dependent as it may be continu-
ously recreated by the endogenous dynamics of the system (Page, 2011). 
Innovation, and hence variety, is generated by the reaction of firms to 
the changing conditions of product and factor markets. Innovation and 
variety are the products of internal feedback supported by the working 
of pecuniary knowledge externalities. Firms caught in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions by unexpected factor and product markets try to cope with 
either extra profits or losses with the introduction of innovations. All 
firms, both advanced and laggard, try to innovate. In order to introduce 
innovations firms need knowledge externalities to generate technological 
knowledge and innovate. Their reaction will be adaptive when and where 
knowledge externalities are weak. The response of firms, instead, will be 
creative and successful so as to make the introduction of innovations pos-
sible when the cost of knowledge is below equilibrium levels. Endogenous 
variety is constantly reproduced by the dynamics of the creative response: 
firms in out-of-equilibrium conditions in fact dare to face the risks 
associated by means of the purchase, use and generation of technological 
knowledge to innovate. The creative reaction is persistent when and where 
knowledge externalities are reproduced and the best practice keeps moving 
ahead. The process rests upon the interaction between the entrepreneurial 
behaviour of agents in out-of-equilibrium conditions and the systemic 
process that is at the origin of pecuniary knowledge externalities. Growth 
keeps increasing along the typical Schumpeterian cycles explained by the 
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successful introduction of new technologies until knowledge governance 
mechanisms support the levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Evolutionary models that impinge upon biological metaphors miss a 
consistent microeconomic analysis of the determinants of the introduc-
tion of innovations. Appreciation of the Marshallian framework clarifies 
the weaknesses of the evolutionary approaches that impinge upon bio-
logical metaphors: as a matter of fact they are more Marshallian than 
Schumpeterian. This enables us to mark a clear distinction between the 
two evolutionary approaches: those that impinge upon biological meta-
phors and miss a consistent analysis of endogenous innovation and the 
new emerging evolutionary complexity. The integration of the Marshallian 
legacy and the late Schumpeterian frameworks, in fact, provides solid 
microfoundations to an evolutionary complexity that is able to account for 
the endogenous introduction of innovations. The integration in a single 
framework of the dynamic interaction of reactive decision-making at the 
firm level and changing provision of externalities as determined by the 
evolving structure of the system are the cornerstones of the new evolution-
ary complexity.
Externalities play a central role both in the Marshallian and in the 
Schumpeterian analysis of the working of economic system. In the 
Marshallian legacy, however, imitation externalities are the cause and the 
consequence of the search for a stable equilibrium. In the Schumpeterian 
legacy, in contrast (especially of 1947), knowledge externalities are the 
cause and the consequence of the creative response of firms in out-of-equi-
librium conditions that makes possible the introduction of innovations, 
persistent growth and evolution. The differences and yet the continuity and 
actual complementarity between the notions of externality implemented 
by Marshall and the Schumpeterian notion of creative response condi-
tional to the availability of knowledge externalities seem clear. In both 
externalities are endogenous to the system. In Marshall they are bounded 
as they are intrinsically tied to the – transient – heterogeneity and variety 
of firms. In Schumpeter, instead, they may be continuously reproduced 
by the creative response of firms, the introduction of innovations and the 
consequent dynamics of the system.
Schumpeter builds his dynamics upon the Marshallian foundations. 
While Schumpeter (1911/1934) praises Leon Walras, Schumpeter (1947, 
1941 and 1928) relies on Alfred Marshall moving away from an ex ante 
equilibrium that precedes production to an ex post quasi-equilibrium that 
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follows production and market exchange, showing that equilibrium is 
impossible with innovation. The early Schumpeter shares with Marshall 
the hypothesis that innovations are exogenous and random. Not surpris-
ingly, biological evolutionary models impinge upon this line of analysis. 
A line of analysis that had been overcome not only by Schumpeter (1942) 
but also by Schumpeter (1947) which draws from Marshall two key 
mechanisms: i) the competition process as a selection process, and ii) the 
endogenous dynamics of externalities; but it implements radically the 
Marshallian framework with the notion of creative response conditional 
to the availability of endogenous knowledge externalities. The approach 
elaborated by Schumpeter (1982, 1947) is able not only to go beyond the 
limits of the unexplained origins of variety assumed by Marshall as the 
result of a Darwinistic grafting, but also to provide the foundations of an 
evolutionary complexity.
The understanding of the complementarities and linkages between the 
Marshallian and the Schumpeterian (1947) legacies enables us to take 
advantage of the rich Marshallian framework and to use it to implement 
and strengthen the foundations of the new emerging approach to innova-
tion as a creative response and an emerging system property where both 
agent-based decision-making and the properties of the system in which 
firms are embedded. The Schumpeterian framework elaborated in 1947 
shares the basic microeconomic tools laid down by Marshall but departs 
from them – as well as from the earlier approach elaborated in Theory of 
Economic Development – as soon as firms in out-of-equilibrium conditions 
are credited with the capability to try to react to the unexpected conditions 
of both product and factor markets by means of the endogenous introduc-
tion of innovations.
In the Schumpeterian dynamics the reaction function of the firms plays 
a central role. The performance of each company is considered in equilib-
rium when results for the year fall in a spherical neighbourhood of zero 
whose amplitude is parametrically determined by the researcher. Firms are 
in out-of-equilibrium conditions when their profits – either below or above 
0 – are far from equilibrium. Firms that experience performance below 
equilibrium try to reduce the use of the current input and to purchase 
knowledge. Firms that enjoy profits try to increase both the amount of 
labour and that of knowledge: output and productivity increase together.
In the Schumpeterian model, pecuniary knowledge externalities 
substitute and actually augment the transient Marshallian externali-
ties associated with the imitation and selection processes. Because of 
the Arrovian characteristics of knowledge as an economic good such 
as limited appropriability and exhaustibility, non-divisibility and hence 
cumulability, limited rivalry in use and the recombinant generation of new 
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knowledge where existing knowledge is an indispensable input, the cost of 
knowledge may be actually lower than in equilibrium conditions. When 
the system properties are such that the costs of absorption and use of 
external knowledge are below equilibrium levels, the creative reaction can 
take place.10 The Schumpeterian dynamics may be endless provided that 
knowledge governance mechanisms remain at work, and hence the costs 
of knowledge keep falling below equilibrium levels.11
The results of this chapter provide a platform that can be enriched 
further to contribute complexity economics implementing the notion of 
innovation and knowledge as emergent properties of an economic system 
based upon the recursive interaction between individual action and the 
structure of the system (see Antonelli and Ferraris, 2017a). The structure 
of the system makes available pecuniary knowledge externalities. The 
entrepreneurial attempts of agents (caught in out-of-equilibrium condi-
tions) to introduce innovations have multiple effects:
●● They bring new changes in product and factor markets altering the 
expected equilibrium conditions upon which agents elaborate their 
productive plans.
●● They expand the generation of new additional technological knowl-
edge modifying the structure of interactions and transaction.
●● Hence, they change the actual amount of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities available in the system.
●● They reproduce variety within the system and push ahead the tech-
nological frontier so as to keep improving best practice.
In the framework that builds upon Schumpeter (1928, 1947) innovation, 
knowledge, variety and growth are endogenous and stochastic. This 
Schumpeterian framework enables us to identify the forces that may limit 
its reproduction. At each point in time knowledge governance mecha-
nisms, and hence the amount of pecuniary knowledge externalities, may 
decline with the consequent decline of the reproduction of variety, the 
rates of introduction of innovation and the rates of growth. The continual 
implementation of effective knowledge governance mechanisms is crucial 
to keep the working of knowledge externalities. This dynamics is clearly 
path dependent, as opposed to past dependent. When and if  the system 
is no longer able to support the regeneration of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities, the innovation process stops and the system identifies a stable 
attractor. The recursive interaction between individual decision-making 
and the system properties enable us to identify the introduction of innova-
tions as an emergent and contingent system property (Antonelli, 2008, 
2011, 2013, 2015a, 2017b).
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Evolutionary complexity empowered by the solid microfoundations of 
endogenous innovation derived from the Marshallian and Schumpeterian 
legacies seems far better equipped than evolutionary economics impinging 
upon the Darwinian legacy to grasp the endogenous drivers of innova-
tion and economic dynamics. Growth as a result of the endogenous and 
contingent reproduction of variety, made possible by the introduction 
of innovations, may be endless provided that appropriate knowledge 
governance mechanisms are implemented and supported. The recursive 
interaction between individual action and the evolution of the properties 
of the system paves the way to elaborate effective strategies at the firm 
level to make it actually persistent. The implications for policy are most 
important as it becomes clear that all interventions aimed at increasing the 
quality of knowledge governance mechanisms that favour the persistence 
of pecuniary knowledge externalities and consequently the reproduction 
of innovative variety are likely to enhance economic growth.
ABM is confirmed as a powerful theoretical tool as it enables us to show 
how different theoretical frames are the result of the recombination of 
analytical bricks drawn from pre-existing models that alter the working of 
the system and yield new theories. In this case the shifting role of externali-
ties plays a crucial role.
NOTES
 1. See the contributions of Stan Metcalfe (2007a and b, 2009a and b) that have highlighted 
the Marshallian foundations of the early Schumpeterian framework.
 2. See Metcalfe (2007a: 10, quoting Marshall, 1920; internal citations omitted): ‘In a 
famous passage Marshall claims that the tendency to variation is the chief  source of 
progress. This telling phrase captures in a single step the deep evolutionary content 
of Marshall’s thought but “What is meant by this?” The rest of the Principles make 
clear that variation and progress are connected by a variation cum selection dynamic, 
Marshall’s principle of substitution in which more profitable firms prosper at the 
expense of weaker brethren. Outcomes are tested in the market so that “society sub-
stitutes one undertaker for another who is less efficient in proportion to his charges”. 
Indeed, in introducing a discussion of profit in relation to business ability, Marshall is 
quite explicit that this principle of substitution is a “special and limited application of 
the law of “the survival of the fittest”. Furthermore, innovation is inseparable from the 
competitive process. For the advantages of economic freedom “are never more strik-
ingly manifest than when a business man endowed with genius is trying experiments, 
at his own risk, to see whether some new method or combination of old methods, will 
be more efficient than the old”. The relation runs two ways and mutually reinforces the 
links between free competition and business experimentation.’
 3. See Ravix (2012: 53, quoting Marshall, 1920): ‘In Marshall, entry and exit appears 
in different contexts. For instance, economic change leads to the distinction between 
“those who open out new and improved methods of business, and those who follow 
beaten tracks”.’
 4. Careful reading of the celebrated notion of ‘forest trees’ introduced by Marshall (1920) 
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is useful to support the hypothesis that young trees are the carriers of innovations 
that account for the growth of the system and the continual reproduction of out-of-
equilibrium conditions: ‘We saw how these latter economies are liable to constant 
fluctuations so far as any particular house is concerned. An able man, assisted perhaps 
by some strokes of good fortune, gets a firm footing in the trade, he works hard and 
lives sparely, his own capital grows fast, and the credit that enables him to borrow more 
capital grows still faster; he collects around him subordinates of more than ordinary 
zeal and ability; as his business increases they rise with him, they trust him and he 
trusts them, each of them devotes himself  with energy to just that work for which he 
is specially fitted, so that no high ability is wasted on easy work, and no difficult work 
is entrusted to unskillful hands. Corresponding to this steadily increasing economy of 
skill, the growth of his business brings with it similar economies of specialized machines 
and plant of all kinds; every improved process is quickly adopted and made the basis of 
further improvements; success brings credit and credit brings success; credit and success 
help to retain old customers and to bring new ones; the increase of his trade gives him 
great advantages in buying; his goods advertise one another, and thus diminish his 
difficulty in finding a vent for them. The increase in the scale of his business increases 
rapidly the advantages which he has over his competitors, and lowers the price at which 
he can afford to sell. This process may go on as long as his energy and enterprise, his 
inventive and organizing power retain their full strength and freshness, and so long as 
the risks which are inseparable from business do not cause him exceptional losses; and 
if  it could endure for a hundred years, he and one or two others like him would divide 
between them the whole of that branch of industry in which he is engaged. The large 
scale of their production would put great economies within their reach; and provided 
they competed to their utmost with one another, the public would derive the chief  
benefit of these economies, and the price of the commodity would fall very low. (Book 
IV. XIII. 3). But here we may read a lesson from the young trees of the forest as they 
struggle upwards through the benumbing shade of their older rivals. Many succumb on 
the way, and a few only survive; those few become stronger with every year, they get a 
larger share of light and air with every increase of their height, and at last in their turn 
they tower above their neighbours, and seem as though they would grow on for ever, and 
for ever become stronger as they grow. But they do not. One tree will last longer in full 
vigour and attain a greater size than another; but sooner or later age tells on them all. 
Though the taller ones have a better access to light and air than their rivals, they gradu-
ally lose vitality; and one after another they give place to others, which, though of less 
material strength, have on their side the vigour of youth’ (Book IV. XIII. 4). The Theory 
of Economic Development can now be read as the evident grafting of the Marshallian 
intuition about the role of entrepreneurs as the vehicles of innovation and growth.
 5. As a matter of fact Schumpeter had already overcome the limits of the exogenous 
role of entrepreneurship, not only in the 1928 essay but also and more consistently in 
Business Cycles (1939), where the cause/effect relationship between the phases of the 
economic cycle and the flows of innovations is investigated in depth, at least at the 
aggregate level.
 6. See Antonelli and Ferraris (2011, 2017a, b) for complementary specifications of the 
basic ABM presented here.
 7. The recent advances in economics of knowledge enable us to substantiate the dynamics 
of knowledge costs. Technological knowledge as an economic good is characterized 
not only by limited appropriability, but also by non-exhaustibility and non-divisibility 
(Arrow, 1962, 1969). Technological knowledge, moreover, has the unique characteristic 
to be at the same time the output of a dedicated process and a necessary, indispensable 
input in the generation of new knowledge as well as in the production of all other goods 
(David, 1993). Finally, the generation of technological knowledge is a recombinant 
process characterized by the central role of the stock of existing knowledge, both inter-
nal and external, to each learning agent (Weitzman, 1996; Fleming, 2001; Sorenson et 
al., 2006). The understanding of the unique characteristics of technological knowledge 
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as an economic good and the features of its generation process enables us to better 
grasp the dynamics of knowledge externalities. Each learning agent – not only worst-
performing firms but also most advanced ones – can actually benefit from the spillovers 
of the knowledge generation processes at work in the system (Griliches, 1979, 1984). 
The actual access conditions to knowledge generated at each point in time, and hence 
the mechanisms governing its dissemination, are crucial to make persistent the working 
of pecuniary knowledge externalities (Antonelli and Ferraris, 2011, 2017a, b).
 8. Agents that face losses reduce their input by a parametrical amount that was set to 0,1 
in all the simulations.
 9. See note 8.
10. In the simulation model we allow the actual costs of knowledge (z) to assume different 
values so as to show the effects of different types of knowledge governance mechanisms. 
In the first simulation run z is slightly smaller than the cost of knowledge-as-if-it-were 
a standard good (c) to mimic a system with weak knowledge governance mechanisms 
at work. In the second simulation run z is assumed to be much smaller than c so as to 
consider the case of high-powered knowledge governance mechanisms.
11. As noted, knowledge equilibrium levels would take place when the cost of external 
knowledge equals the costs of a standard good or when absorption costs are so high that 
the total costs of effective use of external knowledge equals the costs of knowledge as a 
standard good.
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   81 19/02/2018   13:42
82
4.  External and internal knowledge in 
the knowledge generation function
Cristiano Antonelli and Alessandra Colombelli
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contributes the analysis of the process by means of which new 
technological knowledge is generated. We define the object of our analysis 
as the knowledge generation function, as distinct from the technology 
production function. The knowledge generation function frames the gen-
eration of new knowledge as an economic activity, while the technology 
production function analyses the contribution of technological knowledge 
to the production of other outputs. The knowledge generation function 
was introduced in the literature, somewhat accidentally, by Zvi Griliches 
(1979) and actually articulated by Adam Jaffe (1986), enriched by Richard 
Nelson (1982) and fully elaborated by Weitzman (1996, 1998), Fleming 
and Sorenson (2001) and Arthur (2011), who characterize the generation 
of new technological knowledge as the output of the recombination of 
existing knowledge.
The aim of the chapter is to implement the notion of the knowledge gen-
eration process as a recombination process, highlighting the  complementary 
– as opposed to supplementary – indispensable role of the knowledge 
generated by other firms as a strictly necessary input, together with the size 
and composition of each firm’s stock of both internal and internal existing 
knowledge and their current research and development R&D activities.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
a synthesized account of the emergence of the knowledge generation 
function and the increasing attention to the complementary – as opposed 
to supplementary – role of external knowledge and to the specific char-
acteristics of the stock of knowledge both internal and external in each 
firm, instead of considering it a generic bundle. Section 3 articulates the 
hypotheses about the complementarity of external knowledge and the role 
of the composition of the stock of knowledge with R&D activities in the 
knowledge generation process. A novel specification of the knowledge 
generation function is the result of the analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present 
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the data, the econometric model and the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses presented in Section 3. Section 6 presents the results of the 
econometric tests. The conclusions summarize the results of the analysis 
and explore the implications.
2.  FROM THE TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION TO THE KNOWLEDGE 
GENERATION FUNCTION
The notion of knowledge generation function studies specifically the 
process and inputs that make possible the generation of knowledge as 
an output.1 The knowledge generation function differs from the technol-
ogy production function, one of the pillars of the applied economics of 
innovation, where knowledge, alongside capital and labour, is considered 
explicitly as an input in the standard production function for all other 
goods (Griliches, 1979, 1990, 1992; Romer, 1990; Link and Siegel, 2007; 
Cohen, 2010).
The identification of the knowledge generation function is the result of 
a long process that takes its first steps from the Arrovian analysis of knowl-
edge as an economic good (Arrow, 1962, 1969; Nelson, 1959). Preliminary 
attempts to identify a direct relationship between inputs and outputs in 
the generation of technological knowledge were first made in the growth 
literature by Phelps (1966), who called it the ‘technology function’ and 
‘effective research function’, and by Gomulka (1970), who referred to the 
direct relationship between knowledge inputs and knowledge outputs as 
the ‘production function of innovations’.
Griliches (1979) explores the relationship between R&D and knowledge 
output as a by-product of his attention to the structure of lags of R&D 
that is necessary to compute properly the stock of R&D capital, and 
mentions the ‘complication’ that knowledge is itself  a dependent variable 
in a knowledge production function where past and current R&D efforts 
are the independent variables.2 It seems worth noting that Griliches, who 
introduced the technology production function and the notion of spillover 
to highlight the role of external knowledge alongside internal knowledge 
in the production of all other goods, never considered the role of external 
knowledge in the generation of new technological knowledge, limiting 
its role to the production of all other goods. At the same time, Griliches 
should be credited with the first explicit appreciation of the role of the 
stock of knowledge together with that of current R&D efforts: in so doing 
he acknowledges the role of knowledge cumulability, but not of knowledge 
externalities.
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Jaffe (1986) can be regarded as the first explicit, empirical analysis of 
the knowledge generation function: the number of patents is treated as 
the output of a Cobb–Douglas production function where internal R&D 
expenditures together with the spillovers of related knowledge generated 
by other firms are the independent variables.3 As a matter of fact little 
attention has been paid in the subsequent literature to the Cobb–Douglas 
specification of the knowledge generation function used by Jaffe. The 
Cobb–Douglas specification proposed by Jaffe makes clear that external 
knowledge is not a supplementary input that magnifies the output, but 
an indispensable one. The Cobb–Douglas specification used by Jaffe 
implies that external knowledge is a complementary – as opposed to 
 supplementary – input that cannot be dismissed: in a region with no spillo-
vers available all internal R&D efforts cannot generate any technological 
knowledge. Very little attention has been paid to the complementarity of 
external knowledge as an indispensable input: the literature has mainly 
treated it as a supplementary one.
Attention on the efficiency of the knowledge generation function has 
been stressed by Nelson (1982), who made an important contribution 
to articulate a clear knowledge generation function approach, stressing 
the need to consider explicitly knowledge as the output of a specific and 
dedicated activity and to take into account the variety of inputs, comple-
mentary to R&D expenditures, that make possible the generation of new 
knowledge. David (1993) marks the final step in the process, stressing that 
knowledge is at the same time an input in the generation of new knowledge 
and in the production of all other goods; but it is also and primarily the 
output of a dedicated activity.
Weitzman (1996) opened up a new literature that frames the new 
understanding of knowledge generation as a recombinant process where 
existing knowledge items enter as inputs, shedding new light on the role of 
knowledge indivisibility and cumulability. After much attention was paid 
to the notion of knowledge non-appropriability, other key  characteristics – 
such as non-exhaustibility, cumulability and complementarity that stem 
from its intrinsic indivisibility – are appreciated. Because no agent can 
command all existing knowledge, the recombination approach clearly 
implies a multiplicative relationship both between knowledge items and, at 
the firm level, between internal and external knowledge.
Antonelli (1999) articulates the hypothesis that technological knowledge 
is the output of a bundle of dedicated activities such as learning, R&D, 
search and technological transactions and interactions with the scientific 
community that enable firms to acquire the four knowledge inputs – that 
is, internal, external, tacit and codified knowledge – that are necessary 
for the generation of new technological knowledge. Along these lines, 
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Patrucco (2008, 2009) uses explicitly a Cobb–Douglas specification of the 
knowledge generation function to stress at the same time the complemen-
tarity between external and internal knowledge and their substitutability 
within well-defined ranges. Fleming and Sorenson (2001), Lucas (2008) 
and Arthur (2009) show how the generation of technological knowledge 
follows a branching process where earlier modules feed the new ones. Da 
Silva (2014) is able to model the ‘Jefferson’s candle light effect’ with the 
notion of knowledge multiplier defined by the extent to which external 
knowledge enhances the innovative capacity of each firm. The larger 
the knowledge multiplier, the stronger the cumulative positive effects of 
external knowledge on the generation of new knowledge.
The specification of knowledge generation as a combinatorial process 
where, together with levels of current R&D efforts, the stock of existing 
knowledge both internal and external to each agent is an essential input 
in the current generation of new knowledge can be regarded as the arrival 
point of a long research process that has moved external knowledge from 
the role of supplementary input to the crucial role of complementary 
input.
Since then a growing empirical literature has paralleled the advances 
of the theoretical analysis exploring the characteristics of the knowledge 
generation function, assessing the role of different measures and proxies 
for both knowledge inputs and knowledge outputs, providing important 
contributions to understanding the complementarity of external knowl-
edge to internal research and learning processes and the heterogeneity of 
knowledge as a composite bundle of differentiated items.
The first empirical estimates of the knowledge generation function are 
quite simplistic and use R&D expenditures as the key input. Furman et al. 
(2002) follow Griliches, and show that the differences in the levels of inno-
vation activity across countries are explained by the differences in the level 
of inputs such as R&D manpower and spending invested in the generation 
of innovations. The empirical framework of the knowledge generation 
functions has been applied not only at the country level but also at the 
regional level, with interesting results with an elementary frame where 
R&D expenditure is the single input and the patents granted to a given 
region are the output (Fritsch, 2002; Ó hUallacháin and Leslie, 2007).
The contribution by Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998, hereafter CDM) 
marks a major step in the empirical analysis from many viewpoints. To start 
with, the CDM approach provides the first econometric analysis of the 
knowledge generation function combined with the technology production 
function in a single framework. In so doing it provides a broad econometric 
model in which the relationships between knowledge inputs, knowledge 
outputs and productivity are estimated within a four equation model able 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   85 19/02/2018   13:42
86 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
to assess in parallel the effects of R&D expenditures not only on innovation 
counts but also on labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). 
In this sense the CDM model represents an empirical setting dedicated to the 
analysis of the relationship between innovation and productivity able to take 
into account also the generation of technological knowledge (Mohnen and 
Hall, 2013). The CDM approach, however (following strictly Griliches, 1979, 
1990), does not consider the role of external knowledge in the generation of 
new technological knowledge. As a matter of fact the structured system of 
equations of the CDM approach raises the problematic issue of assigning 
knowledge externalities: whether they enter the technology production func-
tion and/or the knowledge generation function.
Parisi et al. (1996) explore the likelihood that R&D expenditures affect 
the introduction of product innovations, as distinct from process innova-
tions, using the European Community Innovation Survey. In so doing 
they depart from the simplistic knowledge generation function and draw 
attention to the need to explore other determinants of process innovations.
Nesta and Saviotti (2005) make a major innovation in the empirical 
analysis of the determinants of the generation of new knowledge at the 
firm level, overcoming the limitations of regarding knowledge as a homo-
geneous bundle and drawing attention to the characteristics of the stock 
of knowledge as a central input in the generation of new knowledge and 
analysing the relationship between the coherence of the knowledge base 
and the innovative performance of US pharmaceutical firms measured by 
means of citation-weighted patent count.
The composition of the stock of knowledge, in other words, matters as 
well as its sheer size. The shorter the distance between different types of 
knowledge, the higher the capability of a firm to absorb external knowl-
edge and to combine it with its internal knowledge, cumulated over time. 
Furthermore, this representation provides the basis to move to empirical 
analyses by constructing an image of the knowledge base as a network in 
which the nodes are constituted by units of knowledge at a given level of 
aggregation. Such empirical investigations can be successfully conducted 
by exploiting information contained in patent documents exploiting as 
a relevant source of information on the qualification of each knowledge 
item the assignment of patents to multiple technological classes (Saviotti, 
2004, 2007; Krafft et al., 2009; Nesta and Dibiaggio, 2003; Quatraro, 2010; 
Colombelli et al., 2013a, 2014).
Conte and Vivarelli (2005) identify formal R&D activities and the acqui-
sition of external knowledge as the key inputs of three alternative measures 
of innovative output. Their evidence confirms that external knowledge is a 
necessary and indispensable input strictly complementary to internal R&D 
activities.
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Because of the relevant costs of absorption of external knowledge, 
knowledge externalities can be considered as pecuniary rather than pure 
externalities. Knowledge spills, but its use – as an input in the generation 
of new knowledge – is not free; dedicated resources are necessary to 
use external knowledge as such knowledge externalities are pecuniary 
rather than pure (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Colombelli and von 
Tunzelmann, 2011). Following this line of analysis, Gehringer (2011a, b, 
2012) uses input–output tables to track the flows of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities and provides substantial evidence on the key role of external 
knowledge provided by upstream suppliers to downstream users, showing 
how the flows of knowledge parallel the flows of goods contributing to 
the downstream generation of new technological knowledge. Her evidence 
confirms, once more, the relevance of user–producer interactions (see also 
Von Hippel, 1988).
Jaffe (1989) applies his original approach to explore the effects of 
academic research on the generation of technological knowledge by firms 
localized in proximity. He is able to identify significant effects of academic 
research on the number of patents filed by firms particularly in the areas 
of drugs and medical technology, and electronics, optics and nuclear tech-
nology. Once again, Jaffe made one step forward, suggesting that academic 
research may actually induce R&D activities of co-localized firms.
Strumsky et al. (2012) and Youn et al. (2015) provide rich evidence, 
based upon US patent records dating from 1790 to 2010, to analyse the 
evolving distribution of patents across technological classes. They also 
explore the characteristics of the combinatorial process that is at the heart 
of the knowledge generation process, identifying the central role of the mix 
of exploitation and exploration of the existing technological knowledge.
An array of detailed empirical studies shows that external knowledge 
can be sourced by means of a variety of tools such as user–producer 
interactions, mobility of personnel among firms and interactions with 
academic research. In all cases the specific screening and reassessment of 
the items of existing knowledge are necessary for their subsequent active 
inclusion and integration as inputs of the knowledge generation process. 
The current levels of R&D expenditures of each agent do play a role, but 
only in a context that is shaped by the past of each firm and by the charac-
teristics of the system in which it is localized (Feldman, 2003; Chesbrough 
et al., 2006; Antonelli et al., 2013).
Love and Roper (2009) explore the use of external knowledge in four 
discrete stages of the innovation process – new product development (iden-
tifying new products), product design and development, product engineer-
ing and product marketing – and test their complementarity with internal 
research activities in an innovation production function where output is 
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measured by the percentage of sales derived from innovative products. 
Their empirical results, however, are influenced by the methodological 
approach that does not allow taking into account the positive effects of 
the substitution of any of the activities with others according to changes 
in their relative costs.
Johansson and Lööf (2008, 2014, 2015), in a remarkable string of 
contributions, draw attention back to the role of spillovers to gener-
ate technological knowledge, and stress the mutual complementarity of 
internal effort and external knowledge. While much attention is paid to the 
role of spillover, little attention is paid to the need for agents to participate 
actively in the process. Internal efforts are necessary both to scan the 
available external knowledge and to absorb it. Agents with low levels of 
commitment to R&D activities can benefit very little from the generous 
opportunities offered by regions rich in technological spillovers (Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999, Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Griffith et al., 2003; 
Ruckman, 2008).
3.  THE HYPOTHESIS: EXTERNAL KNOWLEDGE AS 
AN ESSENTIAL INPUT IN THE RECOMBINANT 
GENERATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE
The recombinant knowledge approach has paved the way to elaborate a 
new frame of analysis able to accommodate the central role of existing 
knowledge, including external knowledge, as an input in the generation 
of new knowledge. As Weitzman recalls (1996: 209), ‘when research is 
applied, new ideas arise out of existing ideas in some kind of cumulative 
interactive process that intuitively has a different feel from prospecting for 
petroleum’. This insight has led to the so-called recombinant approach: 
new ideas are generated by means of the recombination of existing ideas 
under the constraint of diminishing returns to scale in performing the 
R&D activities that are necessary to apply new ideas to economic activi-
ties. The generation of new knowledge stems from the search and identifi-
cation of elements of knowledge that had been already generated for other 
purposes and yet reveals characteristics and properties that had not been 
previously considered. The search for existing knowledge items that can 
be recombined and used as input in the generation of new knowledge is 
strictly necessary.
Existing knowledge is both internal to the firm, stored in the stock of 
competence and knowledge accumulated in the past, and external to each 
firm. In this case it can be accessed by means of knowledge interactions 
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and transactions with suppliers, customers and other agents qualified by 
substantial proximity. Appreciation of the generation of new technological 
knowledge as a recombination process that consists in the reorganization 
and reconfiguration of the relations among existing knowledge items 
enables us to better appreciate the effects of knowledge indivisibility, 
articulated in internal cumulability and external complementarity in the 
generation of new knowledge. The generation of new technological knowl-
edge at each point in time, by each agent, in fact is strongly influenced not 
only by the internal accumulation of knowledge but also by the knowledge 
made available by the other firms that belong to the system in which each 
firm is embedded.
The recombinant approach enables us to appreciate the central role of 
two important inputs in the generation of new technological knowledge, 
such as the knowledge base of each firm as qualified by the size and 
the composition of stock of knowledge that each firm possess, and the 
components of knowledge that are external and yet highly complementary 
to the research activities undertaken by each firm.
Analysis of the composition of the internal stock of knowledge enables 
us to qualify the characteristics of the knowledge base of each firm. 
Technological knowledge cannot be regarded as a homogeneous pile, but 
rather as a composite bundle of highly differentiated and idiosyncratic 
elements that are qualified by specific relations of interdependence and 
interoperability. This approach enables us to identify the extent to which 
the generation of new technological knowledge in a field depends upon 
the contributions of knowledge inputs stemming from other fields: a new 
knowledge item exhibits high levels of composition when it relies upon a 
large number of other knowledge fields.
Our basic hypothesis is that external knowledge is an essential and 
strictly complementary – as opposed to supplementary – input in the 
generation of new knowledge. At each point in time, no agent possesses all 
the knowledge inputs. Yet agents need to access the variety of knowledge 
items that are available in the system and, as such, are possessed and being 
used by the other firms that belong to the system. The search for and the 
absorption of external knowledge is necessary, and its acquisition is the 
result of an intentional activity. Access to external knowledge is possible 
only if  dedicated resources are invested to search, screen and interact to 
access, purchase, learn, understand and eventually recombine the external 
units of knowledge with the internal ones.
The standard Edgeworth definition of complementarity – according 
to which two activities are complementary if  doing more of one activity 
increases the returns from doing the other – applies to two interdependent 
but separate activities, but not to the knowledge generation process where 
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the mix of external and internal knowledge is the result of a constrained 
choice and includes the well-known possibility that, within the constraints 
of their relative costs, in order to increase output it may be necessary to 
increase the amount of external knowledge and reduce the amount of 
internal knowledge, or vice versa. An increase in pecuniary knowledge 
externalities stemming from the reduction of screening and absorption 
costs of external knowledge leads to the use of more external and less 
external knowledge, and yet to an increase in knowledge output.
The integration of these issues in the recombinant approach to the 
generation of technological knowledge enables us to lay down our basic 
argument. Technological knowledge is at the same time an input and an 
output, and it is the result of an intentional economic action. Technological 
knowledge is localized in the accumulated competence of firms and in the 
knowledge space in which firms are rooted. New knowledge can be gener-
ated, by means of the recombination of existing knowledge items, when, 
where and if:
●● An intentional action directed at its generation is undertaken. New 
technological knowledge does not fall like manna from heaven. The 
generation of knowledge requires an active and explicit action. R&D 
activities are necessary to activate the recombination process. This is 
not their single function. Current R&D activities are also necessary 
to access, learn and absorb the stock of existing knowledge within the 
firm and the external knowledge generated by third parties. Current 
R&D activities are necessary also to track the records, entertain, 
retrieve and eventually reuse the knowledge that has been produced 
in the past and is stored in the stock of knowledge and competence 
that each firm has accumulated. Current R&D activities moreover 
are necessary to access, learn and absorb the stock of knowledge that 
is external to each firm: this contrasts the passive attitude that would 
characterize the prospective users of technological spillovers. In 
sum, current R&D expenditures are necessary not only to perform 
the recombination but also to supply it with the stock of knowledge 
internal to each firm and with access to the external knowledge 
generated by other firms.
●● The knowledge base of each firm is identified and the role of previ-
ous knowledge is fully appreciated. The knowledge base of a firm 
is identified by the size and composition of the stock of knowledge 
that each firm has been able to generate in the past. The knowledge 
base exerts its positive effects in the long run and enters directly as 
an input in the knowledge generation function. According to our 
interpretative framework, knowledge generation is a non-ergodic 
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process where history matters as it helps build higher and higher 
levels of competence and innovative capability.
●● External knowledge is a crucial, indispensable input in the generation 
of new technological knowledge. Each agent has access only to local 
knowledge interactions and externalities, that is, no agent knows 
what every other agent in the whole system at large knows. Because 
of the localized character of knowledge externalities and their strong 
tacit component, interactions matter. Consequently, proximity in a 
multidimensional space, in terms of distance between agents and 
their density, matters. Agents are localized within networks of 
transactions and interactions that are specific subsets of the broader 
array of knowledge externalities, interactions and transactions that 
take place in the system. The wider and easier the access to the 
local pools of knowledge, the larger the amount of technological 
knowledge that each firm is able to generate for given levels and 
composition of the internal stock of knowledge and the amount of 
current R&D.
●● External and internal knowledge and R&D activities are mutually 
complementary. This has two important implications: i) no agent 
can generate new technological knowledge without access to external 
knowledge; ii) no agent can generate technological knowledge with-
out appropriate efforts even in a spillover-rich context.
4. DATASETS
Our data source is the Intergovernmental Preparedness for Essential 
Records (IPER) database, which collects information on 3882 companies 
listed on the main European markets (UK, Germany, France, Italy 
and the Netherlands).4 The IPER database has been built by matching 
information from multiple sources of  data. Our main source of  market 
and accounting data is Thomson Reuters Datastream, which delivers 
worldwide economic and financial time series data. To obtain additional 
relevant variables we include in information collected from Bureau Van 
Dijk’s Amadeus, which contains financial data on European companies. 
In order to match information from these two databases we use the 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), which uniquely 
identifies a security. Our final sample includes all companies listed on 
the selected markets and active in 2010 for which we were able to collect 
the necessary information from the above-mentioned data sources, and 
represents 42 per cent of  the population of  active listed companies in the 
period and countries analysed.
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We also use data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) REGPAT database, which provides regional 
information on the addresses of patent applicants and inventors as well as 
on technological classes cited in patents granted by the European Patent 
Office (EPO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), from 1978 to 2006. In order 
to match the firm-level data with data on patents, we draw on the work 
of Thoma et al. (2010), which develops a method for harmonization and 
combination of large-scale patent and trademark datasets with other 
sources of data, through standardization of applicant and inventor names. 
Finally, we pooled the dataset by adding industry-level information on 
OECD countries from the organization’s STAN database.
Our sample is an unbalanced panel that includes 1156 R&D reporting 
firms and 484 companies that submitted at least one patent application to 
the EPO in the period 1995–2006. Moreover, in order to build the cognitive 
distance index, which measures the dissimilarity between two technologies 
(see Section 5.1 for details), equation (4.4) focuses on 101 companies that 
submitted at least one patent application to the EPO only if  this patent has 
been assigned at least to two technological classes.
This may cause some biases in the estimations if  missing data are non-
random. The econometric techniques we implement (which are described 
in detail in Section 5) allow for the mitigation of this problem. In particu-
lar, the estimation methods implemented allow us to account for the fact 
that only a subsample of firms are engaged in research activities, and that 
only relatively few firms have patents.
As mentioned above, the period of observation for all the firms exam-
ined is 1995 to 2006. Table 4.1 reports the sample distribution by macro-
sector classes. High- and medium-high technology classes are highly 
represented in the sample of R&D reporting and patenting firms, while 
Table 4.1 Sample distribution in macro-sectors, %
Macro-sector Total R&D reporting Patenting
HT 16.98 29.31 32.75
MHT 17.31 27.93 37.91
MLT 3.18 3.39 4.53
LT 13.44 9.10 10.11
KIS 38.73 25.77 10.11
LKIS 6.95 0.78 0.91
EP 3.41 3.71 3.67
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
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 knowledge-intensive services are highly represented in the whole sample 
and in the sample of R&D reporting firms.
5. METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES
Our econometric strategy takes into account the many problems inherent 
to the model and to the nature of the data. First, only a minority of firms 
are engaged in (formal) R&D activities, so that studies restricted to these 
firms are prone to such biases. Also, only relatively few firms have patents, 
and thus analyses limited to them may be similarly biased. In addition, 
patents being count data require specific econometric methods to handle 
them. Finally, there is the major issue of the endogeneity of innovative 
input and output, and more generally of the simultaneity in our model as 
R&D is endogenous in the innovation equation.
We treat all these estimation problems by relying on a recursive model 
that is an extension of the CDM model developed by Crépon et al. (1998). 
In so doing, we rely on a model comprising a system of equations. We take 
care of selection problems and of the specific nature of variables by using a 
Heckman procedure and a count data specification for patents, respectively. 
We deal with simultaneity by using a two-stage estimation procedure.
It is worth noting that the original CDM model is based on three distinct 
interrelationships: i) the research equation linking the knowledge input 
with its determinants; ii) the knowledge generation equation relating 
knowledge input to knowledge output; iii) the productivity equation relat-
ing knowledge output to productivity.
Following this seminal work, more recently a number of studies have 
applied the CDM model to analyse the determinants of the knowledge 
generation process. In this stream of the literature it is possible to identify 
two groups of works: i) those studies based on an application of a fully 
structured CDM model, taking into account all three stages of the model; 
ii) those studies based on a partial structured model, taking into account 
at least one link between the three stages. Given our focus on the role of 
knowledge in the generation of new technological knowledge, we follow 
this latter group of works and apply an extended version of a CDM partial 
structure model.
More precisely, we focus on the first two stages of the CDM model and 
analyse the determinants of the knowledge inputs and the equations that 
test the knowledge generation function. First, firms decide on whether to 
perform R&D and, if  so, how much. Then, depending on the extent of 
their R&D and other factors, they achieve a certain knowledge output. 
Hence, our model consists of two groups of equations:
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●● Research and development equations:1) firms’ decision to engage in 
R&D activities; 2) the determinants of the amount of R&D activi-
ties, and
●● Knowledge generation equations: 3) the probability to patent; 4) the 
knowledge generation function.
The following subsections describe the econometric methodologies and the 
specifications used for the estimations of the model’s four equations.
5.1 R&D Equations
To describe a firm’s research behaviour, we rely on a two-equation model, 
where the first equation accounts for the fact that the firm is engaged in 
research activities and the second for the intensity of these activities.
Let D_R&Dit* be the latent dependent variable whether to invest in 
R&D or not, and LnR&Dit* be the latent or true intensity of R&D invest-
ment of firm i; D_R&Dit and LnR&Dit are the corresponding observed 
variables. The two-equation R&D investment model is written as follows:
 D_R&D*it 5 b1x1it1k1i 1u1it (4.1)
with D_R&Dit = 1 if  D_R&D*it>0, D_R&Di = 0 otherwise.
 LnR&D*it / (D_R&Dit51) 5b2x2it1k2i1u2it (4.2)
with LnR&Dit = LnR&D*it if  LnR&Dit>0, LnR&Dit = 0 otherwise.
Here x1it and x2it are the explanatory variables; b1 and b2 are the respec-
tive coefficients; k1i and k2i represent unobserved characteristics that are 
fixed over time; and u1it and u2it are the individual-specific unobserved 
disturbances. The variable LnR&Dit is only observable if  D_R&Dit = 1
The independent variable explaining, first, the probability of engaging 
in R&D activities and, second, the intensity of these activities is intangible 
assets. Investment in intangible assets seems to provide a reliable proxy 
for the broad array of activities that are necessary to explore the existing 
stock of knowledge, both internal and external to each firm, master the 
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge and exploit it. 
Moreover, in the selection equation (4.1) we include a measure of firm 
size. Finally, both equations include a set of industry and time dummies to 
capture market and cycle conditions (see Section 5.3 for detailed specifica-
tions of all variables).
We estimate equations (4.1) and (4.2) following two approaches. The first 
approach is the Heckman two-step sample selection procedure (Heckman, 
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1981). Hence, the first equation is estimated using a probit; the second 
equation is estimated in levels by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and includes the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) as an explanatory variable to 
correct for possible selection bias. Yet, with panel data, OLS estimates of 
the selected subsample are inconsistent if  selection is non-random and/or 
if  correlated individual heterogeneity is present. We thus adopt also the 
estimation method proposed by Wooldridge that can be used in a panel 
setting to take into account that there may be some unobserved time-
variant factors that can affect selection and influence R&D levels through 
the error term. In this approach, the time-invariant effects are assumed to 
be linked with x1it through a linear function of k1i on the time averages of 
x1it (denoted by x1i_bar) and an orthogonal error term ai which exhibits no 
variation over time and is independent of x1it and u1it:
 k1i = x1i_bar + ai
Hence equation (4.1) can be rewritten as:
 D_R&D*it5 b1x1it1g1x1i 1v1it (4.1a)
with the composite error term v1it = u1it + ai being independent of x1it and 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance s2. In this approach, 
to obtain estimates for the IMR, a standard probit on the selection equa-
tion (4.1a) is estimated for each t. In this approach, equation (4.2) can be 
rewritten as:
 LnR&D*it / (D_R&Dit51) 5b1x2it1g2x2i 1zl2it1v2it (4.2a)
where lit is the IMR and v2it is an orthogonal residual.
Wooldridge proposes estimating equation (4.2) by including the t IMR 
obtained from the selection equation for each time period along with the 
regressors. Moreover, as the error term is allowed to be correlated with 
the IMR, equation (4.2a) can be consistently estimated by pooled OLS. 
We followed the procedure described by Wooldridge and calculated panel 
bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm. This allows for obtaining 
standard errors corrected for first-stage probit estimates and robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The two approaches by Heckman 
and Wooldridge allow predicting the potential R&D for non-reporting 
firms.
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5.2 The Knowledge Generation Function
To describe the generation process that goes from knowledge input to 
knowledge output, we rely on a two-equation model: the first (equation 
4.3) accounts for the fact that only relatively few firms have patents, and 
thus analyses limited to them may be biased; the second (equation 4.4) is 
the knowledge generation function. Equation (4.3) is formalized as:
 D_PAT *it 5 aLnR&Dit1b3x3it1u3i  (4.3)
with D_PATit = 1 if  D_PAT*it>0, D_PATit = 0 otherwise.
D_PATit is the observed dichotomous variable taking value 1 if  the firm 
has applied for a patent and D_PAT*it is the corresponding latent variable. 
Equation (4.3) is estimated using the predicted values for all firms obtained 
from the estimations of equations (4.1) and (4.2).5 As a consequence, 
LnR&Dit is the prediction of the R&D intensity variable from equation 
(4.2) and/or (4.2a), and a is the corresponding coefficient; x3it is a vector of 
other explanatory variables including the IMR as an explanatory variable 
to correct for possible selection bias.
Equation (4.3) tests the hypothesis that the probability to patent is 
determined by: i) the estimated levels of R&D activities; ii) the amount 
of external knowledge; iii) the size of the firm; and iv) the interaction 
term lnR&D_hat *lnRegK that is expected to catch the multiplicative 
complementarity between internal and external knowledge. Note that 
the interaction term is expected to catch the complementarity between 
the current internal learning and research efforts of each agent and the 
current efforts of all the other co-localized firms. This specification enables 
us to test the hypothesis that the decision to generate new technological 
knowledge is contingent upon the flow of current research and learning 
efforts of co-localized firms. We estimate equation (4.3) using a standard 
probit estimator.
Finally, equation (4.4) tests the knowledge generation function (1), 
where the knowledge output is measured in terms of number of patents 
while all terms on the right-hand side enter in logarithmic form. Equation 
4.4 is formalized as follows:
 N_PAT *it /(D_PATit5 1) 5b4x4it1u4it (4.4)
with N_PATit = N_PAT*it if  N_PATit > 0, N_PATit = 0 otherwise.
The x4it are the explanatory variables and b4 the respective coefficients.
Here, the output measure is explained by three sets of independent 
time-varying variables that identify the specific relevant characteristics 
9
9
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of the size and the internal knowledge base and the amount of external 
knowledge respectively. The internal knowledge base here plays a central 
role in order to appreciate the effects of knowledge cumulability both in 
terms of its size, as measured by the stock of patents, and its composition, 
as measured by the cognitive distance (see Section 5.4 for its detailed speci-
fications). Finally, the alternative interaction term (lnRegK *lnKSTOCK) 
is expected to catch the multiplicative complementarity between internal 
and external knowledge (see Section 5.3).
As the dependent variable N_Pat, measuring the number of a firm 
patents, is a count variable, equation (4.4) is estimated using count models 
that prove more appropriate in dealing with non-negative integers. More 
precisely, equation (4.4) can be estimated by means of either a Poisson or 
a negative binomial model.
Since our dependent variable is over-dispersed, as shown in Table 4.3 by 
the fact that its variance is far larger than the mean for the sample of pat-
enting firms, the negative binomial estimator seems to be more appropri-
ate. Moreover, since firms included in our sample belong to all industrial 
sectors, they show different patenting behaviour. For this reason, equation 
(4.4) can be estimated by a zero-inflated regression model. Zero-inflated 
models attempt to account for excess zeros by means of the estimation of 
two equations simultaneously, one for the count model and one for the 
excess zeros. In other words, zero-inflated models deal with two sources of 
over-dispersion: a qualitative part, which explains the presence or absence 
of patent count; and a quantitative part, which explains the positive patent 
count for firms having at least one patent in a given year. Zero-inflated 
regression models might be a good option if  there are more zeros than 
would be expected by either a Poisson or a negative binomial model. We 
thus finally use a zero-inflated negative binomial regression estimator. To 
account for the panel nature of our dataset, we cluster on firm identifiers 
to correct the standard errors within cluster similar values.
5.3 Variables’ Measurement Methods
In this section we describe all variables’ measurement methods.
D_R&D is a dummy taking value 1 if  a firm’s R&D expenditures are 
positive. The variable lnR&D is specified in relative terms as the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to total assets for firm i at time t − 16.
LnIA is the logarithm of intangible assets for firm i at time t − 1 and is 
used in equations (4.1) and (4.2) to predict R&D expenditures.
In order to appreciate the effects of the internal stocks of knowledge of 
firms, we have included the variable lnKSTOCK measured in terms of the 
number of patents held by each firm. This is computed by applying the 
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permanent inventory method to patent applications. We calculate it as the 
cumulated stock of patent applications using a rate of obsolescence of 15 
per cent per annum. The choice of the rate of obsolescence raises some 
basic issues as to the most appropriate value. There are indeed a number 
of studies moving from Schankerman and Pakes (1986) that attempted 
to estimate the patent depreciation rate. However, for the scope of this 
chapter we follow the established body of literature based on Hall et al. 
(2005) that applies to patent applications the same depreciation rate as 
the one applied to R&D expenditures (see for example McGahan and 
Silverman 2006; Coad and Rao 2006; Nesta 2008; Laitner and Stolyarov 
2013; Rahko 2014).
 KSTOCKit = h
•
it + (1−s)KSTOCKit−1 (4.5)
where h
•
it is the flow of patent applications and s is the rate of obsoles-
cence. We finally compute the logarithm of the patent stock.
The variable lnCD accounts for the composition of the stock of knowledge 
internal to each firm, and qualifies its knowledge base in terms of cognitive 
distance (lnCD). Following the recombinant knowledge approach, this index 
expresses knowledge dissimilarities among different types of knowledge (see 
Section 5.4 for the specifications and measure of this variable).
The third set of variables accounts for the contribution of the knowledge 
that is external to each firm at time t but made accessible by proximity. 
Here lnRegK measures the patenting activities of firms localized within 
the same region, and as such can produce positive pecuniary knowledge 
externalities mainly based upon the mobility of skilled personnel and more 
generally of the array of knowledge interactions that make the access and 
use of external knowledge cheaper.
We also include a dedicated variable to account for the contribution 
of the knowledge that is external to each firm but made accessible by 
inter-regional knowledge flows. Here lnExtRegK measures the patenting 
activities of firms localized outside their region and aims at capturing the 
role of the sources of external knowledge that are far away from firm i. 
The variable has been computed as the number of patents (in Log) in the 
NUTS2 regions of the EU-24 member states, weighted using distance from 
firm i’s region at time t − 1.
Moreover, to catch the multiplicative cumulability between internal 
and external knowledge in equation (4.3), we develop the interaction term 
lnR&D_hat *lnRegK. Specifically, in this interaction term the levels of 
estimated R&D activities at the firm level multiply the levels of external 
knowledge in terms of patenting activities.
In addition, to catch the multiplicative cumulability between internal 
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and external knowledge in equation (4.4), we develop the interaction 
term lnRegK *lnKSTOCK. Here, the stock of knowledge at the firm level 
multiplies the levels of external knowledge. This specification enables us 
to test the hypothesis that the amount of knowledge output that a firm is 
able to generate is contingent upon the multiplicative relationship between 
the internal stock of knowledge and the levels of current efforts of all the 
other co-localized firms.
We finally included a set of control variables. The variable lnSize controls 
for the firm’s size and is measured as the Log of its sales (deflated using 
industry deflators). Moreover, we included both sectoral and time dum-
mies in order to control for industrial and time effects. For each variable 
the measurement method is defined in Table 4.2, while descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 4.3. The correlation matrix can be found in Table 4.4.
5.4 The Cognitive Distance Index
The implementation of the cognitive distance index, proxying for similar-
ity, rests on the recombinant knowledge approach. In order to provide 
Table 4.2 Variables’ measurement methods
Variable Measurement method
R&D dummy D_R&D Dummy = 0 if  firm’s R&D expenditures 
are positive
R&D intensity lnR&D Log (R&D / total assets) for firm i at time 
t − 1
Intangible assets lnIA Log intangible assets for firm i at time 
t − 1
External knowledge  
 within the firm’s region
lnRegK Log of no. of patents in the same region 
(NUTS2) of firm i at time t − 1
External knowledge  
 outside the firm’s region
lnExtRegK Log of no. of patents in regions 
(NUTS2) belonging to EU-24 member 
states other than that of firm i at time 
t − 1, weighted using distance
Patent dummy D_Pat Dummy = 1 if  firm has applied for 
patents
Number of patents N_Pat No. of patents for firm i at time t
Knowledge stock lnKSTOCK Log of patent stocks (PIM) for firm i at 
time t − 1
Cognitive distance lnCD Log of cognitive distance of firm i at 
time t − 1
Firm’s size lnSize Log of deflated sales for firm i at time 
t − 1
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an operational translation of such a concept one needs to identify both 
a proxy for the bits of knowledge and a proxy for the elements that make 
up their structure. For example, one could take scientific publications as a 
proxy for knowledge, and look either at keywords or at scientific classifica-
tion (like the JEL code for economists) as a proxy for the constituting ele-
ments of the knowledge structure. Alternatively, one may consider patents 
as a proxy for knowledge, and then look at technological classes to which 
patents are assigned as the constituting elements of its structure, that 
is, the nodes of the network representation of recombinant knowledge. 
Here we will follow this latter avenue. Each technological class l is linked 
to another class j when the same patent is assigned to both of them.7 The 
higher the number of patents jointly assigned to classes l and j, the stronger 
is this link. Since technological classes attributed to patents are reported 
in the patent document, we will refer to the link between l and j as the 
co-occurrence of both of them within the same patent document.8
On this basis we calculated the cognitive distance (CD), which expresses 
the average degree of dissimilarity among different types of knowledge 
(Nooteboom, 2000). A useful index of distance can be derived from techno-
logical proximity proposed by Jaffe (1986, 1989), who investigated the prox-
imity of firms’ technological portfolios. Breschi et al. (2003) adapted this 
index to measure the proximity or relatedness between two technologies.
We define Plk = 1 if  the patent k is assigned the technology l [l = 1, . . ., 
n], and 0 otherwise. The total number of patents assigned to technology l 
is Ol5gkPlk. Similarly, the total number of patents assigned to technology 
j is Oj5gkPjk. We can, thus, indicate the number of patents that are clas-
sified in both technological fields l and j as Vlj5gkPlk  Pjk . By applying this 
count of joint occurrences to all possible pairs of classification codes, we 
obtain a square symmetrical matrix of co-occurrences whose generic cell 
Vlj reports the number of patent documents classified in both technologi-
cal fields l and j.
Technological proximity is proxied by the cosine index, which is cal-
culated for a pair of technologies l and j as the angular separation or 
un-centred correlation of the vectors Vlm and Vjm. The similarity of 
technologies l and j can then be defined as:
 Sl j5
anm51V1mVjmÅanm51V 21mÅanm51V 2jm  (4.6)
The idea behind the calculation of this index is that two technologies, j 
and l, are similar to the extent that they co-occur with a third technology, 
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m. Such a measure is symmetric with respect to the direction linking 
technological classes, and it does not depend on the absolute size of the 
technological field. The cosine index provides a measure of the similarity 
between two technological fields in terms of their mutual relationships 
with all the other fields. Slj is the greater the more two technologies l 
and j co-occur with the same technologies. It is equal to one for pairs of 
technological fields with identical distribution of co-occurrences with all 
the other technological fields, while it goes to zero if  vectors Vlm and Vjm are 
orthogonal (Breschi et al., 2003). Similarity between technological classes 
is thus calculated on the basis of their relative position in the technology 
space. The closer technologies are in the technology space, the higher is Slj 
and the lower their cognitive distance (Breschi et al., 2003; Engelsman and 
van Raan, 1994; Jaffe, 1986).
The cognitive distance between j and l can therefore be measured as the 
complement of their index of technological proximity:
 dlj = 1−Slj (4.7)
Having calculated the index for all possible pairs, it needs to be aggregated 
at the firm level to obtain a synthetic index of technological distance. 
This is done in two steps. First we compute the weighted average distance 
(WAD) of technology l, that is, the average distance of l from all other 
technologies:
 WADlt5
a j21dljPjt
a j21 Pjt  (4.8)
where Pj is the number of patents in which the technology j is observed. 
The average cognitive distance at time t is obtained as follows:
 CDt5a lWADlt3 Plta lPlt (4.9)
In our model the variable is included in logarithm (lnCD).
6. RESULTS
Table 4.5 shows the results for the R&D equations estimated using the 
Heckman and the Wooldridge procedures. More precisely, the estimates of 
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equations (4.1) and (4.2) are reported in columns (4.1) and (4.2), while the 
estimates of equation (4.2a) are reported in column (4.2a).9 The two set 
of equations allow predicting the potential R&D for non-reporting firms.
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results for equation (4.3) and the extended 
one that includes the interaction variable. Columns (4.3) and (4.3’) show 
results if  the levels of R&D are estimated using the Heckman procedure, 
and columns (4.3a) and (4.3a’) if  the levels of R&D are estimated using the 
Table 4.5 Estimation results for the R&D equations
Equation (4.1)
Dep. Var.
(4.1)
D_R&D
(4.1a)
D_R&D
lnINTASS 0.1044*** See Antonelli and  
Colombelli (2015a)
(0.0054)
lnSize 0.0312***
(0.0066)
Time dummies Yes
Sectoral dummies Yes
N 16,998
Equation (4.2)
Dep. Var.
(4.2)
Pooled OLS
lnRED
(4.2a)
Wooldridge
lnRED
lnINTASS 0.3817*** −0.0852***
(0.0902) (−4.27)
lnINTASS_bar 0.139***
(4.24)
Time dummies Yes Yes
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes
Constant −15.0707*** −7.892***
(2.0508) (−10.40)
IMR 6.3322*** 2.087***
lambda (1.1110) (4.93)
N 6305 6305
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (here and in Tables 4.6–4.7).
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Wooldridge procedure. Our results confirm the hypothesis that the prob-
ability to patent is determined by: i) the estimated levels of R&D activities; 
ii) the amount of external knowledge; iii) the size of the firm; and iv) the 
complementarity between internal and external knowledge. First, R&D 
activities contribute significantly to the generation of new knowledge, 
as confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient of lnRED_hat. 
Second, the positive and significant role of external knowledge is con-
firmed by the results of the lnRegK variable. Moreover, in order to check 
further the role of external knowledge, we also included in our model a 
variable measuring the patenting activities of firms localized outside their 
region (lnExtRegK). lnExtRegK turns out to be significantly related to the 
probability of generating new technological knowledge only in two out of 
four regressions. Finally, the interaction term proved to be positively and 
significantly related to a firm’s probability to patent (columns 4.4’ and 
4.4a’).
Table 4.7 shows the results of the zero-inflated negative binomial regres-
sion estimations for equation (4.4) and the extended one that includes the 
interaction variable. Columns (4.4) and (4.4’) show results if  the levels of 
R&D are estimated using the Heckman procedure, while columns (4.4a) 
Table 4.6 Estimation results for Equation 4.3
Equation (4.3)
Dep. Var.
(4.3)
D_PAT
(4.3’)
D_PAT
(4.3a)
D_PAT
(4.3a’)
D_PAT
lnRED_hat 0.119*** 0.153***
(29.93) (11.11)
lnRegK 0.0984*** 0.0851***
(10.57) (9.50)
lnRED_hat* lnRegK 0.0122*** 0.00296*
(21.89) (1.87)
lnExtRegK 0.223*** 0.140** 0.0411 0.0486
(3.46) (2.25) (0.66) (0.79)
lnSize 0.0668*** 0.0949*** 0.124*** 0.115***
(12.48) (18.30) (22.50) (21.11)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −2.461*** −2.040*** −1.6524*** −2.379***
(−6.52) (−5.68) (0.4143) (−6.65)
N 16,998 16,998 16,998 16,998
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and (4.4a’) if  the levels of R&D are estimated using the Wooldridge proce-
dure. The negative and significant results of the knowledge base – specified 
as the multiplicative relation between the stock of patents and their cogni-
tive distance (LnCD * lnKSTOCK) – suggests, first, that stocks of patents 
with high levels of similarity exert positive effects on the generation of 
new knowledge. This means that when firms focus their search activity in 
a region of the knowledge space that is close to their accumulated com-
petences, they are more likely to achieve the successful generation of new 
knowledge. Second, the interaction term (lnRegK * lnKSTOCK), designed 
to catch the multiplicative interaction between internal and external 
knowledge, exerts a positive and significant impact on the generation of 
new knowledge.
These results fully confirm our hypothesis that the generation of new 
technological knowledge is affected by the complementarity between 
Table 4.7 Estimation results for Equation 4.4
Equation (4.4)
Dep. Var.
(4.4)
N_PAT
(4.4’)
N_PAT
(4.4a)
N_PAT
(4.4a’)
N_PAT
LnCD * lnKSTOCK −0.1303*** −0.0784*** −0.1289*** −0.0808***
(0.0088) (0.0099) (0.0082) (0.0097)
lnRegK * lnKSTOCK 0.0503*** 0.0521***
(0.0086) (0.0089)
lnSize 0.0739** 0.0733** 0.0002 −0.5929***
(0.0328) (0.0349) (0.0421) (0.2102)
IMR lambda −0.5543* 0.1427 −1.3239*** −9.0380***
(0.2980) (0.2892) (0.4049) (2.6659)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −3.3782*** −4.3537*** −1.3670 15.4298***
(0.6352) (0.6185) (0.9805) (5.9484)
Inflate macro-sector 1.8629 0.0803 0.0197 1.7295
(1.3856) (0.3026) (0.2839) (1.4122)
Constant −0.5183*** −0.7274*** −3.6444*** −14.1992
(0.1220) (0.1336) (1.2266) (8.9442)
lnalpha
Constant −0.5172*** −0.6558*** −0.6150*** −0.7736***
(0.1269) (0.1341) (0.1319) (0.1319)
N 883 883 883 883
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internal and external knowledge, and by the composition and size of the 
stock of internal knowledge.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The knowledge generation function is an important tool that enables us 
to open the black box of the knowledge generation process. The Arrovian 
analysis of the characteristics of knowledge as an economic good has 
important implications to understand the specificities of the knowledge 
generation process. The key attributes of indivisibility and limited appro-
priability identified – especially when the twin character of knowledge 
that is at the same time the output of the generation process and an input 
in the following generation process – is fully grasped, together with its 
implications.
Analysis of knowledge indivisibility has made it possible to identify the 
two key dimensions of internal and external knowledge cumulability. The 
efficient and effective generation of new knowledge at time t is possible only 
standing on the shoulders of the technological knowledge that has been 
generated until that time both by the very same firm and by the other firms 
in geographical, technological and industrial proximity. Since no agent can 
command all the technological knowledge that has been generated at each 
point in time and the limited appropriability of technological knowledge 
engenders the possibility to access, absorb and use the knowledge that has 
been generated by third parties, the knowledge external to each firm plays 
a key role in the generation of new technological knowledge.
The early specifications of the knowledge generation function did 
not pay attention to the characteristics of knowledge as an economic 
good and could not take advantage of their important implications 
to understand the dynamic process that makes the generation of new 
technological knowledge possible. The results of our empirical analysis 
confirm that the output of knowledge is generated not only by means of 
R&D expenditures: knowledge external to each firm, the stock of existing 
knowledge within the firm and the composition of the knowledge internal 
and external to each agent enter the knowledge generation function as 
essential inputs. Our results suggest the strong and positive role of the 
stock of knowledge possessed by each firm, and the key role of proximity. 
External knowledge plays a role as an input when it is embedded in firms 
that are co-localized in regional proximity. Proximity also matters with 
respect to the components of the knowledge base: the higher the similarity 
of the knowledge base, the larger the output in terms of new knowledge.
These results have important implications on three counts. First, they 
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confirm that the generation of technological knowledge is the result of 
a systemic process that is jointly influenced by the efforts of each agent, 
by the size and the composition of the stock of knowledge cumulated in 
the past, and by the amount of external knowledge that can be accessed 
within the system in which each firm is embedded. These results help put 
the excess attention paid to R&D expenses in the appropriate context, 
grasping the role of the other essential factors in the knowledge generation 
process.
The specific endowment cumulated in the past through time and 
represented by the size and the composition of the stock of technological 
knowledge exerts long-term effects on the actual ability of firms to gener-
ate new technological knowledge. These effects can be altered and affected 
by the current effects of R&D expenditures that each firm is able to fund 
and perform at each point in time and by the quality of the pools of 
external knowledge that each firm can access.
Technological knowledge can no longer be regarded as a homogene-
ous bundle. Its composition in terms of specific components must be 
appreciated and taken into consideration both from a policy and a strategy 
viewpoint. The identification of the actual levels of complementarity of 
the types of knowledge available in a region and in the stock of other 
firms must be closely assessed when public interventions to support the 
introduction of innovations and strategic action by firms are at stake.
Appreciation of the key role played by external knowledge enables 
us to fully understand the systemic conditions that shape and make the 
generation of new technological knowledge possible. The generation of 
new technological knowledge is influenced by individual characteristics 
of each firm, such as the past accumulation of knowledge and the cur-
rent commitment of resources to research, but requires access to the 
complementary knowledge that is external to each firm because it has 
been generated and is – partly – possessed by other firms in geographical, 
industrial and technological proximity. The generation of technological 
knowledge cannot be regarded as the result of stand-alone activity, but 
rather as the product of a collective process. This leads to the identification 
of innovation as an emergent property of a system. The characteristics of 
the system are crucial to assess the amount and the characteristics of the 
knowledge being generated.
These results are important for their implications for both public policy 
and corporate strategy. Appreciation of the strong complementarity of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities stemming from external knowledge 
and current inputs, together with the internal stocks of knowledge, draws 
attention to the fact that the actual amount of knowledge that a firm is 
able to generate with given levels of R&D is heavily influenced by the size 
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and density of the local pools of knowledge as shaped by the knowledge 
possessed by other firms and by the networks in which firms are able to 
participate.
NOTES
1. The knowledge generation function has very often been called the knowledge produc-
tion function (KPF). Former use of this latter terminology can be found in Pakes and 
Griliches (1984). Jaffe (1986) instead calls it patent equation. However, there is also much 
literature that used to label KPF the technology production function, engendering some 
confusion. We therefore use the label ‘knowledge generation function’ so as to rule out 
any possible ambiguity.
2. See Griliches (1979: 95, note 3): ‘An alternative approach would complicate this model 
further by adding an annual knowledge production function of the form dK = H(R, K) 
and defining K accordingly’ (where K stands for knowledge and R for R&D activities). 
Griliches’ subsequent contributions (1990 and 1992) fully confirm that his main interest 
was assessment of the statistical merits of patents as an indicator of R&D rather than 
exploration of the relationship between patents and R&D expenditures as a knowledge 
generation function.
3. See Jaffe (1986: 988): ‘I begin by assuming that the new knowledge produced by the firm 
in any period is related to its RaD in that period according to a modified Cobb–Douglas 
technology . . . where k, is the new knowledge generated by firm i, r, is its R&D spending, 
and s, is the potential “spillover pool” whose construction is described above.’
4. Implementation of the IPER database was financed by the Collegio Carlo Alberto, under 
the IPER project.
5. This approach reflects the assumption that all firms carry out innovative activities, 
although some of them do not report any innovative investment.
6. As in our model, we do include the variable in logarithmic form; we obtain negative 
values in the descriptive statistics of lnR&D and lnCD.
7. In the calculations four-digit technological classes have been used.
8. It must be stressed that to compensate for intrinsic volatility of patenting behaviour, 
each patent application lasts five years in order to reduce the noise induced by changes 
in technological strategy.
9. The t estimates of equation (4.1a) are not given here but are reported in Antonelli and 
Colombelli (2015a).
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5.  The role of external knowledge in 
the introduction of product and 
process innovations
Cristiano Antonelli and Claudio Fassio
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contributes to the literature on knowledge generation 
with a novel approach that stresses the heterogeneity of  the sources of 
external knowledge and their differentiated effects on types of  innova-
tion. The crucial role of  external knowledge in the generation of  new 
knowledge as a necessary, complementary input in the generation of  new 
technological knowledge is well known. External knowledge however 
cannot be regarded as a homogeneous bundle. Its origins, properties 
and acquisition mechanisms are major factors that determine to what 
extent firms can actually benefit from access to the external inputs of 
knowledge. Indeed, not all types of  external knowledge convey the same 
innovative outputs, and firms should update their knowledge-sourcing 
strategies accordingly.
This chapter focuses on the inbound side of  knowledge sourcing and 
open innovation, and makes two contributions. First we show that dif-
ferent sources of  knowledge impact different types of  innovation. More 
specifically, we distinguish among: a) horizontal sources of  knowledge 
stemming from competitors in the same industry; b) transaction-based 
upstream vertical knowledge embodied in acquisitions of  machinery; 
c) upstream vertical knowledge flows proceeding from interactions 
with suppliers; d) vertical downstream knowledge stemming from the 
interaction with customers. We show how these different types of  external 
knowledge impact differently on product and process innovation. While 
horizontal and vertical downstream sources have a stronger effect on 
product innovation, upstream vertical knowledge (whether stemming 
from transactions or interactions with suppliers) mainly favours process 
innovation. We also show how these findings are surprisingly similar for 
different types of  firms: even when we consider separately small, medium 
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and large firms, as well as high-tech and low-tech ones, our results remain 
largely unchanged.
The implications of these findings are the second contribution of this 
chapter. Awareness of the differentiated effects of the various sources of 
external knowledge on firms’ innovative performance should push manag-
ers to act strategically in their inbound exploratory practices. Managers 
should be able to identify which sources of external knowledge are avail-
able in the system in which firms are embedded and direct firms’ innovative 
strategies accordingly in order to benefit as much as possible from those 
specific sources of knowledge.
Accounting for the heterogeneity of external knowledge seems an 
important research topic on which major progress can be done, through 
exploration of the diversity of technological knowledge according to its 
sources and its effects. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the related literature and introduces the hypotheses, while 
Section 3 presents the methodology for the empirical investigation, the 
data sources and the results of the econometric analyses. The conclusions 
summarize the results and outline the main implications of the analysis.
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES
Analysis of the knowledge generation process has been at centre stage of 
the economics of innovation for quite some time. Building upon the impor-
tant acquisitions of the analysis of the characteristics of knowledge as an 
economic good, it has been possible to explore the economic activities that 
lead to its generation and eventual application through the introduction 
of technological innovations (Griliches, 1979; Pakes and Griliches, 1984; 
Jaffe, 1986). The central role of external knowledge has been identified and 
appreciated as an indispensable complementary input, together with R&D 
activities, in the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge: 
no firm can generate the technological knowledge that is necessary to inno-
vate, alone, in isolation (Schumpeter, 1947; Weitzman, 1996; Antonelli, 
2008).
Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) 
confirm the complementarity of external knowledge and highlight the 
limited possibility to substitute it with internal R&D. Complementarity 
also implies a system-level perspective, since agents with little R&D cannot 
benefit from the opportunities offered by regions rich in technological 
spillovers, while major R&D efforts may fail when the level of knowl-
edge externalities in the system is not appropriate (Griffith et al., 2003; 
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Ruckman, 2008; Johansson and Lööf, 2015). Antonelli and Colombelli 
(2015a) articulate and test the hypothesis that external and internal knowl-
edge are complementary as each of them is indispensable and cannot fall 
to zero levels without annulling output.
The technology management literature has provided substantial con-
tributions to understanding the role of  external knowledge in knowledge 
generation implementing the open innovation research agenda (Enkel 
et al., 2009). This literature has stressed the role of  the inbound open 
innovation strategies that consist in the acquisition of  external knowledge 
inputs and their systematic integration with internal knowledge in knowl-
edge generation (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; 
Bianchi et al., 2010; Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Mortara and Minshall, 
2011).
Identification of  the variety of  activities that make access to external 
knowledge possible and appreciation of  their differentiated effects on the 
rate of  introduction of  innovations have been among the main results 
of  this line of  enquiry. However the results of  these studies have also 
highlighted the potential pitfalls of  inbound open innovation strategies. 
Howells et al. (2008) and Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) study in detail 
the effects of  one such activity to access external knowledge, that is, 
R&D outsourcing. They identify relevant drawbacks as they note that 
it is necessary to take into account the relevant cost of  its integration 
within the internal knowledge generation process with potential negative 
consequences in terms of  dilution of  firm-specific resources. Grimpe 
and Kaiser identify a maximum level of  R&D outsourcing beyond which 
over-outsourcing has negative effects on the rate of  introduction of  inno-
vations. Ebersberger and Herstad (2011) explored in detail the effects of 
three modes of  acquisition of  external knowledge – search, collaboration 
and external R&D – on the introduction of  product innovations. Search 
and collaboration affect innovation performance positively, and are 
complementary to each other. R&D outsourcing instead seems to exert a 
negative impact that is partly reduced if  it is associated with search and, 
conversely, reinforced when it takes place with collaboration (Lin et al., 
2012).
Theyel explores the different components of the value chain of firms 
to assess the stage and the mode of access and use of external knowledge. 
According to her results more than 50 per cent of firms rely on external 
knowledge during technology and product development and commer-
cialization, while only 30 per cent of them engage in joint manufacturing. 
Theyel suggests that open innovation practices do not always lead to 
improvements in innovation performance; in some circumstances firms 
reach a ‘tipping point’ where ‘the usage of additional external sources after 
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a certain amount may become a burden rather than an advantage, result-
ing in negative returns’ (Theyel, 2013: 261).
These results cast some doubt on the effective role of external knowledge 
on the rate of introduction of technological innovations and recall the 
crucial need to balance internal sources with external ones (March, 1991). 
As Faems et al. (2010) note, inbound open innovation strategies are highly 
context dependent. Their implementation and actual success is heavily 
affected by the characteristics of the system in which firms are embedded 
(see also Lee and Wong, 2011).
Hypotheses
These last results suggest that a useful improvement on the existing 
literature consists in an analysis that does not merely focus on the 
quantitative contribution of external knowledge to innovative outcomes, 
but rather investigates the variety of sources of external knowledge and 
their differentiated impact on different types of innovation outputs. Here 
we will consider the effect of a number of different sources of external 
knowledge on innovative outcomes. As Di Stefano et al. (2012) remark, 
the old dilemma between technology-push and demand-pull inducements 
on innovation suggest that relevant knowledge inputs for the development 
of innovations might stem both upstream from suppliers and downstream 
from customers. We analyse the role of external knowledge that flows 
vertically across industries, both upstream from suppliers and downstream 
from clients, as well as external knowledge inputs stemming horizontally 
from competitors in the same industry. The sources of external knowledge 
are likely to influence not only the amount of new technology being 
introduced, but its type: specifically, we focus on their effect on process and 
product innovations. Let us articulate our hypotheses in detail.
Cappelli et al. (2014) show that horizontal knowledge spilling from com-
petitors active in the same product market seems better able to contribute 
to the generation of new technological knowledge directed towards the 
introduction of product innovations. Here external knowledge consists in 
the reciprocal borrowing and use of technological knowledge produced by 
each competitor able to imitate and implement the innovations introduced 
by the other firms engaged in the same innovation race (see also Laursen 
and Salter, 2006; Quatraro, 2009; O’Regan and Kling, 2011). On the basis 
of this evidence we put forward our first hypothesis:
H1: Horizontal flows of  external knowledge that spill among com-
petitors in the same product markets would favour the generation of  new 
technological knowledge with a bias in favour of  product innovations.
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Technological knowledge also flows vertically among firms within value 
chains, across industries. Transactions between suppliers and customers 
of capital goods and other intermediary inputs are a primary source of 
embodied technological knowledge that affects the innovation process of 
downstream users. Firms that acquire advanced capital goods that embody 
new technological knowledge take advantage of learning by using, and 
introduce new technologies in their production process (Parisi et al., 2006). 
In a similar way, user–producer interactions between potential innovators 
and their suppliers activate upstream knowledge flows that empower the 
access to tacit knowledge and competence on the characteristics of the 
production process: again this favours, mainly, the introduction of proc-
ess innovations (Fassio, 2015). Accordingly, our second hypothesis is the 
following:
H2: External knowledge that flows vertically upstream within user–
producer relations should mainly favour the generation of technological 
knowledge for process innovations.
Bartelsman et al. (1994) distinguish between upstream and downstream 
flows of  technological knowledge. User–producer interactions between 
potential innovators and their customers activate downstream knowl-
edge flows that empower the access to tacit knowledge and competence 
on the characteristics of  the products so as to favour – mainly – the 
introduction of  product innovations. As also shown by the literature 
on user-driven innovation (von Hippel, 1998), it is likely that external 
knowledge stemming from customers of  technological products will 
favour the introduction of  product innovations thanks to the compe-
tent  knowledge  provided by users. Our third hypothesis is hence the 
following:
H3: External knowledge that flows vertically downstream within user–
producer interactions should mainly favour the generation of technologi-
cal knowledge for product innovations.
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 provide a graphical representation of our 
hypotheses. The matching of types of innovation and sources of external 
technological knowledge is crucial to understanding properly the actual 
role of external knowledge and to design both policy instruments and 
strategic action.
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3. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Data
In order to test empirically the relevance of the different sources of 
external knowledge to product and process innovation we use Eurostat’s 
harmonized Community Innovation Survey (CIS)4 data, which refer to 
the period 2002–2004.1 The great advantage of this database is the pos-
sibility to treat company data from the same wave of the CIS together for 
different countries. We hence pooled in a unique database all the firms that 
answered the questionnaire from all the manufacturing sectors. We limit 
our analysis to the six larger countries included in the  database: Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Norway and Spain.
Dependent variables
In the CIS each firm is asked whether it has introduced at least one product 
or process innovation in the time span covered by the survey. The dependent 
variables are: a dummy variable for the introduction of process innovation; 
another dummy for the introduction of product innovation; and a third 
dummy for the introduction of at least one of the two types of innovation.
Table 5.1 Types of external knowledge and innovation
Horizontal external 
knowledge
Vertical external knowledge
Product innovation When competitors in the 
same product markets are 
the main source of external 
knowledge the innovation 
processes of firms rely 
on creative imitation 
that favours mainly the 
introduction of new 
products
Downstream user–producer 
interactions with clients are 
an important source of tacit 
knowledge and competence 
about the characteristics 
of the products, and 
hence a major source of 
technological knowledge that 
enables the introduction of 
product innovations
Process innovation Process innovations are 
favoured by: i) high-quality 
upstream use–producer 
interactions with suppliers; 
ii) relevant transactions of 
advanced machinery and 
intermediary inputs
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Independent variables
Horizontal flows of external knowledge The horizontal flows of external 
knowledge measure the external knowledge coming from the industrial 
environment in which the firm is embedded. In CIS4 the firms surveyed 
are asked to report the total amount of internal and external R&D in the 
time span considered. On the basis of this data we summed up all the firms’ 
expenditures in R&D for each national sector and obtained the overall 
amount spent in that sector, hence an industry-specific variable. More 
specifically:
 HORIZONTALj 5 a
i
RDij
where j = sector of firm i.
In order to take into account potential size effects due to cross-country 
differences we also computed the average level of R&D for each sector by 
dividing the total sum of R&D by the number of firms in each sector.
SUPPLIERS
UPSTREAM
INTERACTIONS
UPSTREAM
TRANSACTIONS
PROCESS INNOVATION
PRODUCT INNOVATION
HORIZONTAL
FLOWS
DOWNSTREAM
FLOWS
COMPETITORS
CUSTOMERS
Figure 5.1 Differentiated effects of sources of innovation
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Downstream vertical flows of external knowledge Downstream vertical 
flows are measured by the interaction between firms and their customers. 
The flows of external knowledge proceeding from interactions with users 
and customers are proxied by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if  a firm 
declares that customers have been an important source of information for 
the development of innovations.
Transaction-based upstream vertical flows The flows of external knowl-
edge that firms are able to access through transactions with their suppliers 
are measured by the share of expenditures in machinery acquisition over 
the total sales by each firm. The purchase of machinery is the primary 
means of acquisition of external knowledge embodied in capital goods.
Interaction-based upstream vertical flows The flows of knowledge stem-
ming from interactions with upstream suppliers are proxied by a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if  a firm declares that suppliers are an important 
source of information in the innovative process.
Other controls
We also control for the use of internal sources of knowledge by firms, and 
use a standard measure of internal R&D. Moreover, we control for com-
pany size, distinguishing between small, medium and large firms. We also 
check the sectoral affiliation of each firm, using the two-digit sector ISIC 
rev.3. classification. Our database is composed of all the manufacturing 
firms who answered the CIS4 survey in the six countries considered. After 
some necessary cleaning procedures to eliminate outliers our database is 
made of 23,247 observations, which include both innovating and non-
innovating firms.2 Table 5.2 provides some descriptive statistics of the 
firms in the database.
3.2 Methodology
To test our hypotheses we start from a generic knowledge generation 
function in which (IK) and (EK) are vectors of indispensable and comple-
mentary inputs in the generation of new knowledge (KN):
 KN = f (IK EK) (5.1)
We then elaborate the basic knowledge generation function with the fol-
lowing specifications: i) internal knowledge is proxied by the firm’s own 
investments in in-house R&D; ii) external knowledge is distinguished in 
its four heterogeneous components – downstream stemming from interac-
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tions with customers (DOWNSTR), vertical upstream stemming from 
interactions with suppliers (UPSTR-inter), vertical upstream mediated by 
transactions (UPSTR-trans) and horizontal (HORIZONTAL); the output 
KN is distinguished in terms of product innovations, process innovations 
and innovations that affect both products and processes. Equation (5.1) is 
consequently re-specified as it follows:
 KNsi 5R&Dai DOWNSTRb 1i UPSTR2 trans b 2i UPSTR 2 interb 3i
 HORIZONTAL gj  (5.2)
where s = PRODUCT INNO, PROCESS INNO, INNOVATION.
KN denotes the knowledge generated by firm i: we distinguish among 
PRODUCT INNO and PROCESS INNO, which indicate the introduction 
of product or process innovations, while INNOVATION stands for the 
introduction of either or both of them.
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean
(1)
St. dev.
(2)
Firm-level variables
upstream-interaction 0.123 0.328
upstream-transaction (logs) −9.348 3.381
downstream 0.157 0.364
horizontal*Oi (sum of sectoral R&D in logs) 3.287 3.876
horizontal*Oi (average sectoral R&D in logs) 2.260 2.775
Oi (predicted values) 0.176 0.196
R&D intensity (logs) −1.618 2.302
Turnover in 2004 (logs) 15.59 1.793
size (employees): < 50 0.552 0.497
size (employees): 50–249 0.307 0.461
size (employees): > 250 0.141 0.348
Patenting activity 0.146 0.353
Local funding 0.121 0.326
National funding 0.124 0.330
European funding 0.055 0.308
Cooperation 0.168 0.374
Industry-level variables
Sum of sectoral R&D (logs) 17.97 1.693
Average sectoral R&D (logs) 12.00 1.632
Notes: The sample includes 23,247 firms. All financial variables are in Euros.
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Following Griffith et al. (2006b) we assume that the appropriation of the 
horizontal flows of external knowledge is filtered by the degree to which a 
firm is open to external knowledge; that is, the influence of the horizontal 
external stock of knowledge (HORIZONTAL) on firm i is a linear func-
tion of a firm-specific degree of openness to external knowledge, which we 
indicate as O:
 gi = pOi (5.3)
We proxy the openness Oi of  each firm with the probability that it will 
invest in external R&D. We introduce a probit equation that identifies 
the determinants of this decision, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if  a firm invested in extramural R&D, and equal to zero 
otherwise. By estimating the probit model we can obtain the predicted 
probabilities of investing in external R&D. This new variable, which will 
be bounded between zero and one, will be used as a proxy for the openness 
variable Oi, that is, the firm-specific propensity to engage in external R&D.
We then take logs in equation (5.2), where lower case letters indicate 
logs:
knsi  = a rd inti + b1 downstr + b2 upstr-trans + b3 upstr-interi + g horizontalj
 (5.4)
Then we simply substitute (5.3) in (5.4) and obtain the following equation 
to estimate:
 knsi  = a rd inti + b1 downstr + b2 upstr-trans + b3 upstr-interi +
 p (horizontalj*Oi) + dxi + ui (5.5)
Equation (5.5) allows us to estimate the direct effect of the investments 
in internal R&D on the generation of knowledge. Moreover, the model 
measures the impact of the heterogeneous types of external knowledge on 
the innovative capacity of firms. The x variables are standard controls for 
firm size and for sector and country effects, while u is an idiosyncratic error 
term. We estimate equation (5.5) with a probit model using three proxies 
of knowledge creation: product innovation, process innovation or both of 
them.
3.3 The Results
Before estimating equation (5.5) we first build our measure of openness 
(Oi) for all the firms in our sample. Column (1) of Table 5.3 presents the 
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Table 5.3 Probit and Tobit estimation of R&D
Dependent variable Engagement in 
external R&D
Engagement in 
R&D
Intensity of R&D
Probit Tobit
(1) (2) (3)
Turnover in 2004 (in logs) 0.033*** 0.052*** −0.282***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
Belonging to a group 0.034*** 0.008 0.102***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.037)
International markets 0.036*** 0.121*** 0.214***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.051)
Patenting activity 0.099*** 0.276*** 0.630***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.042)
Size
50–249 −0.002 0.042*** −0.115**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.047)
> 250 −0.003 0.061*** 0.162**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.076)
Local funding – – 0.204***
(0.035)
National funding – – 0.440***
(0.035)
European funding – – 0.180***
(0.031)
Cooperation – – 0.207***
(0.034)
Constant – – −0.792***
(0.303)
Observations 23,247 23,247 23,247
Wald test of indep. eqns  
 (rho = 0)
– 142.1 142.1
rho – 0.472 0.472
Wald test – Chi-squared 4578 3444 3444
Log-likelihood −7988 −18,629 −18,629
Pseudo R squared 0.261 – –
Notes:
In column (1) the dependent variable is equal to one if  a firm engaged in external R&D 
(R&D bought from other partners) and zero otherwise. In column (2) the dependent 
variable is equal to one if  a firm engaged continuously in R&D. The dependent variable in 
column (3) is equal to the logarithm of the ratio of total R&D expenditures over sales. In 
columns (1) and (2) coefficients display marginal effects computed at the sample mean. All 
models include industry and country dummies.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   119 19/02/2018   13:42
120 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
results of a probit estimation in which the dependent variable is the dummy 
indicating whether or not a firm has invested in R&D performed outside 
the firm. The estimated coefficients of the probit estimation enable us to 
build a measure of the openness variable (Oi) through the predicted values 
of the dependent variable. We hence obtain a useful weight, bounded 
between zero and one, which we multiply by the amount of R&D in the 
sector of each firm in order to obtain a proxy of the horizontal flows of 
knowledge (horizontal* Oi).
In order to estimate equation (5.5) we also need to take into account 
the large number of firms that declare zero expenditure in internal R&D, 
which might lead to the usual problems of censored distribution. In 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 5.3 we implement a Tobit type II estimation 
procedure to identify the determinants of the intensity of R&D expendi-
tures. This estimation allows us to obtain the predicted values of internal 
R&D intensity for all the firms in the sample as a proxy of the investments 
in internal knowledge (IK) in equation (5.1).
In Table 5.4 we estimate the main equation of interest – equation (5.5) – 
in which we test the effect of all types of flows of external knowledge 
on firms’ innovative performance. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable for the introduction of at least one product 
and/or process innovation.
The predicted R&D intensity is positive and significant, coherent with 
previous studies (Griffith et al. 2006a; Li-Ying et al., 2013; Voudouris et 
al., 2012). As for the vertical flows of knowledge, both downstream flows 
(downstream) and upstream flows (either transaction- or interaction-based) 
have a positive and significant effect on the probability of introducing an 
innovation, highlighting the important role of vertical ties. The variable 
that proxies the horizontal flows of external knowledge (horizontal* Oi) 
displays a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that also the abil-
ity to benefit from competitors’ stock of knowledge contributes positively 
to innovation performance. In column (2) we use the average level of 
intramural R&D performed in each sector, instead of the overall sum: the 
coefficient of horizontal flows increases, suggesting that average R&D 
is probably a more precise measure of the stock of horizontal external 
knowledge available to a firm.
In the remaining columns of Table 5.4 we distinguish between the intro-
duction of product and process innovation. In line with our hypothesis 
H1 we find that the horizontal flows of knowledge (HORIZONTAL) 
have a much larger positive effect on product innovation rather than on 
process innovation. When in columns (4) and (6) the horizontal flows of 
external knowledge are proxied by the average level of R&D in each sector 
(weighted by the degree of openness), rather than the simple sum, the 
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difference between product and process innovations becomes even more 
evident: in the product innovation equation the coefficient of horizontal 
flows of knowledge displays a higher coefficient than in the previous speci-
fication, while in the case of process innovation the effect of the horizontal 
flows of external knowledge becomes smaller.
The same differentiated effect is found for the external knowledge 
coming from the downstream vertical linkages (downstream), proxied by 
the importance of customers for the development of innovations, which 
tend to favour product innovation, rather than process innovation, in line 
with Hypothesis H3. Conversely, upstream vertical flows of knowledge 
have a large and positive impact on process innovation, coherently with 
Hypothesis H2. Both transaction-based upstream linkages (upstream 
transaction) proxied by the intensity of the expenditure in machinery 
acquisition, and interaction-based linkages (upstream interaction), proxied 
by the importance of suppliers, display a large and positive coefficient in 
the process innovation equation, while their impact is considerably smaller 
for product innovation (Table 5.5).
Heterogeneous effects
In Tables 5.6 and 5.7 we check if  the results change for different subsamples of 
firms: we run separate regressions for each size category of firm, distinguish-
ing between firms with up to 50 employees, firms with 50 to 250 employees 
and large companies with more than 250 employees. Table 5.6 shows that 
the results are extremely robust across the three samples. Transaction-based 
and interaction-based upstream vertical flows of knowledge are always more 
important for the introduction of process innovations, while downstream 
vertical interactions with customers always show a larger effect for product 
innovation among small, medium and large firms. The only difference with 
respect to the baseline specification consists in the coefficient of horizontal 
flows for large firms, which becomes almost the same both for product and 
process innovations, suggesting that large firms benefit less from competi-
tors’ knowledge for the introduction of product innovations.
Table 5.5  Effects of different types of external knowledge on product and 
process innovation
Type of external knowledge Product innovation Process innovation
Horizontal flow Large Small
Downstream interaction Large Small
Upstream interaction Small Large
Upstream transaction Small Large
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Finally, we control whether our results change if  we consider firms active 
in sectors with different levels of  technological intensity: specifically, 
we want to check whether firms in low- or high-tech sectors benefit 
differently from the heterogeneous sources of  external knowledge that 
we have identified. In Table 5.7 we split our sample between high-tech 
sectors and low-tech sectors. Again our results are very robust: in both 
subgroups product innovations benefit mainly from horizontal flows 
of  knowledge and downstream vertical linkages, while upstream verti-
cal knowledge flows are more relevant for the introduction of  process 
innovations.
Table 5.7  Probit estimation of product and process innovation: high-tech 
and low-tech sectors
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
High-tech Low-tech
product 
inno.
process  
inno.
product 
inno.
process  
inno.
upstream-interaction 0.079*** 0.215*** 0.074*** 0.197***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015)
upstream-transaction 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
downstream 0.284*** 0.038** 0.241*** 0.092***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
horizontal*Oi (average 
 sectoral R&D)
0.053*** 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Predicted R&D intensity 0.351*** 0.119*** 0.295*** 0.232***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Turnover in 2004 (in logs) 0.079*** 0.035*** 0.076*** 0.060***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 7740 7740 15,507 15,507
Log-likelihood −3307 −3866 −5804 −5920
Pseudo R squared 0.383 0.220 0.368 0.358
Notes:
All models report marginal effects from a probit estimation. All models include country 
and sectoral dummies. High-tech sectors include manufacture of: chemicals and chemical 
products (ISIC 24), machinery and equipment (ISIC 29); office machinery and computers 
(ISIC 30); electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (ISIC 31); medical, precision and optical 
instruments (ISIC 33); and motor vehicles and other transport equipment (ISIC 34 and 35).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1.
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4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The successful introduction of technological innovations is the result of the 
matching of characteristics of the system in which firms are embedded and 
their strategies. Technological change is the result of the interdependence 
between the action of individual agents and the structural characteristics 
of the system. It occurs when and if  the structure of the system in which 
firms are localized provides access to external knowledge enabling the crea-
tive reaction of firms that leads to the introduction of innovations.
Knowledge, in general, and external knowledge specifically, is a bundle 
of different types of knowledge that it seems necessary to disentangle. 
This requires the twin effort to specify: i) the types of external knowl-
edge according to source, whether horizontal (that is, within the same 
industry) or vertical (across the chains of user–producer interactions-cum-
transactions), distinguishing between downstream (with customers) and 
upstream (with suppliers) interactions; and ii) their effects on the types of 
innovations introduced, whether product or process.
The inbound search for the proper match between types of external 
knowledge and their relative costs and innovation strategies has important 
implications for the strategies of firms. Firms will take into account the 
important differences in the actual access conditions and absorption 
costs of the different types of external knowledge in the selection of their 
innovation strategies.
We put forward the hypotheses that horizontal flows of knowledge 
should induce the introduction of product innovations because of the 
borrowing and imitation of knowledge from competitors engaged in the 
same product-innovation races. Also, downstream flows of knowledge 
from customers should favour product innovations, thanks to their com-
petent knowledge of the products sold by the innovating firm. In contrast, 
upstream sources of knowledge from suppliers, either based on the 
purchasing of advanced machineries or in true interactions and collabora-
tions, should lead to process innovations.
In our empirical analysis we explore the direct effects of the access con-
ditions to the different types of external knowledge on the actual amount 
of product and process innovations introduced by European firms in 2004, 
using CIS data. The dependent variable of our analysis is the introduc-
tion of process and product innovations. In order to assess their role, the 
horizontal flows of external knowledge, as proxied by the flows of R&D 
activities performed by competitors (firms active in the same industry), 
have been filtered by the degree of openness to external knowledge as 
measured by the firm-specific propensity to invest in extramural R&D. 
Vertical flows of external knowledge have been distinguished between 
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upstream and downstream user–producer interactions. In order to grasp 
the role of knowledge interactions we utilized the information available in 
the CIS data based on the perceived relevance of external vertical sources 
of knowledge, whether stemming from interactions with customers or 
suppliers. Finally, in order to appreciate the amount of external knowledge 
flowing via user–producer transactions we have taken into account the 
intensity of investment as a proxy of machinery purchased by downstream 
users.
The results confirm our hypotheses: the upstream vertical flows of 
external knowledge channelled both by transactions and interactions have 
positive effects mainly on the introduction of process innovations. The 
downstream vertical flows of external knowledge, as well as the flows of 
external knowledge spilling horizontally from competitors, have positive 
effects mainly on the introduction of product innovations. Moreover, the 
findings are surprisingly similar for different types of firm: even when we 
consider separately small, medium and large firms, as well as high-tech and 
low-tech ones, our results remain largely unchanged.
Our analysis provides an important contribution to the related literature 
on inbound open innovation practices (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). 
This literature has found relevant limits and drawbacks of the quantitative 
effect of external knowledge on innovation outcomes (Howells et al., 2008; 
Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). However our results show that an appropriate 
analysis of the effect of external knowledge on innovation must account 
for the degree of heterogeneity of external knowledge, as well as its differ-
entiated impact on different innovative strategies. Indeed, the results stress 
the diversity of the effects of knowledge externalities, and confirm the 
interest to appreciate the variety of types of external knowledge and the 
need to explore in detail their different sources and differentiated effects.
The distinction of external knowledge according to its origin and the 
identification of its differentiated effects favouring different innovation 
strategies also represent a step forward in the identification of the effects 
of the system upon the overall innovation process. The necessary corollary 
of the analysis is in fact that not only the amount of innovations being 
introduced but also their typology is influenced by the characteristics of 
the system in which firms are embedded.
These results seem quite important for R&D management for their stra-
tegic implications for inbound exploratory practices. Firms that are willing 
to rely on the introduction of process innovations in product markets 
characterized by cost and price competition should pay attention to the 
opportunities provided by vertical transactions and interactions with their 
suppliers. Firms that are more engaged in product innovation races within 
oligopolistic markets should pay attention to the opportunities provided 
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by both customers and competitors as sources of dedicated knowledge 
externalities.
The careful identification of the role of innovation in the strategy of the 
firm, the selection of the types of innovation (whether product or process) 
and the screening of the types of technological spillover available in an 
economic system should be part of a single and integrated decision-mak-
ing process. The availability of major vertical flows of external knowledge 
provided by upstream providers of capital goods and intermediary inputs 
might favour the choice of introducing process rather than product inno-
vations. The search for the accurate matching between types of innovation 
and types of external knowledge should become an important procedural 
device for decision-making.
Our empirical analysis has some limitations that should be highlighted. 
Our measures of the importance of the different sources of knowledge are 
simple dummy variables that might represent a quite poor proxy of the 
level of importance of each flow of knowledge. Moreover, the debate on 
technology-push and demand-pull has shown that among the push-factors 
universities and PROs are crucial sources of science-based external knowl-
edge (Di Stefano et al., 2012), but in our analysis we did not include them 
among the possible sources of external knowledge. Further research could 
hence improve on such shortcomings of our study.
Our analysis on the heterogeneity of external knowledge calls for further 
research on the relationships between sources of knowledge and innova-
tive strategies. A first possible extension is to better distinguish between 
inbound open innovation practices based on transactions, as opposed 
to those that are based on interactions, whether vertical upstream or 
downstream. Moreover, in this study we only analysed the inbound side 
of open-innovation practices: however to every inbound flow in a system 
should correspond an outbound flow (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; 
Knudsen and Mortensen, 2011). Therefore the necessary corollary of our 
analysis is to check also the effect of outbound strategies on the direction 
of firms’ innovations.
NOTES
1. The authors acknowledge the provision of the European Commission, Eurostat, Fourth 
Community Innovation Survey, microdata. Eurostat has no responsibility for the opin-
ions expressed in this chapter, which remain solely of the authors. Eurostat releases data 
in micro-aggregated form for confidentiality reasons.
2. We use the same procedure adopted by Hall and Mairesse (1995) and remove any obser-
vations for which value added in 2002 or 2004 is zero. We also eliminate any observations 
for which the growth rate of value added is less than minus 90 per cent or greater than 300 
per cent. Finally, we drop firms for which the ratio between total R&D expenditures and 
value added is higher than 80 per cent.
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6. The cost of knowledge
Cristiano Antonelli and Alessandra Colombelli*
1. INTRODUCTION
The study of the cost of knowledge seems an important area of investiga-
tion that has received, so far, quite surprisingly, very little attention. After 
the introduction of the knowledge generation function it is now necessary 
to introduce and analyse the knowledge cost function.
Identification of the knowledge generation function has been a major 
advance in the economics of knowledge (Crépon et al., 1998; Weitzman, 
1998). Finally, technological knowledge can be analysed as the output of a 
dedicated economic activity. Working along these lines, increasing evidence 
shows that the unit costs of knowledge differ widely across firms. Some 
firms are able to generate new technological knowledge with low levels of 
current expenditures in R&D. Others experience very high levels of current 
expenditures. As a matter of fact the costs of knowledge differ and their 
variance becomes a fascinating area of research. The new appreciation of 
the role of knowledge indivisibility in the generation of new knowledge 
enables us to better grasp the specific effects of knowledge externalities 
and knowledge cumulability on the costs of knowledge (Antonelli and 
Colombelli, 2015a, b).
The rest of  the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls the 
recent advances of  the new economics of  knowledge and applies them 
to grasping the determinants of  the heterogeneity of  firms in terms 
of  unit costs of  their knowledge. Section 3 provides an empirical 
investigation of  the econometric estimate of  a knowledge cost func-
tion based on a panel of  companies listed on the financial markets in 
the UK, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands for the period 
1995–2006 for which information about patents have been gathered. The 
 conclusions   summarize the results and discuss the implications of  the 
analysis.
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2. KNOWLEDGE AS INPUT AND OUTPUT
After a long period of time during which the early economics of 
knowledge has investigated in depth the determinants and effects of the 
characteristics of knowledge as a good – with special attention to its 
limited appropriability, non-rivalry in use and non-tradeability – the new 
economics of knowledge pays much attention to the characteristics of the 
knowledge generation process. In this context, it has grasped the implica-
tions of another bundle of characteristics of knowledge as an economic 
good that has received less attention: knowledge indivisibility, in terms of 
both knowledge cumulability and knowledge complementarity. The twin 
character of knowledge – at the same time an input and an output – and its 
limited exhaustibility enable us to grasp a key aspect of the knowledge gen-
eration process. Its generation consists in the recombination of knowledge 
items that enter the process as inputs (Weitzman, 1996, 1998).
Because of knowledge complementarity and knowledge cumulability, 
together with current R&D activities, both the external knowledge gener-
ated by third parties but not fully appropriated and the internal stocks of 
knowledge generated by each firm in the past are now recognized as rel-
evant inputs in the generation of knowledge as an output. The knowledge 
generated as the output of a dedicate activity is itself  a necessary condition 
and hence an input for both the introduction of an innovation and the 
generation of further knowledge (David, 1993). This has led to analysis of 
the generation of technological knowledge as a specific economic activity 
(Crépon et al., 1998; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Nesta and Saviotti, 2005).
A second important step in this enquiry can be done with analysis of the 
knowledge cost function. This approach enables us to identify the deter-
minants of the great variance in the costs of knowledge. Specifically, study 
of the knowledge cost function helps with grasping to what extent the cost 
of knowledge is affected by the availability of the full range of inputs and 
their costs (Antonelli and David, 2016).
As soon as it becomes evident that R&D activities are not the single 
input in the knowledge generation process (Gunday et al., 2011), the stocks 
and composition of existing knowledge both internal and external to each 
firm, as indispensable and strictly complementary inputs, acquire a new 
relevance (Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b). Knowledge inputs such as 
the amount of external knowledge that can be accessed by firms to gener-
ate new knowledge are distributed unevenly across space. Major institu-
tional and structural characteristics affect the actual amount of external 
knowledge that each firm can access and use as an input. The costs of 
these inputs differ in turn because of the variance in the access conditions 
to the external knowledge available (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990) 
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and because of the different characteristics of the local pools of external 
knowledge (Saviotti, 2007; Quatraro, 2010, 2012). By the same token, firms 
differ widely with respect to the size and characteristics of the stocks of 
internal knowledge that can be used to generate new knowledge (Jones, 
1995). Knowledge inputs and outputs vary across firms also because firms 
differ in their specific competence in managing the knowledge generation 
process (Nelson, 1982).
The inclusion in the knowledge cost function of these variables stems 
from the identification of the recombinatorial character of the knowledge 
generation process, and enables us to appreciate the role of knowledge 
indivisibility as articulated in knowledge cumulability and knowledge 
complementarity in its generation (Weitzman, 1996, 1998). Let us consider 
these aspects in turn.
Knowledge cumulability – and its limited exhaustibility – implies that 
the stock of existing knowledge can be used again and again and plays 
a central role as input in the generation of new knowledge. The stock of 
knowledge qualifies and identifies the knowledge base of each firm. The 
inclusion of this variable enables us to grasp the path-dependent character 
of knowledge generation. The generation of new technological knowledge 
at each point in time, by each agent, in fact is strongly influenced by the 
accumulation of knowledge in the past. The current levels of R&D expen-
ditures of each agent do play a role, but only in a context that is shaped by 
the past of each firm (Antonelli, 2011; Belenzon, 2012).
Appreciation of knowledge complementarity enables us to put in context 
the role of knowledge externalities. A large body of literature has explored 
the role of technological spillovers as a major input in the generation of 
new technological knowledge (Colombelli et al., 2013b). In this approach 
external knowledge plays an important and yet supplementary role in the 
generation of new technological knowledge (Griliches, 1979, 1990, 1992). 
Moreover, its recipients are mainly viewed as the passive beneficiaries of 
knowledge leaking from other firms (Feldman, 1999). A large body of 
empirical evidence has subsequently confirmed that external knowledge 
is an essential input in the generation of new knowledge (Adams, 1990; 
Marrocu et al., 2012; Smit et al., 2015).
The composition of the knowledge pools to which co-localized firms 
have access also plays an important role in assessing the levels of absorp-
tion activities (Camagni and Capello, 2013; Grillitsch et al., 2013). 
Technological knowledge cannot be regarded as a homogeneous pile, but 
rather as a composite bundle of highly differentiated and idiosyncratic 
elements that are qualified by specific relations of interdependence and 
interoperability. This approach enables us to identify the extent to which 
the generation of new technological knowledge in a field depends upon 
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the contributions of knowledge inputs stemming from other fields: a new 
knowledge item exhibits high levels of compositeness when it relies upon 
a large number of other knowledge fields (Antonelli, 2011). The quality 
of the local pools of knowledge, in other words, matters as well as its 
sheer size. The larger the coherence of the local knowledge base and the 
shorter the distance between different types of knowledge, the higher the 
probability that they can be combined (Saviotti, 2004, 2007; Krafft et al., 
2009; Quatraro, 2010).
The interplay between the stock and composition of internal knowledge, 
which also increases a firm’s absorptive capacity, and the actual levels 
of knowledge externalities helps to increase the amount of knowledge 
that each firm can generate with a given amount of R&D activities and 
competence acquired by means of internal learning processes.
Analysis of a knowledge cost function that takes into account the role 
of internal stocks of knowledge and of local pools of external knowledge 
enables us to reconsider, but from quite a different perspective, two stand-
ard assumptions of the economics of innovations – that is, the well-known 
Schumpeterian and Marshallian hypotheses. Let us consider them in turn.
2.1 The Schumpeterian Hypothesis
Joel Mokyr (1990b: 267) has recently expertly summarized Schumpeterian 
hypothesis as follows: ‘large firms with considerable market power, rather 
than perfectly competitive firms are the “most powerful engine of techno-
logical progress”’. Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
actually went so far as to claim that perfect competition is not only 
impossible but also ‘inferior’ (Schumpeter, 1942: 106). The Schumpeterian 
hypothesis has fed a long-lasting theoretical debate, and the significant 
empirical evidence provided controversial proof of the actual advantages 
of large firms with respect to smaller ones in the rates of generation of 
technological knowledge and the eventual introduction of innovations. 
The results of empirical studies in different sectors, historic periods, coun-
tries and regions have not provided conclusive evidence (Link, 1980; Link 
and Siegel, 2007). The recent advances in the economics of knowledge 
enable us to focus the Schumpeterian hypotheses on knowledge generation 
and on the long-lasting effects of the limited divisibility and exhaustibility 
of knowledge. The Schumpeterian hypothesis, in other words, would apply 
only to the size of the stock of knowledge and not to the sheer size of firms 
in terms of employment.
Following this approach, we put forward the specific hypothesis that the 
size of firms exerts negative – cost-reducing – effects when it is measured 
in terms of internal knowledge stock rather than in terms of sheer size. For 
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a given size in terms of employment, firms with a larger stock of internal 
knowledge have lower unit knowledge costs than firms with smaller inter-
nal stocks. The advantage of incumbents, in other words, stems specifically 
from the effects of knowledge cumulability and non-exhaustibility, and is 
specific to the size of the stock of knowledge.
2.2 The Marshallian Hypothesis
According to the standard application in the economics of knowledge of 
the Marshallian hypothesis, firms located in large industrial districts with a 
strong knowledge base have better chances to access knowledge spillovers 
and feed their own knowledge generation process. In large districts with a 
rich knowledge base firms have better access to external knowledge and 
can substitute it with expensive R&D activities. Knowledge externalities 
are pecuniary rather than pure: relevant search and absorption costs are 
necessary in order to use knowledge spilling from third parties as an input 
in the generation of new knowledge. For this reason, not only the size of 
the knowledge base but also its nature is of some significance. Indeed, the 
generation of technological knowledge stems from a variety of compe-
tences: knowledge is not a homogenous good, and therefore its intrinsic 
heterogeneous nature cannot be neglected.
We thus argue that not only the amount of knowledge available at the 
local level but also the characteristics of that knowledge have an impact on 
the costs of knowledge. More precisely, the larger is the size and coherence 
of the local knowledge pools and its complementarity with the internal 
knowledge base, the lower the search costs (Antonelli, 2008a). On the other 
hand, the higher the variety and the dissimilarity in the combination of 
technologies in the firm’s region, the higher the costs associated with the 
firm’s knowledge output. When the local knowledge that firms may access 
is distributed across a wide range of technology domains and features 
technologies which are far away from one another in the technological 
space, the absorption costs increase.
Following these arguments along the lines of the Marshallian tradition 
of analysis, we put forward two hypotheses: i) we expect a negative cor-
relation between the size of the regional stock of knowledge and the firm 
cost of knowledge; ii) knowledge externalities are all the more effective 
the larger are the levels of coherence and the lower the levels of variety 
and dissimilarity of the local knowledge base. We thus expect that the unit 
knowledge costs decrease with regional levels of knowledge coherence and 
increase with regional levels of variety and dissimilarity.
The following knowledge cost function provides the general framework 
of our approach:
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CKit = (R&Dit KNOWLEDGEBASEit EXTERNAL KNOWLEDGEit) (6.1)
Equation (6.1) provides a suitable specification of the knowledge cost func-
tion that accommodates, along with the role of R&D expenditures, apprecia-
tion of the knowledge base of each firm in terms of stocks of knowledge in 
the generation of new knowledge, and identification of the key role of knowl-
edge external to each firm but available in regional proximity. Specifically, we 
expect that unit knowledge costs are lower the larger the stock of internal 
knowledge and the larger the pool of external knowledge that firms can 
access, as well as its consistency with the stock of internal knowledge.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.1 Dataset
As in Chapter 4, our data source is the IPER database, which collects 
information on 3382 active companies listed in the UK, Germany, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands.2 These countries were selected not only for 
their economic size and importance but also as they represent the main 
European financial markets. The variety in terms of size, sectors, regions 
and countries of this set of companies seems to provide a reliable represen-
tation of the European business sector. The IPER database has been built 
by matching information from multiple sources of data. Our main source 
of market and accounting data is Thomson Reuters Datastream, which 
delivers worldwide economic and financial time series data. To obtain 
additional relevant variables, we again include information from Bureau 
Van Dijk’s Amadeus. In order to match information from these two 
databases, we used International Securities Identification Numbers (ISIN).
We also use data from the OECD REGPAT database on patent appli-
cants and inventors as well as on technological classes cited in patents 
granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), from 1978 to 2006. The use of patents as the single indicator of 
the knowledge output is, indeed, a limit of the analysis. A large body of 
literature has identified the limits of patents as the exclusive source of 
information on the actual amount of knowledge generated: not all firms 
patent their ‘inventions’; small firms rely less than large ones on patents 
to increase the appropriability of their inventions; patents are used more 
to secure property rights of inventions that apply to product rather 
than process inventions; firms in fashion industries rarely patent their 
 distinctive knowledge. Awareness of these limits has not prevented the use 
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of patents in the extensive empirical literature that relies on the legacy of 
Zvi Griliches (1984, 1990).
In order to match the firm-level data with data on patents, we draw on 
the work of Thoma et al. (2010), which develops a method for harmoniza-
tion and combination of large-scale patent and trademark datasets with 
other sources of data, through standardization of applicant and inventor 
names. The new evidence on the actual meaning of patent citations, often 
included by patent officers to better specify the borders of the domain of 
the intellectual property right, rather than its quality, suggests using the 
raw evidence of the number of patents with no attempt to try to elaborate 
misleading quality indicators (Van Zeebroeck, 2011; Van Zeebroeck and 
van Pottelsberghe, 2011).
Finally, we pooled the dataset by adding industry-level information 
from the OECD STAN databases as it is based on ISIC revision 3 sectoral 
classifications and Datastream uses the four-digit level ICB industry clas-
sification (see Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b).
Our final dataset includes active companies listed on the main European 
financial markets that submitted at least one patent application to the EPO 
in the period analysed. Table 6.1 reports the sample distribution by macro-
sector. High- and medium/high-technology firms account for around 31.6 
per cent and 45.4 per cent of observations, respectively. Medium/low and 
low-tech firms account for 4.5 per cent and 8.9 per cent respectively, while 
knowledge-intensive firms represent 9.4 per cent of observations.
3.2 The Econometric Analysis: Methodology and Variables
The econometric analysis is organized on a baseline equation and a number 
of complementary specifications that explore in detail the different facets 
of the basic hypotheses. Our baseline estimating equation is:
Table 6.1 Sample distribution in macro-sectors
Macro-sector % Cum.
High-technology manufactures – HT  31.6  31.6
Medium/high-technology manufactures – MHT  45.4  77.0
Medium/low-technology manufactures – MLT   4.5  81.5
Low-technology manufactures – LT   8.9  90.4
Knowledge intensive sectors – KIS   9.4  99.8
Less knowledge-intensive sectors – LKIS   0.2 100.0
Total 100.0
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 PCostit5b 11b 2R&Dit211b 3PStockit211b 4AGEit211b 5RegPStockit211
 b6RegTVit211b7RegCDit211b8RegCOHit211a  ri1a  yt1eit (6.2)
In equation (6.2) all explanatory variables are lagged one year so as to 
mitigate endogeneity problems. Given the panel nature of our dataset and 
to control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics, equation (6.2) has 
been estimated using a fixed effects estimator. The Hausman test confirms 
that fixed effects perform better than the random effects estimator.
In equation (6.2) the dependent variable for the firm i at time t is the 
cost of  knowledge output measured by the logarithm of the ratio between 
the firm’s current R&D expenditures and the number of  patents deliv-
ered. This measure is a good proxy of  the actual cost of  producing new 
technological knowledge. Yet, it is worth noting that the cost of  external 
interactions based on knowledge is not directly accounted for. The unit 
cost of  knowledge is explained by two sets of  independent variables: i) the 
knowledge base of  each firm as defined by the internal expenses in R&D, 
the size of  the internal knowledge stock and the age of  the firm; and ii) the 
size the local pools of  external knowledge and their composition in terms 
of  variety, complementarity and similarity (dissimilarity). As to the latter 
set of  variables, variety aims to capture the technological differentiation 
within the knowledge base of  a region; coherence measures the extent 
to which the pieces of  knowledge that firms combine to generate new 
technological knowledge are complementary; and, finally, similarity (dis-
similarity) measures the extent to which the pieces of  knowledge used by 
firms are close (distant) to one another in the technology space (Krafft et 
al., 2014).
More precisely, on the right-hand side, the first set of variables considers 
R&D, that is, the current research efforts and activities funded by each firm 
at time t − 1, measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures (R&Dexp) to 
total assets (in logarithms). In order to appreciate the effects of the stocks 
of internal knowledge of firms, the model includes the variable PStock 
measured as the ratio between the number of patents held by each firm 
(CumPatStock) and total assets (in logarithms). CumPatStock is computed 
by applying the permanent inventory method (PIM) to patent applica-
tions. We calculate it as the cumulated stock of patent applications using a 
rate of obsolescence of 15 per cent per annum:3
 CumPatStockit−1 = h
•
it−1 + (1 − s) CumPatStockit−2 (6.3)
where h
•
it−1 is the flow of patent applications (in logarithms) and s is the 
rate of  obsolescence. Alongside the stock of  patents we include the age 
of  firms. This variable aims at grasping the effects of  the accumulation 
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of competence by means of  learning processes. Age is measured by the 
years since foundation and is expressed in logarithms; it aims at grasp-
ing the effects of  the accumulation of  tacit knowledge and competence, 
based upon learning processes that affect the generation of  patentable 
knowledge.
To articulate the different facets of the knowledge that is external to 
each firm and made accessible by proximity with firms co-localized, in the 
second basket of variables we include first a variable aimed at grasping the 
effects of the size of the knowledge pools in which firms are embedded: 
RegPStock, that is the log of patents stock in the same region (NUTS2) 
of firm i at time t − 1. The method used for computing this variable is the 
same used for PStock, that is, (PIM).
Next, we include other variables proxying for variety, complementarity 
and similarity. These indicators rest on the recombinant knowledge 
approach. In order to provide an operational translation of such concepts 
one needs to identify both a proxy for the bits of knowledge and a proxy for 
the elements that make up their structure. We consider patents as a proxy 
for knowledge, and then look at technological classes to which patents are 
assigned as the constituting elements of its structure, that is, the nodes of 
the network representation of recombinant knowledge. Each technological 
class j is linked to another class m when the same patent is assigned to both 
of them. The higher the number of patents jointly assigned to classes j and 
m, the stronger is this link. Since technological classes attributed to patents 
are reported in the patent document, we will refer to the link between j and 
m as the co-occurrence of both of them within the same patent document. 
On this basis we calculated the following three key characteristics of firms’ 
knowledge bases (all expressed in logarithms):
●● Knowledge variety (KV) measures the degree of technological diver-
sification of the knowledge base. It is based on the informational 
entropy index. We thus include in equation (6.2) RegTV as a meas-
ure of the regional total variety, RegRTV and RegUTV, measuring 
the related and unrelated variety respectively (see Antonelli and 
Colombelli, 2015a, b for methodological details). Unrelated variety 
measures the technological diversification of the knowledge base 
which is likely to be affected by a radically new type of knowledge, 
while related variety measures the technological diversification of 
the knowledge base which is likely to be affected by incremental 
recombination of existing types of knowledge.
●● Knowledge coherence (COH) measures the degree of complemen-
tarity among technologies. It is measured by means of the RegCOH 
index (see Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b).
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●● Cognitive distance (CD) expresses the dissimilarities among differ-
ent types of knowledge and is measured using the RegCD variable 
(see Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b).
The inclusion of these variables marks an important step forward in the 
operational translation of knowledge creation processes. In particular, they 
allow for a better appreciation of the collective dimension of knowledge 
dynamics. Knowledge is indeed viewed as the outcome of a combinatorial 
activity in which intentional and unintentional exchange among innovat-
ing agents provides access to external knowledge inputs (Fleming, 2001; 
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001).
The recombinant knowledge approach provides indeed a framework to 
represent the internal structure of regional knowledge bases as well as to 
enquire into the effects of their evolution (Antonelli et al., 2010). If  knowl-
edge stems from the combination of different technologies, knowledge 
structure can be represented as a web of connected elements. The nodes 
of this network stand for the elements of the knowledge space that may be 
combined with one another, while the links represent their actual combina-
tions. The frequency with which two technologies are combined provides 
useful information on the basis of which one can characterize the internal 
structure of the knowledge base according to the average degree of com-
plementarity and proximity of the technologies which knowledge bases 
are made of, as well as to the variety of the observed pairs of technologies.
The dynamics of technological knowledge can therefore be understood 
as the patterns of change in its own internal structure, that is, in the pat-
terns of recombination across the elements in the knowledge space. This 
allows for qualifying both the cumulative character of knowledge creation 
and the key role played by the properties describing knowledge structure 
(Saviotti, 2004, 2007; Quatraro, 2010; Colombelli et al., 2013b). Finally, we 
include time dummies in order to control for time effects.
In order to check further the robustness of our empirical analysis with 
respect to the role of external knowledge, we also estimated an extended 
model including the patenting activities of firms outside a firm’s region 
(WRegPStock). Here WRegPStock aims at capturing the role of the 
sources of external knowledge that are far away from firm i. The vari-
able WRegPStock has been computed as the log of patents stock (PIM) 
in the NUTS2 regions of the EU-24 member states, weighted using a 
row-normalized inverse distance matrix so as to appreciate the contribu-
tion of knowledge produced in regions close to firm i’s region at time 
t − 1. Moreover, as a further robustness check, we also estimated additional 
models including firm Size among the covariates. The inclusion of a vari-
able that accounts for the sheer size (that is, the logarithm of employees 
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number for firm i at time t − 1) enables us to appreciate the estimated 
parameters as the direct effect of the variables proxying for the internal 
knowledge base, after taking into account the effects of the size of the firm.
For each variable the measurement method is defined in Table 6.2, while 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6.3. The correlation matrix for 
the extended model can be found in Table 6.4. As reported in the tables, 
correlations among some independent variables are relatively high. In 
particular, RegPStock is highly correlated with the three knowledge variety 
measures. Not surprisingly, the different measures of knowledge variety 
are highly correlated with each other. To further detect multicollinearity 
among covariates, we also checked the variance-inflation factor (VIF) 
for each covariate. If  RegPStock is regressed on all the other covariates, 
including each of the three knowledge variety measures in different regres-
sions, the VIF assumes values in the range 1.35–1.38, much less than the 
accepted cut-off  value of 10 (Neter et al., 1990). Finally, when RegPStock 
is regressed on all the other covariates, including both RegRTV and 
RegUTV, the VIF value equals 1.43. Therefore, in our empirical analysis 
Table 6.2 Variables’ measurement methods
Variable Measurement method
PCOST Log (R&D/N Patents) for firm i at time t
R&D Log (R&D/Total assets) for firm i at time t – 1
R&Dexp Log (R&D) for firm i at time t – 1
PStock Log of (Patents stock (PIM)/Total assets) for firm i at time t – 1
CumPatStock Log of (Patents stock (PIM)) for firm i at time t – 1
Age Log of years since foundation for firm i at time t – 1
Size Log of employees number for firm i at time t – 1
RegPStock Log of patents stock (PIM) in the same region (NUTS2) of firm 
i at time t – 1
WRegPStock Log of patents stock (PIM) belonging to EU – 24 member states 
other than that of firm i at time t – 1, weighted using a row-
normalized inverse distance matrix
RegTV Log of total variety in the region (NUTS2) of firm i at time t – 1
RegRTV Log of related variety in the region (NUTS2) of firm i at time 
t – 1
RegUTV Log of unrelated variety in the region (NUTS2) of firm i at time 
t – 1
RegCD Log of cognitive distance in the region (NUTS2) of firm i at time 
t – 1
RegCOH Log of knowledge coherence in the region (NUTS2) of firm i at 
time t – 1
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we ran different regression models. First, the three specifications of knowl-
edge variety are included in different regression models. Subsequently, we 
include the two components of knowledge variety (RegRTV and RegUTV) 
in the same model. Moreover, we ran different regression models excluding 
knowledge stock from the vector of covariates. Finally, a relatively high 
correlation is also observed between internal R&D and the stock of pat-
ents. However, if  R&D and PStock are regressed on all the other covariates 
the VIF assumes values in the range 2.61–2.84, much less than the cut-off  
value of 10. Therefore, we also ran different regression models excluding 
R&D from the vector of covariates as a robustness check.
3.3 Results
The results of  the fixed effects regression estimations for equation (6.2) are 
reported in Table 6.5. The Hausman test, comparing the results obtained 
with the fixed effects model with those obtained from the random effects 
regression model, indicates that the fixed effects model is a better fit 
for our regressions. In order to cope with multicollinearity among the 
knowledge-related variables, column 1 shows the results for the baseline 
equation that only includes variables measuring the internal activities 
performed by each firm in terms of  R&D expenditure, patent stock and 
age. Columns 2 to 5 include also the variables proxying for the size and 
composition of  the external pool of  knowledge. More precisely, the results 
of  the model including the RegTV variable are presented in column 2. 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
PCOST 870 9.330 1.725 2.996 15.547
R&D 870 −3.340 1.097 −7.777 0.420
R&Dexp 870 10.888 2.146 2.996 15.824
PStock 870 −11.247 1.914 −18.732 −6.587
CumPatStock 870 2.981 1.756 −0.650 7.519
Age 870 3.425 1.185 0 5.541
Size 854 8.920 2.296 1.386 13.090
RegPStock 870 8.845 1.347 4.853 10.892
WRegPStock 870 7.627 0.268 6.988 8.268
RegTV 870 2.182 0.131 1.653 2.397
RegRTV 870 1.882 0.155 1.232 2.129
RegUTV 870 0.822 0.110 0.269 0.991
RegCD 870 −0.264 0.020 −0.368 −0.223
RegCOH 870 1.782 0.546 0.660 3.846
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Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the RegRTV and RegUTV variables, 
respectively, while column 5 includes the two latter variables in the same 
model.
The results concerning the internal stock of  knowledge help to confirm 
and qualify the Schumpeterian hypothesis. The stock of  patents (PStock) 
of  each firm exerts in fact a strong negative and significant effect on the 
costs of  knowledge (p < 0.01 in all estimations). This is fully consistent 
with expectations, as the dependent variable is a measure of  the unit 
costs of  knowledge, which is likely to decrease as the stock of  internal 
knowledge that firms can mobilize and use to generate new technological 
knowledge increases, other things being equal. Knowledge cumulability 
Table 6.5 Results: baseline model
Fixed effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables PCost PCost PCost PCost PCost
R&D 0.211*** 0.197** 0.208*** 0.196** 0.190**
(0.0763) (0.0768) (0.0766) (0.0769) (0.0770)
PStock −0.489*** −0.463*** −0.463*** −0.471*** −0.468***
(0.0605) (0.0613) (0.0615) (0.0614) (0.0614)
Age 0.0145 0.0971 0.0787 0.0985 0.110
(0.160) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
RegPStock −0.631* −0.557 −0.331 −0.496
(0.374) (0.379) (0.356) (0.379)
RegTV 2.512**
(1.152)
RegRTV 1.306 1.151
(0.920) (0.921)
RegUTV 1.837** 1.745**
(0.866) (0.869)
RegCD 8.910** 8.625** 9.248** 9.236**
(4.156) (4.162) (4.166) (4.164)
RegCOH 0.275 0.203 0.0814 0.216
(0.238) (0.240) (0.214) (0.240)
Constant 6.951*** 8.953** 11.45*** 10.40*** 9.602**
(0.881) (3.987) (3.722) (3.773) (3.826)
Observations 870 870 870 870 870
R-squared 0.386 0.395 0.393 0.395 0.396
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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and non-exhaustibility exert a strong non-ergodic effect that favours 
incumbents that can rely on their internal knowledge in the recombinant 
knowledge generation process. We interpret these results in light of  the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. The characteristics of  knowledge, combined 
with the recombinant feature of  the knowledge generation process, 
favour incumbents that can prolong through time the benefits of  earlier 
‘inventions’.
The intensity of  R&D expenses is positively and significantly related 
to the cost of  knowledge in all the estimations. This is quite in line with 
the expectations, R&D intensity being a measure of  the technological 
efforts of  the firm. The size of  the estimated parameter however seems 
most important. It is consistently much lower than 1, ranging between 
0.190 and 0.211 according to the different specifications. This suggests 
that the unit costs of  knowledge increase, albeit much less than propor-
tionately, with the levels of  R&D intensity. The results of  Table 6.10 (see 
below for more detail) where the base-line model is implemented with 
the absolute levels of  R&D expenses and the explicit integration of  the 
size of  firms, provide further confirmation of  our new interpretation 
of  the Schumpeterian hypothesis: while the size of  the stock of  internal 
knowledge helps reduce the unit cost of  knowledge, the amount of  R&D 
expenditures and the absolute size of  firms in terms of  employment have 
a positive impact on the unit cost of  knowledge. For a given size of  the 
stock of  internal knowledge larger firms have higher knowledge unit costs 
than smaller firms.
The results of  the other variables are most important as they confirm 
the Marshallian hypothesis that knowledge costs decline with the size 
of  the local pools of  external knowledge. Moreover, they confirm that 
not only the size of  the knowledge base but also its nature is of  some 
significance.
The results of  the variables that account for the size and composi-
tion of  the regional knowledge base differ whether they concern the 
size of  the external stock, measured using the stock of  patents of  the 
firms localized in the region, or the knowledge structure in terms of 
variety (RegTV), complementarity (RegCD) and similarity (RegCOH). 
If  we focus on column 2 of  Table 6.5, results show that the size of  the 
regional knowledge stock (RegPStock) exerts a negative and significant 
effect on the cost of  knowledge. This would suggest that companies that 
can access large pools of  external knowledge save on the costs of  their 
internal knowledge generating activities. As far as knowledge variety is 
concerned, results show that RegTV is positively and significantly related 
to the firm’s cost of  knowledge. Let us recall that this index provides a 
measure of  the diversification of  observed combinations of  technologies 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   142 19/02/2018   13:42
 The cost of knowledge  143
in regions’ knowledge bases. The results thus indicate that the higher the 
variety in the combination of  technologies in the firm’s region, the higher 
the cost associated with a firm’s knowledge output. This might be due to 
the fact that firms need to put more effort into trying and experimenting 
with new combinations of  technologies distributed across a wide range of 
technology domains.
When we disentangle the effects of related and unrelated variety we find 
that only the latter (RegUTV) is significant (as shown in columns 3 to 5). 
The procedure by which the index is derived (see Antonelli and Colombelli, 
2015a, b for methodological details) reveals that the concepts of ‘related’ 
and ‘unrelated’ variety refer basically to the belonging of technologies to 
the same technological domain, as defined by the classification system 
used (in our case the IPC). The positive and significant impact of RegUTV 
on the cost of knowledge would imply that an increase in the regional 
variety of technologies that belong to very different technological domains 
is likely to increase the costs of knowledge generating activities at the 
firm level. The unit cost of knowledge increases as an effect of the higher 
volume of resources that the firm needs to commit in order to search for 
and absorb the locally available external knowledge.
The evidence concerning the effect of  regional cognitive distance 
confirms such results. The coefficient is indeed positive and significant 
across all of  the four models in which it is included. The cognitive 
distance may be interpreted as an index of  the average dissimilarity 
among the different technological competences that make up the 
regional knowledge base. When the local knowledge that firms may 
access features technologies which are far away from one another in the 
technological space, firms need to strengthen their absorptive capacity 
by widening the scope of  technological domains that they can master 
in order to take advantage of  knowledge spillovers in the generation 
of  new knowledge. This implies increasing volumes of  firm-level R&D 
expenditures per single patent.
As a robustness check, we further estimated an extended model 
including the patenting activities of firms localized outside their region 
(WRegPStock). Table 6.6 reports the results of the fixed effects regression 
estimations for the equations including WRegPStock. These results con-
firm the robustness of our analysis as regards the variables included in the 
baseline model. Yet, WRegPStock turns out not to be significantly related 
to the cost of knowledge.
To further check the robustness of our analysis and to explore the 
 different facets of the hypothesis, we ran additional models. Table 6.7 shows 
results for the equation excluding RegPStock from the covariates. Indeed, 
one may notice that such a variable has high correlation with regional 
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total, related and unrelated variety. This may affect the  significance level 
of RegPStock. For this reason, we also ran the regressions by dropping 
regional knowledge stock, so as to check the robustness of the results 
concerning the variety measures. The results actually do not change.
In order to control for the relatively high correlation between R&D and 
PStock, Table 6.8 reports results for the regression models which exclude 
R&D from the vector of covariates. The results confirm the robustness of 
our model.
Finally, as a further robustness check and to better test the Schumpeterian 
Table 6.6 Results: extended model
Variables (1)
PCost
(2)
PCost
(3)
PCost
(4)
PCost
(5)
PCost
R&D 0.211*** 0.192** 0.201*** 0.186** 0.183**
(0.0763) (0.0772) (0.0771) (0.0774) (0.0775)
PStock −0.489*** −0.459*** −0.458*** −0.465*** −0.464***
(0.0605) (0.0616) (0.0617) (0.0616) (0.0616)
Age 0.0145 0.0904 0.0711 0.0910 0.103
(0.160) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
RegPStock −0.582 −0.494 −0.288 −0.440
(0.381) (0.386) (0.358) (0.386)
WRegPStock −1.513 −1.918 −2.260 −1.736
(2.259) (2.262) (2.203) (2.259)
RegTV 2.332**
(1.184)
RegRTV 1.126 0.990
(0.944) (0.945)
RegUTV 1.785** 1.718**
(0.868) (0.870)
RegCD 8.297* 7.872* 8.347* 8.545**
(4.257) (4.256) (4.257) (4.261)
RegCOH 0.258 0.180 0.0782 0.194
(0.239) (0.242) (0.214) (0.241)
Constant 6.951*** 20.65 26.12 27.57 22.90
(0.881) (17.93) (17.69) (17.16) (17.72)
Observations 870 870 870 870 870
R-squared 0.386 0.395 0.393 0.396 0.397
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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hypothesis about the positive effects of the size of firms, we also estimated 
additional models including firm Size among the covariates. Table 6.9 
shows results for an extended version of our baseline model which, 
together with R&D intensity, includes Size as an independent variable. 
Here, again, the estimated parameter of R&D intensity, now taking into 
account the inclusion of the variable Size, is positive, albeit well below 1. 
The results in Table 6.10 provide the definitive test of our hypothesis and 
conclude the investigation on the effects of company size on the cost of 
knowledge. The results for this alternative specification – which includes 
Size and where R&D expenditures and patent stocks are measured in 
absolute terms instead of as a ratio of total assets – confirm that even 
when the size of the firm (in terms of employment) is directly included 
in the estimation model, the value of the estimated parameter of R&D 
Table 6.7 Alternative specifications
Variables (1)
PCost
(2)
PCost
(3)
PCost
(4)
PCost
(5)
PCost
R&D 0.211*** 0.197** 0.207*** 0.193** 0.188**
(0.0763) (0.0769) (0.0767) (0.0768) (0.0770)
PStock −0.489*** −0.475*** −0.473*** −0.478*** −0.478***
(0.0605) (0.0610) (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0610)
Age 0.0145 0.0518 0.0411 0.0777 0.0786
(0.160) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
RegTV 1.897*
(1.094)
RegRTV 0.841 0.731
(0.865) (0.864)
RegUTV 1.881** 1.837**
(0.865) (0.867)
RegCD 7.752* 7.679* 8.633** 8.431**
(4.104) (4.116) (4.113) (4.120)
RegCOH 0.182 0.115 0.0603 0.139
(0.231) (0.233) (0.213) (0.232)
Constant 6.951*** 4.470 7.192*** 7.243*** 5.733**
(0.881) (2.974) (2.337) (1.651) (2.431)
Observations 870 870 870 870 870
R-squared 0.386 0.393 0.391 0.394 0.395
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   145 19/02/2018   13:42
146 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
expenditures in absolute terms is positive, albeit well below 1. With respect 
to the results of the estimates of the baseline model conducted on R&D 
intensity, the increase is confirmed, although the estimated parameter now 
varies between 0.288 and 0.312. Also, Size is found to be positive related to 
the cost of knowledge.
The results of both the variables that account for the size of the firm 
and its R&D expenditures in absolute terms confirm our interpretation of 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Company size helps reduce knowledge unit 
costs only if  it is measured in terms of the stock of internal knowledge. 
When size is measured in terms of R&D expenditures and employment, 
under the control of specific variables that account for the size of the inter-
nal knowledge stock, knowledge unit costs increase. The Schumpeterian 
hypothesis is not confirmed with respect to sheer size when knowledge 
generation costs are considered.
These results lead us to articulate the distinction between knowledge 
Table 6.8 Alternative specifications
Fixed effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables PCost PCost PCost PCost PCost
PStock −0.446*** −0.424*** −0.421*** −0.433*** −0.431***
(0.0587) (0.0596) (0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0598)
Age −0.00375 0.0818 0.0598 0.0841 0.0978
(0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164)
RegPStock −0.632* −0.548 −0.292 −0.479
(0.376) (0.381) (0.357) (0.380)
RegTV 2.846**
(1.149)
RegRTV 1.487 1.291
(0.922) (0.923)
RegUTV 2.109** 1.997**
(0.863) (0.866)
RegCD 8.573** 8.226** 8.969** 8.965**
(4.171) (4.179) (4.181) (4.178)
RegCOH 0.340 0.261 0.120 0.269
(0.237) (0.240) (0.215) (0.240)
Constant 6.774*** 7.877** 10.67*** 9.495** 8.625**
(0.883) (3.981) (3.728) (3.772) (3.820)
Observations 870 870 870 870 870
R-squared 0.380 0.389 0.386 0.389 0.391
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
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generation and knowledge exploitation (March, 1991). Further work 
might investigate the relationship between the sheer size of firms and 
knowledge exploitation. Our results suggest that for given levels of the 
internal stock of knowledge larger firms are less efficient in the generation 
of new knowledge. It becomes most important to understand whether 
larger firms might be more efficient in the exploitation of knowledge.
Table 6.9 Alternative specifications
Variables (1)
PCost
(2)
PCost
(3)
PCost
(4)
PCost
(5)
PCost
R&D 0.211*** 0.195** 0.207*** 0.197** 0.189**
(0.0794) (0.0798) (0.0796) (0.0798) (0.0800)
PStock −0.476*** −0.444*** −0.444*** −0.454*** −0.449***
(0.0647) (0.0660) (0.0661) (0.0660) (0.0660)
Age −0.0991 0.00278 −0.0175 0.00831 0.0197
(0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.186)
Size 0.242** 0.250** 0.247** 0.238** 0.247**
(0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117)
RegPStock −0.743* −0.669* −0.423 −0.614
(0.387) (0.392) (0.368) (0.392)
RegTV 2.713**
(1.167)
RegRTV 1.469 1.313
(0.932) (0.933)
RegUTV 1.868** 1.764**
(0.878) (0.880)
RegCD 8.274** 7.949* 8.661** 8.626**
(4.211) (4.218) (4.225) (4.222)
RegCOH 0.278 0.207 0.0708 0.223
(0.244) (0.246) (0.221) (0.246)
Constant 5.314*** 7.648* 10.29*** 9.439** 8.481**
(1.206) (4.149) (3.889) (3.928) (3.984)
Observations 854 854 854 854 854
R-squared 0.386 0.395 0.393 0.395 0.396
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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4.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
The economics of knowledge has made major progress with the identifica-
tion of the knowledge generation function. This empirical evidence has 
shown that the relationship between inputs and outputs of the innovative 
activity across firms exhibits huge variance. With given levels of R&D 
inputs, the actual amount of knowledge generated by each firm differs 
widely. A second important step along this line of analysis can be taken 
Table 6.10 Alternative specifications
Fixed effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables PCost PCost PCost PCost PCost
R&Dexp 0.312*** 0.296*** 0.309*** 0.293*** 0.288***
(0.0780) (0.0784) (0.0781) (0.0788) (0.0788)
CumPatStock −0.436*** −0.398*** −0.395*** −0.413*** −0.407***
(0.0720) (0.0737) (0.0739) (0.0740) (0.0741)
Age −0.0863 0.0222 0.00277 0.0267 0.0377
(0.183) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187)
Size 0.315** 0.312** 0.302** 0.307** 0.316**
(0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
RegPStock −0.812** −0.748* −0.505 −0.687*
(0.391) (0.396) (0.372) (0.397)
RegTV 2.541**
(1.173)
RegRTV 1.382 1.233
(0.936) (0.938)
RegUTV 1.723* 1.621*
(0.889) (0.892)
RegCD 9.419** 9.101** 9.758** 9.744**
(4.211) (4.216) (4.225) (4.223)
RegCOH 0.258 0.194 0.0614 0.205
(0.245) (0.248) (0.222) (0.247)
Constant 7.204*** 10.67*** 13.05*** 12.42*** 11.57***
(1.193) (4.001) (3.748) (3.776) (3.829)
Observations 854 854 854 854 854
R-squared 0.380 0.389 0.387 0.389 0.390
Number of id 171 171 171 171 171
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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by analysing the knowledge cost function. This approach can help in 
understanding why the cost of knowledge is far from homogeneous. This 
evidence has been rarely detected in the literature and poorly investigated.
Study of the knowledge cost function enables us to analyse the role of 
the different cost items that concur with the definition of the knowledge 
output. This innovative approach enables us to explore from a novel 
perspective two important hypotheses that are at the core of the econom-
ics of knowledge: i) the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis according to 
which firms with larger stocks of internal knowledge are superior in the 
generation of new knowledge; and ii) the so-called Marshallian hypothesis 
according to which knowledge externalities exert positive effects according 
not only to the density of the local pools of knowledge but also to their 
levels of coherence.
The empirical analysis of the costs of knowledge, based upon a panel 
of companies listed on UK and the main continental European financial 
markets (Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands) for the period 
1995–2006, for which information about patents have been gathered, has 
considered the unit costs of patents on the right hand side, and on the left 
hand side next to R&D expenditures, the stock of internal knowledge as 
well as the stock and the composition of external knowledge. The results 
confirm that the size and composition of the stock of internal knowledge 
play a key role in assessing the actual capability of each firm to generate 
new technological knowledge and hence in reducing the costs of knowledge. 
These results are important as they cast new light on the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. Company size exerts positive – reducing – effects on knowledge 
unit costs only when it is measured by the stock of knowledge. The 
sheer size of firms in terms of R&D expenditures and employment, 
under the control of the size of the internal stock of knowledge, exerts 
positive – increasing – effects on knowledge unit costs. For given levels of 
internal knowledge, larger firms have higher knowledge unit costs than 
small firms. The sheer size of firms does not help in reducing knowledge 
cost generation. This result pushes us to reformulate the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis, introducing the distinction between knowledge generation and 
exploitation. We have demonstrated that sheer size does not help increase 
the cost-efficiency of firms: additional work should be done to investigate 
whether the sheer size of firms might favour the exploitation of knowledge. 
The results on the role of the size and composition of external knowledge 
fully confirm the Marshallian hypothesis, stressing the important role of 
the composition of the local knowledge pools.
These results bear important implications for technology policy at the 
regional level as well as for the strategic management of firms. Technology 
policy represents indeed one of the key levers that policymakers may use 
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to trigger local development. Due to the collective and systemic nature 
of knowledge generation activities, the choice of the correct policy mix is 
crucial. The promotion of specific technological domains at the local level 
may impact the effectiveness of knowledge generation processes of incum-
bents firms. In this way, attempts to foster the emergence of technologies 
which are not consistent with the competences accumulated in the region 
are likely to increase the average level of unrelated variety and dissimilarity 
and, as a consequence, increase the average cost per patent. The implemen-
tation of technology policies that focus local knowledge endowments and 
try to upgrade them may be more effective than the pursuit of technologi-
cal goals that are unrelated to the local pools of competence.
From the managerial viewpoint, the results of our analysis confirm the 
intuition of Edith Penrose about the central role of the stock of knowledge 
internal to each firm. The results also confirm that the composition of the 
bundle of technological activities carried out at the local level plays an 
important role. This has two important implications for decision-making. 
First, footloose firms should take into account, in their decisions concern-
ing the location of their R&D laboratories, the local mix of technological 
competences so as to select sites with the size and mix of local knowledge 
pools that are more consistent with their technological strategies. Second, 
firms with a given rooted location should choose, among different possible 
technological strategies, those that are more compatible and consistent 
with the specific composition of the local knowledge pool. The location 
in areas featuring a bundle of technological competencies consistent with 
the innovation strategies of the firm is indeed likely to make the search 
process for new combinations of technologies more effective, and hence 
new knowledge less costly.
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7.  The cost of knowledge and 
productivity growth
Cristiano Antonelli and Agnieszka Gehringer*
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic growth based on the continuous generation of innovation is a 
major contribution of the Schumpeterian legacy and endogenous growth 
models (Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998). The subsequent investi-
gation of causes of productivity growth and of differences across regions 
and industries in the productivity dynamics attracted much attention in 
past empirical investigations. The intensive search for the determinants 
of total factor productivity (TFP) led to identifying such factors as R&D 
efforts, human capital accumulation, trade openness and financial globali-
zation (Cameron et al., 2005; Biatour and Dumont, 2011; Gehringer, 2013; 
Gehringer et al., 2014).2
Little attention has been paid to the huge differences in the costs 
of  knowledge. Yet, the cost of  knowledge differs widely over time and 
across countries that share similar regimes of  intellectual property rights 
(IPR). We can assume, in fact, that the levels of  knowledge appropri-
ability are homogeneous across OECD countries. At the macro level, 
the average unit cost of  knowledge was ranging between 0.2 million 
of  constant purchasing power parity (PPP) $ in South Korea and New 
Zealand and 6.2 million in Belgium between 1985 and 2010. Moreover, 
such costs were varying over time in the majority of  the OECD countries 
in our sample: it was generally lower in the last decades of  the twentieth 
century and increased significantly afterwards. We integrate this stylized 
fact into the analysis of  productivity dynamics and treat the cost of 
knowledge as a new determining factor of  TFP growth. Accordingly, 
our main hypothesis is based on the following argumentation. Where 
the cost of  knowledge is higher, more intensive R&D expenditures are 
needed to generate a piece of  technological knowledge. Conversely, 
where it costs less to engage in innovative activities, relatively more new 
knowledge will be generated, contributing to faster productivity growth. 
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This hypothesis seems at first glance to be confirmed by the data, both 
for individual countries and for the average of  the OECD sample. 
Regarding more precisely the development over time, although by their 
nature the TFP growth rates were more volatile, the steady increase in 
the unit cost of  knowledge was accompanied by a diminishing trend of 
productivity growth.
The theoretical explanation of the possible link between the cost 
of knowledge and the productivity dynamics relies on the notion of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities, according to which external techno-
logical knowledge, regarded as indispensable in the generation of new 
technological knowledge and the eventual introduction of innovations, 
can be accessed and used at costs that are below equilibrium levels in 
some specific regional, industrial and institutional circumstances. When 
the private costs of knowledge lie below its social value, the unit cost 
of knowledge-intensive production is lower and the output larger than 
expected. The more intensive are knowledge externalities, the faster the 
productivity growth of the system at large.
Our approach and the main contribution to the literature are twofold. 
First, we construct a broad theoretical background showing that both 
the Schumpeterian and the Arrovian traditions of analysis support our 
working hypothesis. We build here upon two complementary models – the 
knowledge generation function (Nelson, 1982; Weitzman, 1996, 1998) and 
the material goods production function (Griliches, 1979) – that are put 
into a unified analytical framework. Subsequently, we empirically test our 
model in a panel investigation of 20 OECD countries between 1985 and 
2010.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe 
the relevant literature creating the conceptual context for our later analysis. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical model, which is then empirically tested 
in Section 4. Section 5 provides crucial policy implications, and the last 
section concludes.
2. THE ANALYTICAL CONTEXT
Appreciation of the central role of knowledge externalities in the introduction 
of productivity-enhancing innovations is the result of the recent advances 
of two quite separate and yet complementary analytical approaches: i) the 
‘rediscovery’ of the Schumpeterian notion of creative reaction contingent 
upon the availability of knowledge externalities; and ii) the Arrovian analy-
sis of technological knowledge. Let us analyse them in turn.
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2.1 The Schumpeterian ‘Creative Reaction’
The new appreciation of the essay ‘The creative response in economic 
history’ published by Joseph Alois Schumpeter in the Journal of Economic 
History in 1947 and ‘almost’ forgotten since then enables the reappraisal 
of the Schumpeterian legacy. The Schumpeterian literature has paid 
much attention to his earlier contribution which introduced the notions 
of limited appropriability of knowledge and the transient duration of the 
monopolistic market powers associated with the introduction of innova-
tions. According to Schumpeter (1942) imitative entry cannot be impeded, 
but only delayed. With respect to the extensive literature that impinged 
upon Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, the attention paid to ‘The 
creative response in economic history’ has been inconsistent.
Yet Schumpeter (1947) provided quite an original framework where 
innovation is conceptualized as a creative response rather than the result 
of a routine or a rational plan. The availability of knowledge exter-
nalities is regarded as an indispensable condition to support the creative 
reaction and actually introduce technological innovations. According to 
Schumpeter, firms are often exposed to mismatches between the plans that 
are necessary to organize their current business and the actual conditions 
of product and factor markets. Their reaction can be adaptive (or passive) 
and creative. Passive reactions consist in textbook switching activities on 
the existing maps of isoquants and adjustment of prices to quantities, and 
vice versa. Passive reactions take place when firms cannot take advantage 
of knowledge externalities. Without pecuniary knowledge externalities, 
in fact, firms might be able to change their products and their processes, 
but they cannot introduce technological innovations. Without pecuniary 
knowledge externalities firms may increase the variety of their products 
and production processes, but cannot introduce productivity-enhancing 
innovations (Antonelli, 2008).
Their reactions to unexpected mismatches between expectations and 
actual conditions of both product and factor markets are creative when 
and if  relevant pecuniary knowledge externalities are available. Only 
with pecuniary knowledge externalities can firms that try to react to mis-
matches that push them in out-of-equilibrium conditions introduce actual 
productivity-enhancing technological innovations (Antonelli, 2008, 2011).
Schumpeter’s later essay uncovers the positive effects of the limited 
appropriability of knowledge: knowledge spills as it cannot be fully appro-
priated by the ‘inventor’ but yields positive externalities that can benefit 
all inventors. The integration of both the contributions of Schumpeter 
enables us to elaborate the distinction between positive and negative pecu-
niary knowledge externalities. Negative pecuniary knowledge externalities 
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consist in the reduction of the revenues associated with the introduction 
of an innovation. Positive pecuniary knowledge externalities consist in the 
reduction of the costs of knowledge that are necessary to introduce an 
innovation. The algebraic sum defines whether the net pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities are positive or negative.
Reappraisal of the Schumpeterian literature based upon appreciation 
of the notion of innovation as a creative response contingent upon the 
availability of net pecuniary knowledge externalities complements and 
integrates the new developments of the Arrovian economics of knowledge.
2.2 The New Economics of Knowledge
Technological knowledge is a peculiar good as well as a highly idiosyn-
cratic activity. Following the path-breaking analyses by Richard Nelson 
and Kenneth Arrow it is well known that technological knowledge, as 
an economic good, is characterized by limited appropriability, non-
exhaustivity, non-rival use, high levels of tacitness and substantial non-
divisibility (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962, 1969). Technological knowledge is 
at the same time the output of a dedicated activity and a necessary input 
not only in the production of other goods, but also in the generation of 
new technological knowledge (David, 1993; Crépon et al., 1998). The 
generation of technological knowledge, as a consequence, is shaped by the 
systematic recombination of the existing bits of knowledge together with 
current efforts of research, development and learning (R&D&L) activities 
(Weitzman, 1996, 1998; Lucas, 2008).
Intrinsic external and internal cumulability shapes the recombinant 
generation of technological knowledge. The basic inputs in the generation 
of technological knowledge are not only the current flows of R&D&L 
activities performed by each firm, but also the stock of existing knowledge 
generated internally by each firm and externally by the rest of the system 
(Saviotti, 2007).
Due to the very nature of technological knowledge, its owners are 
unable to fully appropriate their intellectual property and, consequently, 
knowledge spills to the rest of the system. Because of this limited 
appropriability, knowledge externalities take place (Griliches, 1979, 1992). 
Knowledge externalities, however, only rarely take the form of pure 
externalities. Indeed, access to external sources of knowledge is not entirely 
free: because of relevant absorption costs, the case of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities applies instead (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).3
Absorption efforts are necessary to screen the existing knowledge of 
the other firms, identify the components that are indispensable to pursuit 
the ongoing generation of new knowledge, access and retrieve them, and, 
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finally, apply their content (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Because of the 
irreducible content of tacitness, access to the relevant portions of existing 
knowledge is possible only by means of systematic interactions and effec-
tive communication between knowledge producers and knowledge users. 
Knowledge interactions on their own are far from free: their successful 
implementation requires dedicated activities that entail specific costs 
(Lane, 2009). The cost of such interactions – involving screening, learning, 
communicating and absorbing – is, nevertheless, below the social value 
of knowledge exchanged, so that pecuniary knowledge externalities are 
possible (Gehringer, 2011a, b).
The portions of technological knowledge acquired externally are strictly 
complementary to the internal knowledge stock and to the current 
efforts of R&D&L in the recombinant generation of new technological 
knowledge. This means that firms cannot afford to be without external 
knowledge. Additionally, external knowledge brings about benefits in 
terms of pecuniary knowledge externalities. When and if  pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities are available and hence can be accessed, implying costs 
of external knowledge below the equilibrium levels, firms can introduce 
technological innovations that increase TFP (Antonelli, 2013a).
2.3 Pecuniary Knowledge Externalities and Productivity Growth
The two lines of enquiry converge with different motivations and in 
different analytical traditions –respectively the equilibrium and the out-of-
equilibrium approach – to articulating the same hypothesis. When firms 
face unexpected product and factor market conditions, the costs of knowl-
edge play a key role in shaping their reaction. When the costs of knowledge 
are high, firms cope with the out-of-equilibrium conditions by means of 
substitution processes: they try to adjust quantities to prices moving along 
the existing maps of isoquants. When the costs of knowledge are low, firms 
try to generate new technological knowledge so as to introduce innovations 
that change the existing map of isoquants. Their reaction can be creative 
only when and if  the costs of knowledge are low.
Low knowledge costs make it possible to try to introduce innovations 
rather than adjusting quantities to prices, and vice versa. In order to intro-
duce innovations, firms activate their knowledge generation processes and 
make effective use of the external knowledge that is available at costs that 
are below equilibrium levels. Pecuniary knowledge externalities are found 
in innovation systems characterized by high levels of knowledge connectiv-
ity when firms can access and use the existing stocks of knowledge at low 
costs. High knowledge connectivity in turn depends upon the quality of 
knowledge interactions not only between users and producers, but also 
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at large between the various agents that are part of the system, including 
firms and research organizations. Strategic alliances aimed at implement-
ing the knowledge capability of firms are key determinants of the general 
levels of knowledge connectivity.
Total factor productivity can be explained only in terms of access 
to pecuniary knowledge externalities. Pecuniary knowledge externali-
ties in fact provide access to external knowledge at costs that are below 
equilibrium levels. This enables firms to cope with unexpected changes 
in product and factor market conditions by means of technological and 
organizational innovations.
Total factor productivity measures the mismatch between historic levels 
actually experienced and the levels of expected (equilibrium) output. 
Pecuniary knowledge externalities can account for the residual. When the 
access and use of the external stock of knowledge cost less than in the 
market equilibrium conditions, the reaction of firms can be creative and 
the actual output levels are larger than the expected ones. Here the distinc-
tion between pure or technical externalities and pecuniary knowledge 
externalities plays a central role. The stock of existing knowledge can be 
accessed and used as an indispensable input in the generation of further 
knowledge only with the intentional effort of prospective users. The access 
itself  does not fall from heaven. It is the result of intentional and dedicated 
activities that entail costs. Such costs in turn depend not only on the sheer 
size of the stock of knowledge but also on the structural characteristics 
of the system and on the quality of knowledge-governance mechanisms 
that are in place. If  we retain the notion of economic systems as rugged 
landscapes articulated by Krugman (1994, 1995) we see that some systems 
are endowed with landscapes that are better able than others to make the 
access to existing knowledge easier and less expensive, with larger knowl-
edge externalities that in turn yield larger occurrence of creative reactions, 
decisions to innovate; and, ultimately, higher rates of TFP increase.
3.  THE COST OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
A simple model whereby pecuniary knowledge externalities explain both 
TFP levels and increase can be stylized by means of two nested activities: 
a knowledge generation function and a technology production function. 
Both activities are usually performed by each and the same firm.
Our knowledge generation function follows analyses by Nelson (1982) 
and Weitzman (1996, 1998). The stocks of all existing technological knowl-
edge both internal and external to each firm are indispensable, strictly 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   156 19/02/2018   13:42
 The cost of knowledge and productivity growth  157
complementary inputs, together with R&D activities and the valorization 
of learning processes, in the recombinant generation of new technological 
knowledge.
Internal and external stocks of existing knowledge can be accessed only 
if  and when dedicated resources have been expended. We can thus write 
the recombinant knowledge generation function and the cost equation of 
technological knowledge of each firm. The knowledge generation function 
is a standard Cobb–Douglas and takes the following form:
 TK (ISK,ESK,R&D&L)5 ISKAESKBR&D&L Δ (7.1)
where TK represents new technological knowledge generated with constant 
returns to scale by means of the current efforts in research, development 
and learning (R&D&L), the internal stock of knowledge (ISK) and the 
external stock of knowledge (ESK) – that is, the three indispensable pro-
ductive factors. A, B and Δ are the respective output elasticities of the three 
inputs. The marginal rates of technical substitution of the three factors are:
 
0TK/0ISK
0TK/0ESK
5
A # ISKA21ESKBR&D&L D
B # ISKAESKB21R&D&L D 5
(A/B) (ESK/ISK)
 
0TK/0ISK
0TK/0R&D&L
5
A # ISKA21ESKBR&D&L D
D # ISKAESKBR&D&L D21 5
(A/D) (R&D&L/ISK)
 (7.2)
 
0TK/0R&D&L
0TK/0ESK
5
D # ISKAESKBR&D&L D21
B # ISKAESKB21R&D&L D 5
(D/B) (ESK/R&D&L)
Denoting with t, u and z the unit price of the respective factors, the cost 
equation is:
 C5 tISK1uESK1 zR&D&L (7.3)
Profits can be defined as:
 p(TK)5 sTK(ISK,ESK,R&D&L)2 tISK2 uESK2 zR&D&L (7.4)
where s is the price of the knowledge output.
The first order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
deriving equation (7.4) with respect to ISK, ESK and R&D&L, and putting 
the partial derivatives equal to zero. This can be expressed as:
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 0p/0ISK 5 s # A # ISKA21ESKBR&D&L D2 t50
 0p/0ESK5 s # B # ISKAESKB21R&D&L D2u50 (7.5)
 0p/0R&D&L 5 s # D # ISKAESKBR&D&L D212 z50.
From equation (7.5), the equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as:
 t/u5 (A/B) (ESK/ISK)
 z/t5 (A/D) (R&D&L/ISK)  (7.6)
 z/u 5 (D/B) (ESK/R&D&L)
It follows that firms select the equilibrium mix of inputs such that the 
relative unit costs are equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution. 
In some localized, historic, institutional and spatial circumstances, because 
of the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms at work and the high 
quality of knowledge interactions and communication, the unit costs of 
the access and reuse of the stock of existing knowledge are very low: hence 
the reaction of firms can be creative. Pecuniary knowledge externalities are 
found where and when the localized costs of the stock of external knowl-
edge (u) are below socially desirable equilibrium – average – levels (u*).
According to equation (7.6), it is in fact clear that when pecuniary 
knowledge externalities apply, given a certain budget, the firm will choose 
a combination of inputs biased towards a larger stock of external knowl-
edge and a smaller internal stock of knowledge and of current efforts in 
R&D. When pecuniary knowledge externalities apply, as a consequence, 
the firm will be able to generate an amount of technological knowledge 
that is larger than in equilibrium conditions, and will be able to react 
creatively so as to generate new technological knowledge at low costs and 
actually introduce technological innovations.
The effects of the larger amount of technological knowledge generated 
at costs that are lower than in equilibrium conditions has a direct effect 
on the downstream production of all other goods. The recombinant 
knowledge generation function feeds the technology production function.
Following Griliches (1979), in fact, technological knowledge enters 
directly a standard Cobb–Douglas production function of all the other 
goods with constant returns to scale of each firm. Hence:
 Y (K,L,TK)5K aL bTK g (7.7)
where K, L and TK are the productive factors and a, b and g the  respective 
output elasticities. The marginal rates of technical substitution are:
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0Y/0L
0Y/0K
5
b # KaL b21TK g
a # Ka21L bTK g 5
(b/a) (K/L)
 
0Y/0L
0Y/0TK
5
b # KaL b21TK g
g # KaL bTK g21 5
(b/g) (TK/L)  (7.8)
 
0Y/0TK
0Y/0K
5
g # KaL bTK g21
a # Ka21L bTK g 5
(g/a) (K/TK)
Denoting with r, w and s the unit price of the three indispensable produc-
tion factors in the production of Y, the cost equation is:
 C5 rK1wL1 sTK  (7.9)
Profits can be defined as:
 p (Y )5 pY (K,L,TK)2 rK2wL2 sTK  (7.10)
where p is the price of output Y.
The first-order conditions can be obtained by deriving equation (7.10) 
with respect to factors K, L and TK, and putting the partial derivatives 
equal to zero. This can be expressed as:
 0p/0K 5 p # a # Ka21L bTK g2 r50
 0p/0L5 p # b # KaL b21TK g2w50 (7.11)
 0p/0TK5 p # g # K aL bTK g212 s50.
From equation (7.11), the equilibrium conditions are:
 w/r5 (b/a) (K/L)
 w/s5 (b/g) (TK/L)  (7.12)
 s/r5 (g/a) (K/TK) .
Firms select the equilibrium mix of inputs such that the relative unit costs 
are equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution. Corresponding to 
these three conditions, the profit-maximizing firm will identify TK*, K* 
and L*, that is, the equilibrium levels of the production factors.
With positive pecuniary knowledge externalities in the upstream gen-
eration  of technological knowledge and, hence, cheap localized costs of 
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 technological knowledge, below equilibrium level, s < s*, firms will try to gen-
erate new technological knowledge in order to introduce innovations. Hence 
firms will use a technique characterized by higher levels of TK and lower 
levels of both capital and labour: they will use a more knowledge- intensive 
technique than the adaptive firms that cannot benefit from pecuniary 
knowledge externalities. Most importantly, the firms that benefit from pecu-
niary knowledge externalities will be able to react creatively to unexpected 
mismatches in both product and factor markets. This happens because they 
can generate new technological knowledge at a cost that is below equilibrium, 
and hence introduce productivity-enhancing technological innovations, 
experiencing an actual increase in their levels of TFP: producing an output Y 
that is larger (and cheaper) than in general equilibrium conditions.
Following Abramovitz (1956), we know that the level of TFP is measured 
by the ratio between the real historic levels of output Y and the theoretical 
ones calculated as the result of the equilibrium use of production factors:
 A = Y/K*L*TK* (7.13)
where K*, L* and TK* are the general equilibrium quantities of produc-
tion factors and A measures TFP.
Technological knowledge that has been generated without the avail-
ability of pecuniary knowledge externalities will yield equilibrium levels 
of output. In these conditions firms can introduce novelties rather than 
innovations. Novelties consist in an increase in the variety of products and 
processes, such as changes in production processes, higher levels of product 
differentiation with new characteristics of their products. Novelties differ 
from innovations. The former are produced in equilibrium conditions 
such that the marginal product of inputs matches their costs. Innovations 
instead yield TFP-enhancing effects (Link and Siegel, 2007).
The results of the modelling exercise can be summarized as follows: 
firms produce more than expected, and hence experience an ‘unexplained’ 
residual in the actual levels of output. The observed levels of output are 
larger than the expected ones (Y > Y*) if  and when the localized costs 
of the access and secondary use of the stock of existing technological 
knowledge in the upstream knowledge generation function are lower than 
in general equilibrium (u < u*). It is clear in fact that, when pecuniary 
knowledge externalities apply, the output of the recombinant knowledge 
generation function in terms of technological knowledge is larger than in 
general equilibrium conditions and the costs of the technological knowl-
edge that enters the downstream Cobb–Douglas technology production 
function for all the other goods are also lower (s < s*). Moreover, the lower 
such costs, the stronger the effect of productivity increases. With a given 
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budget, firms that benefit from pecuniary knowledge externalities are able 
to generate a larger amount of technological knowledge, and hence an 
amount of all the other goods that is larger than the expected levels based 
upon equilibrium assumptions.
In such conditions, qualified by positive pecuniary knowledge externali-
ties, each firm operates in localized (and transient) equilibrium conditions, 
but the aggregate output of the system is larger than expected in general 
equilibrium conditions. The working of pecuniary knowledge externalities 
is compatible with short-term, instantaneous equilibrium conditions at the 
firm level, while at the aggregate level the system is far from equilibrium.
This approach enables us to take into account the specific characteristics 
of the rugged landscapes that make pecuniary knowledge externalities actu-
ally available. Pecuniary knowledge externalities, in fact, are not a ubiqui-
tous, persistent and spontaneous attribute of any kind of economic system, 
at any time. Quite the opposite; pecuniary knowledge externalities are the 
endogenous result of the specific conditions of the rugged landscapes in 
which external knowledge flows and can be accessed. The actual access 
to external knowledge may take place in highly localized conditions when 
and where knowledge cumulability is actually implemented and supported. 
Such characteristics, in turn, are a consequence of the past generation of 
technological knowledge and introduction of technological innovations. As 
such they are endogenous to the system (Saviotti and Pyka, 2008).
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.1 The Descriptive Evidence
The empirical analysis refers to a sample of 20 industrialized OECD coun-
tries that implement and enforce homogeneous intellectual property rights 
regimes, observed over the time span 1985–2010 (Table 7.1). We assume 
that the levels of knowledge appropriability are comparable across the 
20 countries considered. The unit cost of knowledge, as measured by the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to patents, differs widely over time and across 
countries, regions, industries and firms. As Table 7.1 (column 1) shows, 
at the macro level, the unit cost of knowledge ranged from 0.2 million 
constant PPP $ in South Korea and New Zealand to 5.5 million in Portugal 
and 6.2 million in Belgium. The variance across the OECD average of 1.9 
million is relevant. Moreover, such costs varied over time in the majority of 
countries in our sample: it was generally lower in the first half  of the period 
and increased significantly afterwards.
This dynamic over time is clearly confirmed in Figure 7.1. The average 
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unit cost of knowledge was steadily increasing between 1985 and 2010 for 
our sample. For the growth of TFP the picture is less clear, although a 
diminishing tendency over time can be recognized.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
Our focus is on the relationship between the unit cost of knowledge genera-
tion and TFP growth. This relationship might in principle go two ways. On 
the one hand, and in line with our previous argument, where the cost of 
knowledge is lower, the more intensive and stronger will be pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities and the faster should be the growth of TFP. On the other 
Table 7.1  Unit cost of knowledge and TFP growth in OECD countries, 
1985–2010
Country Unit cost of knowledge TFP growth (%)
1985–2010 1985–98 1999–2010 1985–2010 1985–98 1999–2010
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.5
Austria 1.8 1.1 2.6 1.4 1.3 1.4
Belgium 6.2 3.4 9.0 0.8 1.2 0.3
Canada 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5
Denmark 1.7 1.1 2.5 0.8 1.1 0.3
Finland 1.5 0.6 2.6 1.8 2.2 1.2
France 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.4 0.6
Germany 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.7
Ireland 1.3 0.5 2.1 2.7 3.5 1.8
Italy 1.8 1.6 2.0 0.4 1.0 −0.3
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.8 0.9
Korea 0.2 0.3 0.2 3.8 4.3 3.3
Netherlands 3.4 2.9 3.9 1.0 0.9 1.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
Portugal 5.5 2.6 8.8 1.3 2.5 0.6
Spain 2.8 1.9 3.9 0.5 1.0 −0.1
Sweden 2.5 1.3 3.4 0.9 0.7 1.2
Switzerland 2.3 1.4 3.4 0.0 −0.6 0.4
UK 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7
US 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.4
Average OECD 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 0.8
Note: Unit cost of knowledge is calculated as the ratio between the total R&D 
expenditures in millions of constant (2005) PPP $ and the number of patent applications 
made to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). TFP growth is the growth 
rate of multi-factor productivity.
Source: Own calculations based on the IPER database built upon OECD STAN and 
WIPO data.
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hand, in a context characterized by a positive dynamics of TFP, the costs of 
knowledge generation are likely to decrease due to the more extensive avail-
ability of newly generated external knowledge. Although we believe that this 
second mechanism is less likely to be true, or at least not on a regular basis, we 
account for this potential simultaneity by applying the instrumental variable 
method (also called two-stage least squares, 2SLS), where the cost of knowl-
edge is treated as an endogenous regressor and needs to be instrumented.
It is a common problem to find variables serving as valid instruments, in 
the sense of being satisfactorily exogenous with respect to the dependent vari-
able and at the same time strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors. 
If  instruments are weak, the precision of instrumental variable estimations is 
lower than that of simple OLS regressions. On the other hand, if  endogenous 
regressors are included in the estimation, OLS results will be biased. As we 
suspect – and confirm with a test – that endogeneity could be an issue in our 
framework, we aim to explicitly deal with it, but at the same time ensure that 
our procedure does not lead to loss of precision of our estimations.
In order to implement this approach, our econometric model is based 
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Note: See note of Table 7.1.
Source: Own calculations based on the IPER database built upon OECD STAN and 
WIPO data.
Figure 7.1  Development of TFP growth and of the unit cost of knowledge 
on average of 20 OECD countries, 1985–2010
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upon a system of two equations: the cost of knowledge equation and the 
TFP equation, where the second-step TFP growth equation includes the 
fitted values of knowledge cost from the first step. The two-step model can 
be represented in the following system:
 CKit5a11a2STOCKit1a311Vrita41a5CKit211a6CKit221tt1ri1eit
 (7.14)
 DTFPit5b11b2CKit1Vritb31t1mi1 eit (7.15)
The first step described in equation (7.14) consists in testing the key 
hypothesis that the cost of knowledge (CK) reflects the density of the 
stock of existing knowledge (STOCK). Each firm at each point in time will 
be better able to generate technological knowledge the larger the amount 
of pecuniary knowledge externalities. The latter in turn are likely to stem 
diachronically from the stock of existing knowledge. Hence we expect 
that the costs of knowledge in a country is lower, the larger is the stock 
of patents per capita. In addition to the two aforementioned instruments 
(the so-called excluded instruments), we include the first and second lag 
of the dependent variable. Vector V′it is the set of exogenous covariates 
that should be included in both the first and the second stage (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). Finally, tt and ri are the time- and country-specific effects, 
whereas eit is the indiosyncratic error term.
A comment is due here to our measure of the cost of knowledge. This is 
captured by the R&D expenditures made in a country per unit of patent, 
and thus most closely refers to what we called in our theoretical discussion 
‘internal cost of knowledge’. Ideally, we would be willing to have a measure 
of cost that is an average between internal and external cost of knowledge 
generation, where external cost refers to the cost necessary to support when 
acquiring knowledge from sources external to a firm’s own business. However, 
there are insuperable limits in finding such a measure and we are constrained 
to sticking to R&D expenditures only.4 This notwithstanding, even for our 
R&D unit cost variable, our main hypothesis always holds: given the avail-
ability of pecuniary knowledge externalities, in any instant of time firms face 
a cost advantage associated with external knowledge, which provides them 
with the incentive to adjust their production plans towards a higher relative 
implementation of external versus internal knowledge. It follows thus that 
the more abundant are knowledge externalities, the lower should be the unit 
cost of (internal) knowledge and the higher will be productivity growth.
In the second step, we account for the endogeneity of the costs of knowl-
edge within the productivity equation. In order to validate our instrument-
ing strategy we implement different post-estimation diagnostics – precisely, 
9 ′it 4 ′
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weak instruments test, over-identification test, redundancy test (see Table 
7.4). Additionally, we check whether our excluded instrumental variables 
affect the dependent variable only indirectly, by including them as regres-
sors in the estimations of TFP growth.5 We could confirm that these vari-
ables were not directly influential in TFP growth and, thus, the exclusion 
restriction cannot be rejected.6
More precisely regarding the second stage, in addition to our main 
explanatory variable, we account for other possible factors determining 
TFP growth, as suggested in the past literature. Finally, our econometric 
model assumes the form:
 ∆TFPit = b1+b2CKit+1b3HCit1b4TOit1b5GDP/capit1t1mi1eit  (7.16)
where ∆TFPit is the annual growth rate of TFP in country i at time t; CKit 
is our variable of interest expressing the unit cost of knowledge generation; 
HCit is a measure of human capital stock available in an economy; TOit 
refers to a measure of trade openness; and GDP/capit refers to national 
income per capita. The variables and data sources are presented in Table 
7.2, and detailed description of the method in Appendix B.
9 9
Table 7.2 Variables used in the estimations: description and data sources
Variable Description Source
Δ(TFP) Growth rate of TFP OECD.stat
CK Cost of knowledge, measured 
in terms of the ratio between 
R&D spending and the number 
of patent applications in a 
country each year in 1985–2010
Own calculation based on OECD.
stat (R&D spending) and WIPO 
(patent applications)
TO Openness to trade measured as 
the ratio between the sum of 
imports and exports over GDP
Penn World Table 7.1 
HC Human capital: R&D personnel 
per 1000 employees
OECD.stat
GDP/cap GDP per capita Own calculation based on Penn 
World Table 7.1
Excluded instrument
STOCK Patent stock per capita Own calculations applying the 
perpetual inventory method on 
annual patent applications to 
WIPO*
Note: * A detailed description of the method is included in Appendix B.
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Coefficient b1 is a constant, whereas coefficients b2 to b5 are supposed to 
measure the marginal contribution of each factor to TFP growth. Finally, 
t and mi are the time and country dummies, respectively, whereas eit is the 
idiosyncratic error term.
To justify our set of control variables, the motivation to include a meas-
ure of trade openness, as expressed in terms of the share of the overall trade 
volume (imports plus exports) relative to the size of the economy (GDP), 
derives from the fact that the intensifying trade integration between 
economies has often been argued to have a positive impact on productiv-
ity growth. This impact can be direct – when trade flows (particularly 
export) take place in technology-intensive sectors – and indirect – through 
the acquisition of specialized technological skills as a consequence of 
interactions between the trade partners (see López, 2005 for a survey of 
the related literature).
The inclusion of human capital directly derives from the models of 
endogenous growth, supportive for the positive role in the growth process 
played by the accumulation of skills (Lucas, 1998). We measure the stock 
of human capital as the ratio of the R&D personnel for 1000 employees. 
In that way, we aim to capture the influence of the skilled labour that is 
most intensively involved in innovative processes.7 Finally, we include GDP 
per capita in order to account for the convergence process. More precisely, 
economies that are at a relatively lower stage of economic development 
(that is, lower GDP per capita) are supposed to experience relatively faster 
productivity growth. Alternatively, as another way to control for the 
possible differences in economic development and their influence on the 
speed of productivity growth, one could include the initial levels of TFP. 
Accordingly, we checked this hypothesis as well, but the coefficient on this 
variable, although reporting the right sign, was never significant.
Table 7.3 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in 
estimations. Regarding the main variables of interest, average annual 
growth rate of TFP was equal to 1.1 per cent, ranging between −7.8 per 
Table 7.3 Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
Δ(TFP) 469 1.11 1.71 −7.8 7.8
CK 451 1.96 2.08 0.09 10.93
TO 520 69.16 33.90 16.00 183.30
HC 404 10.77 4.05 2.44 24.73
GDP/cap 520 27,559.24 6731.22 7352.31 47,134.06
STOCK 484 7471.04 11,062.42 150.15 58,820.32
R&D 457 554.91 281.11 42.07 1265.10
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cent and 7.8 per cent. The unit cost of knowledge was on average almost 2 
million constant PPP $, with a minimum of 0.09 and a maximum of 10.9 
million.
4.2 Results
Table 7.4 summarizes the results of  the estimations of  equation (7.16). We 
report the results from four methods. Column (1) shows the results from 
a pooled OLS method. In columns (2) and (3) we estimate analogous 
specifications with methods explicitly accounting for the panel structure 
of  our dataset, namely random effects and fixed effects model. The results 
from these three methods serve to sort out the direction of  the bias with 
respect to the instrumental variable estimates (2SLS) reported in columns 
(4)–(6).
More precisely regarding the IV estimations, we first estimate a model 
where we include only the instrumented knowledge cost variable (column 
4). This is to show the direct impact of the variable of interest on TFP 
growth. In other words, this is the effect of the cost of knowledge discon-
nected from the influence coming from other factors. We then include such 
other factors in the subsequent two specifications. In column 5, openness 
to trade, human capital and GDP per capita are considered. Finally, in 
column 6, the latter variable is replaced by the initial value of TFP.
As the endogeneity test regarding the endogenous regressor (CK) in 
all cases and at all conventional significance levels clearly rejects the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity, the IV specifications are preferred over those 
run according to the alternative methods, OLS, RE and FE. Regarding 
the direction of bias, the latter methods seem to underestimate the effect 
of knowledge cost on TFP growth. Moreover, considering the other tests 
reported (Hansen J test of validity of the over-identifying restrictions and 
the Kleibergen–Paap test of weak instruments), they suggest that the IV 
estimations are correctly specified.8
The results clearly suggest that the effect of knowledge cost on TFP 
growth is negative, meaning that the higher the unit cost of generating new 
knowledge, the lower the rate of growth of TFP. In quantitative terms this 
impact ranges between −0.35 and −0.36, depending on the control vari-
ables included. If  the cost of knowledge increases by one unit (correspond-
ing to 1 million 2005 constant PPP $), this leads to a 0.35–0.36 percentage 
point decrease in the TFP growth rate. Consequently, given that between 
1999 and 2010 the average unit cost of knowledge for the OECD countries 
in our sample increased by around 1.3 million PPP $, this contributed to 
a reduction in TFP growth rate of approximately 0.42 percentage points. 
If  the cost of knowledge remained unchanged at the average level from 
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the pre-period (1985–98) then, ceteris paribus, TFP would have grown on 
average between 1999 and 2010 at the rate of 1.2 per cent.
Regarding the other factors explaining the TFP growth, trade openness 
was positively contributing to speeding it up. Human capital variable, 
although reporting the expected positive sign, remained always insig-
nificant. Finally, the convergence hypothesis seems to be confirmed by 
the negative sign of the coefficient corresponding to GDP per capita. 
Accordingly, countries experiencing lower levels of GDP per capita 
could register higher TFP growth rates. This same direction of influence, 
although with insignificant estimated coefficient, is found for the variable 
measuring the initial level of TFP.
Finally, the results of the first-stage estimation relative to the excluded 
instruments are also reported. They confirm that the cost of knowledge 
diminishes as the stock of existing knowledge increases.
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The stock of existing knowledge is a primary factor of the levels of pecuni-
ary knowledge externalities. In turn, pecuniary knowledge externalities 
are the cause of TFP growth. Access to the stock of existing knowledge, 
however, is neither free nor automatic nor homogeneous across economic 
systems. It depends upon the quality of the rugged landscapes in which the 
generation of technological knowledge takes place and it requires a wide 
range of dedicated activities, including searching, screening, decodifying, 
interacting and learning. The creative capacity of a system is influenced 
by its transfer and absorptive capacities. Here policy action can play an 
important role in implementing the appropriate mix of interventions so 
as to support the creative capacity of the system (Furman et al., 2002; 
Cincera et al., (2014).
Knowledge transfer policy interventions finalized to favour the transfer, 
dissemination and actual access to the stock of existing knowledge may 
be very effective as their ultimate effects are reduction in the cost of 
knowledge, increase in pecuniary knowledge externalities and the eventual 
increase in total factor productivity.
Such knowledge transfer policy interventions should primarily focus 
the large public research infrastructures, with the aim of making the 
technological knowledge generated by the public research system more 
accessible to prospective users. The systematic encouragement of academic 
departments to enter the markets for knowledge-intensive business services 
(KIBS) can help small and medium-sized firms take advantage of the 
stock of knowledge existing within the academic walls. At the individual 
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level, the extension of professors’ privilege so as to favour their profes-
sional activity in the markets for KIBS should increase the interactions of 
scientific personnel with the business community and put in motion the 
exchange of creative and praxis-oriented ideas.
More intense interactions and transactions between the public research 
system and the business community may also help to better focus the 
research activity of the public research system, directing it towards 
scientific fields that are more likely to yield ‘useful’ knowledge. The 
identification of the appropriate portfolio of research activities able to 
pursue scientific progress and yet contribute to economic growth is a 
major problem of the public research system. The feedback from the 
business community expressed by the intensity of academic outsourcing 
and knowledge transactions may provide useful signals to grasp the actual 
scope of application of the different scientific fields.
With respect to private sector knowledge transfer, policy interventions 
should focus on intellectual property rights regimes. The introduction 
of subsidies for the purchase of IPR, together with classical subsidies 
for funding R&D, might help the dissemination of the existing stock of 
knowledge and its easier access, helping the deepening of transactions 
in the markets for IPR with positive effects on both the demand and the 
supply side. The further reduction of the constraints of competition poli-
cies can favour the cooperation between knowledge users and knowledge 
producers along chain values increasing knowledge interactions. As a third 
step, the structure of IPR regimes might be reconsidered with respect to 
their exclusivity. The IPR regimes play an important role. Exclusive, long-
lasting IPR regimes may delay access to the stock of existing knowledge 
to the point that prospective users may prefer to reinvent existing but 
non-accessible knowledge. For given levels of the stock of existing knowl-
edge the systems endowed with an organized architecture of knowledge 
interactions and transactions may experience higher levels of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities that systems where knowledge interactions and 
transactions are made expensive by lack of trust and excess opportunism.
According to a large body of literature, the weakening of intellectual 
property rights might entail a reduction in incentives to generate techno-
logical knowledge, with the ultimate perverse effect of increasing access 
to existing knowledge and hence reducing the costs of knowledge but 
decreasing the incentives and hence the amount of knowledge actually 
generated. A reduction of the exclusivity of IPR accompanied by the 
identification of correct levels of royalties, however, might help the dis-
semination of existing knowledge yet defend appropriability. Identification 
of the correct levels of royalties is clearly crucial to combine the need to 
secure the rewards to innovators with the goal of increasing as much as 
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possible the social surplus stemming from the introduction of innovations 
(Antonelli, 2013b).
6. CONCLUSION
Technological knowledge is a peculiar economic good and it is the output 
of a highly idiosyncratic economic activity. Technological knowledge is at 
the same time an output and an input, not only in the production of all 
other goods but also in the generation of new technological knowledge. 
Because of such peculiar characteristics of technological knowledge as 
an economic good – namely, intrinsic non-exhaustivity, cumulability 
and complementarity – the access and use of the entire stock of existing 
technological knowledge, both internal and external to each firm, is strictly 
necessary. The stock of existing technological knowledge is a necessary 
input strictly complementary to current research and development and 
learning activities for the generation of new technological knowledge.
The access conditions to the stock of existing knowledge play a crucial 
role in assessing the actual capability of firms to innovate. Knowledge 
cumulability applies both to the internal stocks of knowledge generated 
by each firm and to the external stocks of knowledge available in the eco-
nomic system at large. No firm can generate new technological knowledge 
and introduce technological innovations starting from scratch. Nor can 
a firm command all the existing knowledge. The access and use of the 
stock of external knowledge – that is, the components of the total stock of 
knowledge that have been generated and are possessed by the other firms 
in the system – are non-disposable inputs, for nobody can command all the 
knowledge available at any point in time.
Economic systems where the access conditions to existing technological 
knowledge are better enjoy substantial pecuniary knowledge externalities: 
external knowledge in fact is accessed at costs that are below equilibrium 
levels. In such conditions, economic systems where the stock of existing 
knowledge both internal and external to each firm can be accessed in more 
cost-efficient conditions are able to react more creatively to unexpected 
out-of-equilibrium conditions. Firms succeed in coping with unexpected 
changes in product and factor markets by introducing technological 
innovations. As a consequence, it is clear that the costs of knowledge are 
far from homogeneous across countries and historic times. Countries that 
have been able to elaborate efficient knowledge-governance mechanisms, 
making it possible for firms to access and (re)use the existing stocks of 
knowledge, experience faster rates of introduction of technological inno-
vations and higher levels of total factor productivity growth.
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The empirical evidence, based upon a representative group of 20 OECD 
countries for the considerable stretch of 25 years, confirms that knowledge 
costs, as measured by the ratio of total R&D expenditure to patents, vary 
widely across countries and over time. Moreover, this variation explains 
much of the dynamics in TFP growth. In particular, where and when 
knowledge costs are lower, TFP growth is faster.
Pecuniary knowledge externalities are indeed external to each firm, but 
endogenous to the system. At each point in time and space, in fact, the 
levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities do not fall from heaven like 
manna; they depend upon the amount of innovative effort made by agents 
in the system and the structure of knowledge interactions and transactions 
that relate each firm to the others. The effects of past actions on current 
levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities may be both negative – due to 
congestion – and positive because of knowledge cumulability. When the 
effects are positive a self-feeding process of growth based upon positive 
feedback is likely to take place and persist until pecuniary knowledge 
externalities keep increasing.
The policy implications of our analysis are most important. The 
improvement of the knowledge-governance mechanisms should be a cru-
cial ingredient of innovation policymaking. Such knowledge-governance 
mechanisms contribute to the reduction of the cost of knowledge genera-
tion and of the persistent access to the external stock of existing knowledge 
at low costs. Consequently, they yield substantial support to the eventual 
increase in the rate of introduction of innovations, and are able to account 
for the persistent increase in the general efficiency of the economic system.
NOTES
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the Collegio Carlo Alberto and the University of Torino. This chapter benefited greatly 
from the insightful comments and suggestions of Gary Jefferson, Filippo Belloc and 
other participants at the INFER Annual Conference in Pescara, May 2014 and at the 
Governance of a Complex World Conference in Turin, June 2014.
1. See Gehringer et al. (2016) for an overview of the relevant literature.
2. The distinction between pure (or technological) externalities and pecuniary externalities 
dates back to Tibor Scitovski (1954). Pure externalities are found when inputs can be 
used at no costs. Pecuniary externalities take place when the actual costs of an input, 
in a specific and localized condition, are lower than in equilibrium conditions (see also 
Antonelli, 2008).
3. There are other problems with this measure of knowledge cost as well. First, not all 
internal R&D activities are aimed at patent production, as they might end in other 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   173 19/02/2018   13:42
174 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
productive outcomes like trade secrets, trademarks or other legally unprotected forms of 
innovation. This potentially leads us to overestimate the true cost of knowledge. Second, 
not all patents needs formal R&D expenditure, yet other forms of innovative investment. 
There might be patented incremental innovations obtained without R&D. This could 
lead us to underestimate the real cost of knowledge. Finally, and related to the previous 
two points, we standardize our total cost of knowledge by the number of patents, whereas 
other non-patented innovations are common.
4. For brevity, we do not report the results of the estimations here. They are available upon 
request.
5. This is also confirmed by the very low pair-wise correlation between the excluded instru-
ments and ΔTFP, as shown in the correlation matrix in Table 7A.1.
6. It is not easy to find a good variable measuring the stock of human capital available in 
the economy. It has been common practice in the literature to measure human capital in 
terms of secondary school attainment. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this is a too 
broad definition and that more qualified and more specific skills are essential when trying 
to grasp the influence of human capital on productivity. Consequently, our measure of 
human capital expresses an attempt in this direction. However, it can be argued that 
human capital is a measure of R&D intensity and, as such, could be correlated with our 
measure of unit cost of knowledge. We checked for this possibility and found a very low 
and insignificant correlation between the two.
7. More precisely, the Hansen J test regresses the residuals from the IV estimation on all 
instruments (included and excluded). The null hypothesis is then that all instruments 
are uncorrelated with the residuals. Thus, given that we cannot reject the null, we can 
conclude that our over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F 
test statistic refers to the weak identification test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). The 
test statistic is confronted with (different levels of) the rejection rate r that the researcher 
tolerates. Under the null, the test rejects too often. To reject the null, the F test statistic 
must exceed the critical value. In our case, we are always able to reject the null.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
The calculation of the stock of patents is based on the perpetual inventory 
method, analogously linked in the case of calculation of the stock of 
tangible capital (see, for instance, Gehringer, 2013). Accordingly, the stock 
of patents in each year t in country i is given by:
 STOCKit5 (12d)STOCKit211FLOWit (7A.1)
where FLOWit measures the current flow of patents and d is a depreciation 
rate assumed constant and equal to 0.06. Moreover, the initial level of the 
patent stock, STOCKi0 is computed as:
 STOCKi0 = FLOWi0/g + d (7A.2)
where g is a geometric average of the growth rate of investment over the 
whole period for which data on each year patent applications are available. 
For the majority of countries in our sample this was between 1963 and 
2011, with the exception of Australia (1995–2011), Belgium (1965–2011), 
Canada (1960–2011), Korea (1960–2011), the Netherlands (1960–2011) 
and Spain (1965–2011).
Table 7A.1  Correlation matrix between excluded instruments and 
dependent variables
ΔTFP STOCK CK CKt − 1 CKt − 2
ΔTFP 1
STOCK −0.011 1
CK −0.193 −0.304 1
CKt − 1 −0.190 −0.304 0.980 1
CKt − 2 0.083 −0.069 0.052
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8.  Productivity growth persistence: 
firm strategies, size and system 
properties
Cristiano Antonelli, Francesco Crespi and 
Giuseppe Scellato
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades a broad range of research activities has 
been dedicated to the study of productivity growth and its sources. 
Traditionally, empirical analyses were based on macro- or industry-level 
aggregate data. More recently, a large number of studies based on micro 
data has been produced also due to the increasing availability of firm-level 
data (for extensive reviews, see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Ahn, 2000; 
Foster et al., 2001; Syverson, 2011; Mohnen and Hall, 2013). The discovery 
of ubiquitous, extensive and persistent productivity differences has shaped 
research agendas in a number of fields. Macroeconomists break down 
aggregate productivity growth into various micro-components with the aim 
of providing a better understanding of the sources of this growth. Models 
of economic fluctuations driven by productivity shocks are increasingly 
being enriched to account for micro-level patterns, and are estimated and 
tested using plant- or firm-level productivity data (Bartelsman et al., 2009). 
In this context it has been possible to analyse the differentiated role played 
by firms of different size groups in explaining aggregate patterns of pro-
ductivity growth. This has led to recognizing the contribution that SMEs 
may have in fostering productivity growth due to the process of creative 
destruction that they are able to engender (Hölzl, 2009; Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2010; Colombelli et al., 2014) and to their ability to creatively 
adapt existing technological knowledge to the conditions of local product 
and factor markets (Antonelli and Scellato, 2015).
Moreover, two important lessons have been learned from this extensive 
field of research. First, the level of productivity dispersion is extremely 
large, that is, some firms are markedly more efficient than others. Second, 
firms that are highly productive today are more likely to be highly produc-
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tive tomorrow. In other words, the literature has clearly pointed out the 
existence of a high degree of persistence in productivity differences across 
producers (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2011; Raymond et al., 
2013).
The identification of such high and yet persistent productivity dispersion 
across producers has led to the emergence of a huge amount of empirical 
literature that attempts to explain the sources of these productivity pat-
terns. This evidence casts major doubts on and raises substantial criticism 
of the new growth theory according to which the rates of productivity 
growth and of the introduction of technological innovations should be 
homogeneous across firms that belong to the same system (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1997). The relevance of this empirical evidence and its theoretical 
implications has led to the identification of a number of factors that 
could determine systematic differences in the productivity performances 
of producers, including the role of innovative activities and the diffusion 
of ICTs (Griliches, 1979; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Crépon et al., 
1998; Faggio et al., 2009 Raymond et al., 2013). Among firm-specific 
characteristics that are capable of affecting the productivity growth of 
producers, particular attention has been devoted to assessing the impact 
of human capital and the quality of management practices on different 
measures of productivity and firm performance (for recent contributions, 
see McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002; Ilmakunnas et al., 2004; Galindo-
Rueda and Haskel, 2005; Bou and Satorra, 2007; Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007, 2010).
In this context of  analysis, the presence of  persistent patterns of above-
average productivity growth at the firm level can be interpreted as the 
result of  the ability of  firms to exploit dynamic capabilities to sustain 
competitive advantages, as highlighted by management studies (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994; Verona and Ravasi, 2003; Teece, 2007; Vergne and 
Durand, 2011). In particular, building on recent developments in the 
economics of  innovation that have paid attention to the analysis of 
innovation persistence (Malerba et al., 1997; Cefis, 2003; Peters, 2009; 
Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2008; Antonelli et al., 2012, 2013), it can 
be claimed that the repeated interactions between the accumulation of 
knowledge and the creation of  routines to valorize and exploit it within 
the same organization may lead to the creation of  dynamic capabilities 
that favour the systematic realization of  above-average productivity 
(Nelson and  Winter, 1982; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Verona and 
Ravasi, 2003).
This framework emphasizes that the past has a significant impact on cur-
rent and future performance. However, the dynamic  capabilities approach 
recognizes that a business enterprise is shaped but not necessarily trapped 
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by its past. Management strategies can make big differences through 
investment choices and other decisions. Hence, the  role of   knowledge 
cumulativeness and the relevance of strategic decisions to leverage internal 
and external knowledge are considered to be crucial in shaping path-
dependent dynamics of productivity growth (Antonelli et al., 2013; Crespi 
and Scellato, 2014).
Moreover, in the present study, we investigate the potential role of size 
as another important firm-level characteristic capable of shaping persist-
ent patterns of productivity growth. On the one hand, large corporations 
may have an advantage in sustaining higher performance in terms of 
productivity growth for longer time spans due to their superior ability 
to invest in R&D activities and benefit from high levels of cumulated 
knowledge (Chandler, 1977, 1990). On the other hand, persistency patterns 
can be independent of size, as shown by the literature on ‘gazelles’ – that is, 
high-growth firms where persistent abnormal sales or employment growth 
rates have been identified in subsets of companies belonging to all size 
classes (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010; Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2012; 
Colombelli et al., 2014).
Finally, the proposed analysis aims to take into account the role played 
by system properties that shape the context in which the persistence of 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth occurs. In particular, the effects on 
persistency patterns played by the amount of knowledge externalities, the 
dynamics of market forces and the different types of sectoral systems are 
explored.
The empirical analysis is based on a large sample of Italian firms and 
follows a two-step empirical strategy consisting of a preliminary identifica-
tion of persistence in TFP growth through transition probability matrices 
(TPMs) and an econometric analysis that aims to qualify the persistence of 
productivity growth as an emergent system property that depends on the 
combination of firms’ characteristics and specific properties of the system 
in which the strategy of firms take place. This chapter is structured as 
follows: the literature on persistence in productivity is reviewed in Section 
2; the hypotheses and research design of this study are outlined in Section 
3; empirical evidence is presented in Section 4; and the main results are 
summarized in the conclusions.
2.  THE PERSISTENCE OF PRODUCTIVITY 
PERFORMANCE
Under the assumption of random productivity differences across produc-
ers, relative productivity would be uncorrelated from one period to another. 
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There would be no persistence in productivity distribution, and the TFP 
of a producer in one period would have no predictive power on the TFP 
in another period. However, empirical investigations have shown that 
there are large and persistent differences in productivity across plants and 
firms in the same industry (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). When analysing 
persistence in productivity, many studies have followed an approach based 
on TPMs relative to plant/firm productivity distribution (see, for example, 
Baily et al., 1992; Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998). The calculated transi-
tion matrices exhibit large diagonal and near-diagonal elements, indicating 
that producers that are high in the distribution in one period tend to 
continue to have a high rank in the distribution in subsequent periods.
Baily et al. ranked the plants in their sample for 1972–1988 according 
to their relative productivity for each year and divided them into quintiles. 
They then calculated a transition matrix that highlighted ‘an enormous 
amount of persistence in the productivity distribution’ (Baily et al., 1992: 
219). Of all the plants that were in the first quintile in 1972, a weighted 
60.75 per cent were again in the first quintile in 1977 and, of all the plants 
that were in the first quintile in 1977, a weighted 52.89 per cent had come 
from the first quintile in 1972. The persistence in the 10-year transitions 
was even stronger than that found for five years. More than 58 per cent 
of the plants in the top quintile in 1972 were still in the top two quintiles 
in 1982. Bartelsman and Dhrymes found a similar high degree of persist-
ence  in productivity ranking through an examination of the behaviour 
of TFPs in selected industries over the 1972–86 period in the USA. They 
showed, in particular, that about 60 per cent of the plant-year observa-
tions did not move away by more than one decile from their previous 
rank. Moreover, they found that larger plants exhibited more stability and 
that the probability of staying close (one decile) to the previous position 
increased with age and size. They concluded that this evidence could have 
been the result of some form of ‘learning by doing’ that may characterize 
the evolution of the productivity performance of plants.
More recently, Giannangeli and Gomez-Salvador (2008) have used 
annual account data over the 1993–2003 period for a balanced panel of 
manufacturing firms in a selected panel of five European countries. They 
found a high degree of persistence of the relative efficiency of firms. 
Around 25 per cent of firms in all countries considered in the analysis 
remained in the middle of the distribution, while more than half  of the 
sample persistently remained at the top and bottom. The authors con-
cluded that the high persistence of relative productivity levels suggests that 
firm-efficiency levels are structurally different from firm to firm.
As far as Italy is concerned, Bottazzi et al. (2008) carried out an analysis 
based on a large panel of Italian firms active in both manufacturing and 
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services during the 1998–2003 period that confirmed the presence of a 
strong and positive correlation in productivity over time. They explored 
the links between the persistence in productivity and profitability, and 
found that more-efficient firms also tend to be more profitable.
Although these empirical investigations have shown that there are large 
and persistent differences in productivity levels across plants and firms, 
productivity growth rates have usually been found to exhibit an important 
transitory component. Baily et al. show clear evidence of regression to the 
mean effects in productivity growth regressions. Similarly, Bartelsman and 
Dhrymes detected a strong negative correlation between a plant’s growth 
rate over a five-year period and its productivity growth over the previous 
five years. Giannangeli and Gomez-Salvador, on the other hand, showed 
that when lagged productivity growth is included in the econometric 
model, it is positive and significant, thus indicating some persistence in 
labour productivity growth at the firm level.
Geroski et al. (2003, 2009) specifically investigated persistence in pro-
ductivity growth. In their first paper, using a sample of 147 UK firms 
observed continuously for more than 30 years, they showed that growth 
rates are highly variable over time and that the differences in growth rates 
between firms do not persist for very long. This outcome was considered 
to be due to the random nature of the innovative activities of firms which 
translates into random shocks on productivity. Again, in the second paper, 
they found that, in general, individual firms do not outperform their 
peers for very long when stable firm characteristics, via firm-fixed effects, 
are accounted for. However, the analysis showed that the few instances 
of sustained productivity growth performance that had been observed 
appeared to have been triggered mainly by prior innovative activity and the 
disciplining effect of corporate debt.
The significance of the role of innovation in determining the persistence 
of productivity performance can be better understood by recognizing that 
innovation itself  is characterized by a certain degree of persistence. The 
theme of innovation persistence in recent years has attracted the interest 
of scholars in different research perspectives, ranging from the economics 
of knowledge to the economics of organization and the economics of 
innovation (Malerba et al., 1997; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Peters, 2009; 
Antonelli et al., 2012, 2013; Clausen et al., 2012).1 Most of the empirical 
analysis provides evidence in favour of the presence of persistency patterns 
in innovative efforts at the firm level related to technological learning proc-
esses that eventually generate new knowledge for the innovating company. 
As suggested by Geroski et al. (2003, 2009), these effects probably translate 
into the dynamics of TFP growth at the firm level.
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3.  THE SOURCES OF PERSISTENCE IN 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
The reviewed evidence indicates that productivity growth persistence may 
be substantial, suggesting that past productivity performance influences 
subsequent patterns. However, it seems clear that previous behaviour is 
not sufficient to warrant the ability to keep outperforming levels of total 
factor productivity. TFP growth persistence occurs when a number of 
complementary and contingent factors sustain and strengthen the hyster-
esis generated by previous dynamics. The identification of the dynamic 
features of the sources of persistence is at the core of our analysis. In this 
respect, a firm’s TFP reflects the levels of a broad range of technological, 
organizational and managerial capabilities, along with the ability to exploit 
them through appropriation of the results of introducing technological 
innovations. TFP performance is in fact related to the systematic ability 
to generate new knowledge, apply it to the broad array of activities that 
firms carry out and to exploit it. The exploitation of knowledge includes 
both the introduction of innovations and the adoption of technological 
and organizational innovations introduced by suppliers and competitors.
Knowledge cumulability, related to knowledge indivisibility and knowl-
edge non-exhaustibility, plays a central role in this context. The achieve-
ment of higher performance in terms of productivity dynamics can be 
easier for firms that can command a larger internal knowledge base and 
have access to and the ability to use larger knowledge bases than other 
agents operating in the same system (Antonelli, 2011; Colombelli and von 
Tunzelmann, 2011). For this reason, the effects of knowledge cumulability 
are typically path dependent (David, 1985, 2007).
Knowledge accumulated in the past exerts a strong influence on the 
future generation of new knowledge. Such effects, however, can change 
over time because the rates of accumulation and the conditions of access 
are not fixed (Dobusch and Schüler, 2013). Past knowledge, in fact, is not 
the single, deterministic factor: management strategies appear to be crucial 
in shaping the amount of knowledge that each firm is able to generate at 
each point in time and in sustaining persistent higher performance in terms 
of TFP growth through R&D investment choices and other decisions 
related to the acquisition of specific pieces of external knowledge. In this 
respect, the economics of organization has shown that repeated interac-
tions between the accumulation of knowledge and the creation of routines 
to valorize and exploit it within the same organization eventually lead to 
the creation of dynamic capabilities that favour the systematic reliance on 
innovation as a competitive tool (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rothaermel 
and Hess, 2007; Verona and Ravasi, 2003). In particular, only firms able to 
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leverage their dynamic capabilities can be persistently among the top TFP 
performers over a long period of time (Teece, 2007).
This framework emphasizes that the past has an important impact 
on current and future performances. However, as acknowledged by the 
dynamic capabilities approach, firm strategies are indeed influenced but 
not necessarily trapped by their past. Management can make big differ-
ences through investment choices and other decisions. Hence, managers 
can act creatively and strategically to shape firms’ growth paths (Parker et 
al., 2010). Heterogeneity in the form of strategic differences across firms 
constitutes a key driving force behind a firm’s probability of sustaining 
TFP growth over time (Clausen et al., 2012). In this perspective, firms 
focusing their strategy on acquisition, assimilation and exploitation of 
externally available knowledge are able to continuously renew their knowl-
edge stock and strengthen their dynamic capabilities. Hence, managers can 
deal with and even reap benefits from path dependence if  they are able to 
select appropriate self-reinforcing mechanisms along the capability paths 
that emerge from the firm–environment interaction (Vergne and Durand, 
2011). Therefore, management strategies appear to be crucial to sustaining 
superior productivity performance over time through investment choices 
and other decisions related to the leveraging of dynamic capabilities and 
the exploitation of strategic assets. Managerial contingencies in fact affect 
the non-ergodic dynamics of innovation persistence (Clausen et al., 2012).
In this analysis it is argued that productivity persistence is an emergent 
system property that takes place when there is appropriate matching 
between the system properties and the characteristics and conduct of 
individual agents. This amounts to specifying the hypothesis that produc-
tivity persistence is determined by a mix of strategic decisions, firm-level 
characteristics with special reference to size and system properties. Since 
the dynamics of emergent system properties are influenced by a mix of 
interacting factors where each one exhibits high levels of dynamic variance 
and non-ergodicity, path dependence is claimed to be an intrinsic feature 
of TFP growth persistence. The interaction between different processes is 
in fact most likely to generate path rather than past dependence. Hence 
we put forward the complementary hypothesis that the persistence of 
productivity exhibits the typical traits of a non-ergodic process influenced 
by the past and yet sensitive to events that occur along the growth path.
In order to capture the effects related to firms’ managerial strategies 
on persistency patterns over time we have focused our attention on three 
main dimensions: the decisions related to business process outsourcing; 
the strategies on the accumulation of intangible assets; and the propensity 
to assume a long-term perspective in investment choices. Analysis of 
these aspects should allow us to qualify the observed firms in terms of 
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their strategic commitment to rely on the valorization of intangible assets 
and dynamic capabilities to persistently sustain superior productivity 
performance.
With respect to the first dimension, the literature suggests that in the 
last decades there has been an increasing tendency by firms to outsource a 
significant part of their non-core activities in order to achieve advantages 
in terms of productivity increases (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Grossman 
and Helpman, 2005; Merino and Rodríguez, 2007; Amiti and Wei, 2009). 
When outsourcing processes are successfully implemented, firms are able 
to focus on their core competences and hence improve efficiency and pro-
ductivity, explore new potential sources of revenues and implement new 
investment projects (Heshmati, 2003; Broedner et al., 2009). Moreover, 
through business outsourcing, external long-run sources of TFP growth 
may be activated, as those services are typically carried out by highly 
specialized experts and heavily rely on ICT, a major driver of productivity 
gains (Abramovsky and Griffith, 2006; Crespi, 2007). Finally, significant 
complementarity effects between internal and external R&D may emerge 
when business processes are successfully outsourced (Lokshin et al., 2008).
In parallel, the strong heterogeneity in firms’ investments in intangible 
assets and the identification of strong cumulative processes of intangible 
asset accumulation suggests that the different propensity to invest in intan-
gible assets can be explained by specific characteristics, internal capabili-
ties and managerial strategies at the firm level (Arrighetti et al., 2014). In 
this context, we expect persistence in higher productivity performance to 
be sustained when managers adopt a strategy based on the systematic reli-
ance on and valorization of intangible assets as ways to leverage dynamic 
capabilities (Bontempi and Mairesse, 2008; Corrado et al., 2009; Marrocu 
et al., 2012).
Finally, intangible investment, in particular that related to R&D activi-
ties, tends to be approached as a long-term investment whose influence, 
in terms of business performance, is shaped by experience and learning 
processes provided by previous accumulation of technological, organiza-
tional and other capabilities (Winter, 1987). Hence, we expect the financial 
structure of firms to reflect the strategic commitment of managers to long-
term investment. Hence, a higher propensity to rely on long-term debt can 
be interpreted as an indication of a strategic perspective to continuously 
fuel competitive advantages.
In addition to strategic factors, other internal characteristics of firms are 
expected to play a role. Firm size is a specific internal characteristic that is 
worth analysing in the context of productivity persistence. In particular, we 
claim that it is important to distinguish between two effects of company 
size on the dynamics of productivity. The first is a direct influence due 
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to the relation of size to various efficiency-enhancing activities such as 
the use of ICT, labour skills and training activities, the intensity of R&D 
investments and the introduction of innovations (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2011). The second may be 
related to the idea that cumulability effects are mainly relevant in large cor-
porations: the hysteretic influence of past productivity growth on current 
and future performance increases with size, along with the accumulation 
of competence as a strategic asset.
However, while we expect the first effect of size to be relevant, we 
suppose that persistency patterns can be identified independently of size. 
Small firms can counterbalance the effects of knowledge cumulability that 
favour corporations with positive effects of entrepreneurship (Colombelli 
et al., 2014). Moreover, recent empirical evidence showed that persistence 
in innovation activities can be found also in the case of SMEs, where 
persistency appears to be shaped by success breeds success, sunk costs 
and demand-pull effects (Máñez et al., 2014; Le Bas and Scellato, 2014), 
with a stronger association between sales growth and subsequent R&D 
growth in small firms than larger firms (Deschryvere, 2014). Such persist-
ency patterns in SMEs can be particularly relevant in high-tech industries 
(Máñez et al., 2014), where the role of technological start-ups is potentially 
significant (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007) and, in general, has been found 
to represent an important source of employment and productivity growth 
(Triguero et al., 2014).
Finally in this analysis we highlight the role of system properties such as 
the amount of knowledge externalities and the dynamics of market forces. 
As the economics of knowledge suggests, different forms of external knowl-
edge (that is, scientific, commercial, technological and organizational), as 
well as different kinds of activities close to R&D activities and learning 
(such as searching, networking, absorption and scientific outsourcing), are 
required to generate and exploit new knowledge (Adams, 2009; Johansson 
and Lööf, 2008). Following this approach, the system properties add 
to internal ones and shape the context in which the persistence of TFP 
growth occurs. This approach is confirmed by a wave of recent empirical 
studies that stress the role of system properties in shaping the strategies of 
firms that are able to be persistent innovators, namely Ito and Lechevalier 
(2010), who stress the positive role exerted by qualified interactions in 
international markets with qualified users for Japanese firms that are able 
to export systematically.
This positive feedback supports the persistent introduction of innova-
tions as a key component in firms’ exporting strategies. Triguero and 
Corcoles (2013) and Triguero et al. (2014), emphasize the role of tech-
nological opportunities, appropriability conditions and market demand, 
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arguing that Spanish firms that take advantage of these factors are better 
able to implement the persistent introduction of innovations. Suarez 
(2014) confirms the important role of the macroeconomic context, show-
ing that persistence is stronger in economic systems that grow faster and 
have lower levels of instability. Along similar lines, Bergek and colleagues 
(2013) provide rich empirical evidence in the automotive and gas turbine 
industries confirming that incumbents are able to implement the persistent 
introduction of innovations based on the ‘creative accumulation’ stirred 
by the entry of new competitors and technological discontinuities brought 
about by new technological opportunities. The evidence on Korean firms 
analysed by Kim and Chang-Yang (2011) confirms that early entrants 
in industries characterized by high levels of knowledge appropriability 
and low levels of technological opportunities are able to implement their 
innovative leadership and become persistent innovators retaining and 
replicating first-mover advantages.
In sum, a wave of recent studies confirms that the persistence of 
technological leadership is the result of dynamic capabilities implemented 
by typical Schumpeterian strategies of firms that are able to expand their 
knowledge base and use it as a tool to retain the competitive advantage 
based on the introduction and adoption of innovations in the past, pro-
vided that the system properties are favourable. As Brian Loasby (2010) 
puts it, capabilities deliver effective performances only in a specific context 
that includes aspects that are both internal and external to each firm.
Hence, following the distinction elaborated by Harper and Lewis (2012) 
between resultant properties that qualify both individual agents and 
aggregate and emergent system properties where individual properties are 
qualified by the characteristics of the system in which they are embedded, 
we can put forward the hypothesis that the persistence of innovation 
is an emergent system property, rather than a resultant property. This 
hypothesis stems directly from the legacy of Schumpeter (1947), which 
explains the introduction of innovations as the result of the creative reac-
tion of firms made possible by entrepreneurial strategies contingent upon 
the system properties. Specifically, this chapter stresses the role of system 
properties together with the characteristics and strategies of firms, in 
particular the level of dynamic capabilities, as critical factors that make the 
persistent achievement of superior TFP growth possible. In this context, 
the persistence of productivity growth acquires all the characteristics of an 
emergent property of the system in which firms are embedded that shares 
the typical traits of a path-dependent process, influenced by the past and 
yet sensitive to events that occur along the growth path (Antonelli, 2011).
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In order to test the relevance of these arguments, a two-step empirical 
strategy was set up. In the first step the analysis focused on the identi-
fication of persistence in TFP growth through a sequence of transition 
probability matrices (TPMs) considering different sub-samples. Such an 
approach accounts for changes that take place throughout the process 
which are expected to have significant effects on the path-dependent 
dynamics of TFP persistence (Antonelli, 1997). In the second step, the 
analysis concentrated on the drivers of persistence in order to qualify the 
role of the contingent events that affect the dynamics at work.
4.1 Dataset
The dataset is based on financial accounting data from a large sample of 
Italian manufacturing companies observed over the years 1996–2005. The 
original data were extracted from the Aida database provided by Bureau 
van Dijk, which reports complete financial accounting data for public 
and private Italian firms with a turnover greater than 0.5 million euros. 
The companies included in the analysis were founded before 1995, were 
registered in a manufacturing sector according to the Italian ATECO 
classification, and were still active by the end of 2005. All companies with 
at least 15 employees at the end of the 1995 fiscal year were included. 
After collecting balance sheet data, all the companies with missing values 
were dropped. In order to drop outliers, due to possible errors in the data 
source, we computed a number of financial ratios and yearly growth 
rates of employees, sales and fixed capital stock. After manual checking 
we eventually dropped 45 companies, and thus ended up with a balanced 
panel of 7020 companies. All financial data were deflated according to a 
sectoral three-digit deflator using year 2000 basic prices. For the analysis 
of the sectoral distribution of the companies see Antonelli et al. (2015).
The firm-level TFP was calculated using Cobb–Douglas production func-
tions with constant return to scale for each industry included in the sample:
 TFPi,t5
Qi,t
L bi,t k
12b
i,t
 (8.1)
where Qi,t is deflated value added, Li,t average number of employees and Ki,t 
fixed capital stock.
In order to compute the capital stock through time a perpetual  inventory 
technique was applied according to which the first year accounting data 
(that is, 1996 in the present case) were used as the actual replace-
ment values. The subsequent yearly values of fixed capital were com-
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   186 19/02/2018   13:42
 Productivity growth persistence  187
puted using a  depreciation parameter d, assumed equal to 6.5 per cent, and 
adding  deflated yearly investments.2 The investment parameter (Ii,t) was 
computed as the yearly variation in the net fixed capital in the compa-
nies’ balance sheets plus yearly amortizations. Hence, the time series of 
fixed  capital is defined as:
 Ki,t5 (12d)Ki,t211Ii,t /pt (8.2)
In order to identify the parameter b at industry level to compute equation 
(8.2), the following equation was estimated for each industry, where ai is a 
firm-specific effect and at a time-specific effect:
 LogaQi,tki,t b5 b3Log Li,tki,t 1ai1at1ei,t (8.3)
In order to analyse the dynamics of firm-level TFP growth rates we calcu-
lated the variable ∆TFP, defined as the logarithmic growth rate of the TFP 
level between year t − 3 and year t:
 ΔTFPi,t5 log (TFPi,t)2 log(TFPi,t23)  (8.4)
We then proceeded with a classification of the values taken from the vari-
able ΔTFPi,t on the basis of the distribution of the TFP growth rates of all 
the companies in the same sector of company i between year t − 3 and year 
t. This procedure allows us to evaluate the persistence of firm-level TFP 
growth rates, taking into account industry-specific trends. In particular, we 
analyse the probability of a company’s TFP growth rate being persistently 
located within a specific quantile of the distribution of TFP growth rates 
of all companies in the same industry.3 Sensitivity analyses were conducted 
to assess whether, and to what extent, the thresholds adopted for the dis-
cretization of the TFP growth rate distribution (for example, using tertiles 
or quartiles) affect the estimated intensity of persistence.
Two complementary approaches were followed in the empirical analy-
sis. Initially, we investigated the presence of  firm-level persistence by 
means of  transition probability matrices (TPM). Then, we explored 
firm-level persistence by means of  discrete choice panel data models, 
based on the estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005). While the initial 
TPM approach is expected to provide only summary evidence on the 
persistence of  the TFP growth rates of  firms over time, the panel data 
analysis is aimed at identifying true state persistence after controlling for 
relevant contingent factors. Independent variables used in the economet-
ric analysis include size, return on equity, leverage, an indicator of  vertical 
integration, an indicator of  debt maturity composition and intangible 
intensity, computed as the yearly incidence of  intangible to tangible 
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assets. Table 8.1 reports summary statistics of  the variables used in the 
econometric analysis.
4.2 Transition Probability Matrices on TFP Growth Rates
The following three tables report the results obtained for the persistence of 
TFP growth rates over time, using different discretization criteria. In Table 
8.2 we calculated the TPM by splitting the distribution of firm-level TFP 
growth rates into tertiles. We also report the standard errors of the related 
transition probabilities in the table.4
The data show that, during the observed years, the firms that were in the 
top tertile of TFP growth rates in their sector in year t – 1 were again in the top 
tertile in year t with a probability of 54.04 per cent. Overall, the data in Table 
8.2 highlight the presence of strong persistence: the main diagonal terms are 
larger than 33 per cent. The incidence of inter-temporal transition between 
the lowest and the highest tertile is quite low in both directions and is below 
20 per cent. The analysis was replicated by splitting the distributions into 
quartiles (see Appendix Table 8.A1). Again, the data confirmed the presence 
Table 8.1  Description and summary statistics of the variables used in the 
econometric analysis
Variable Description Mean Median Std dev. 1% 99%
SIZE i,t Log of total assets 
of company i in 
year t (based on the 
perpetual inventory 
method)
14.30 14.33 1.38 10.97 17.70
INTANG i,t Ratio of book values 
of intangible assets 
to tangible assets for 
company i in year t
0.15 0.08 0.19 0 0.85
LEV i,t Book value of debt/
(book value of debt + 
book value of equity)
0.68 0.72 0.20 0.17 0.98
ROE i,t Net income/book 
value of equity
0.32 0.04 0.6 −1.59 0.73
VERT_INT i,t Value added/turnover 0.28 0.28 3.30 0.05 0.68
DEBT_MAT i,t Long-term debt/total 
debt
0.13 0.08 0.15 0 0.61
EMPLOYEES i,t Number of 
employees
111 56 330 16 921
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of non-negligible persistency patterns. As could be expected, inter-quantile 
mobility was higher for the intermediate intervals. This evidence seems to 
highlight the presence within the sample of subpopulations of firms than 
are capable of repeatedly outperforming their peers in terms of TFP growth.
Interestingly, persistence in TFP growth rates is a phenomenon which 
appears not to be confined to large companies, as shown in Table 8.3, 
Table 8.2  TPM on the tertiles of sectoral distribution TFP growth rates 
for all years and all companies
High Growth t Mid Growth t Low Growth t
High Growth t − 1 0.5404
(0.0041)
0.2776
(0.0035)
0.172
(0.0031)
Mid Growth t − 1 0.2911
(0.0038)
0.4232
(0.0041)
0.2857
(0.0038)
Low Growth t − 1 0.1807
(0.0032)
0.2826
(0.0038)
0.5367
(0.0042)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 8.3  TPM on the tertiles of sectoral distribution TFP growth rates 
for all years (firms split according to size)
High Growth t Mid Growth t Low Growth t
Firms with more than  
 250 employees at t − 1
High Growth t − 1 0.5746 0.2625 0.1569
(0.017) (0.015 (0.012)
Mid Growth t − 1 0.2730 0.4378 0.2892
(0.014) (0.016 (0.014)
Low Growth t − 1 0.196 0.2607 0.5457
(0.011) (0.013 (0.014)
Firms with less than 250  
 employees at t − 1
High Growth t − 1 0.5341 0.2836 0.1823
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Mid Growth t − 1 0.2867 0.4241 0.2913
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Low Growth t − 1 0.1700 0.2901 0.5399
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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though the transition probabilities in the main diagonal of the matrices are 
greater in the group of large companies. However, this last result may be 
spurious as it may simply reflect the relevance of what we called the direct 
effect of size on productivity dynamics. A better assessment of this issue 
will be provided through the econometric analysis.
In Tables 8.4 and 8.5 we split the transition probability matrixes, con-
sidering different sub-periods, sectors and regions. This splitting approach 
has the aim of capturing the presence of divergences in persistency pat-
terns of TFP growth rates due to the influence of system properties. In 
particular, we claim that the knowledge intensity of the local context may 
be relevant in shaping differentiated patterns of persistence in productivity 
growth. For this purpose, we split Italian regions into High R&D and 
Low R&D regions on the basis of average aggregate R&D expenditures 
during the observed years. High R&D regions fall into the top 33 per 
cent of distribution of regions in terms of gross R&D expenditures/GDP. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic context is expected to play an important 
role in influencing the productivity performance of firms and their reac-
tions to changing economic conditions in terms of contingent behaviour 
and strategic decisions.
Considering that the time span adopted for the analysis can be con-
veniently divided into two sub-periods that identify an upward economic 
cycle (until 2001) and a downward cycle (after 2001) in Italy, we split the 
TPMs in order to eventually detect any differences in persistency dynamics 
across the two sub-periods. Finally, we divided the sample into groups 
according to the technological intensity of different economic sectors in 
order to account for the effects that sectoral system properties may have 
on the persistence of TFP growth.5 Table 8.4 reports figures on the share 
of companies belonging to the top 15 per cent of the sectoral distribution 
of TFP growth rates for two subsequent periods, for subsamples selected 
according to periods, the R&D intensity of regions and the technology 
intensity of sectors.6
This approach allows us to see whether the observed aggregate persist-
ency patterns are the averaged outcome of processes with peculiar trends 
over different regions, sectors and time. The differences between the results 
can in fact be interpreted as a first indication that system properties are 
capable of shaping persistence by affecting its dynamics.
The results reported in Table 8.4 show that there are significant dif-
ferences between the different sub-groups, ranging from 0.32 to 0.45. 
The highest transition probability for top-performing companies in two 
subsequent periods is associated with the group of firms in High R&D 
regions, and Hightech sectors observed in 2001–2005.
The role of sectoral systems appears to be of particular relevance since, 
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everything else being equal, the probability of continuously performing in 
the top 15 per cent of the distribution is always higher for firms operating 
in High-tech sectors. In parallel, the macroeconomic cycle appears to have 
a differentiated impact according to the type of region where business 
takes place. In particular, for High R&D regions there is a significant 
tendency towards an increase in TFP persistence after 2001, while the 
dynamics is more stable for Low R&D regions.
When interpreting these results, it is fundamental to consider that 
companies that start with lower TFP levels are more likely to exhibit higher 
TFP growth rates. This aspect could be relevant in explaining the high level 
of persistence for outperforming companies in Low R&D regions before 
2001, which may be related to firms starting with lower TFP levels and 
taking advantage of the macroeconomic expansion that occurred until 
2001. Inversion of the economic cycle has powerful effects: firms belong-
ing to the High R&D regions seem to be more capable of sustaining per-
sistently higher levels of productivity growth. One possible interpretation 
of this result is that in this economic phase the dominating effect could be 
related to the best companies that react to the changed economic context 
and which strategically invest in innovative activities to sustain persistently 
higher TFP gains.
4.3 Econometric Analysis
4.3.1 Modelling structure
The previous descriptive evidence clearly calls for a more detailed analysis 
of the actual underlying dynamics and its driving factors. In order to 
Table 8.4  Share of companies in the top 15% of the sectoral distribution 
of TFP growth rates in two subsequent times for selected 
regions, sectors and periods
Region Sector Period Probability of  
high-high growth
Standard  
error
LOW R&D HITECH 1998–2000 0.4040 0.0236
LOW R&D HITECH 2001–2005 0.3829 0.0183
LOW R&D LOWTECH 1998–2000 0.3671 0.0199
LOW R&D LOWTECH 2001–2005 0.3758 0.0135
HIGH R&D HITECH 1998–2000 0.3718 0.0232
HIGH R&D HITECH 2001–2005 0.4514 0.0169
HIGH R&D LOWTECH 1998–2000 0.3224 0.0173
HIGH R&D LOWTECH 2001–2005 0.3906 0.0133
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 analyse the persistence of TFP growth rates throughout the studied periods, 
we constructed a time-varying dummy variable that equals one in period 
t if  a company shows a TFP growth rate that falls within the top 15 per 
cent of the distribution of ΔTFP for all the companies in the same sector. 
We applied a dynamic discrete choice model in which such a variable is 
regressed against its past realization and a set of appropriate controls.7
The observed persistence may be due to true state dependence or per-
manent unobserved heterogeneity across the analysed companies. From 
a theoretical perspective, if  the source of persistence is due to permanent 
unobserved heterogeneity, individuals show higher propensity to make a 
decision; but there is no effect of previous choices on current utility, and 
past experience has no behavioural effect (Heckman, 1981). Hence, in order 
to estimate true state persistence, it is important to capture the variance of 
the state indicator which is explained by both the structural characteristics 
of the firms and by contingent, time-varying observable factors. and then 
to analyse whether its past values still have a significant effect (Peters, 2009; 
Antonelli et al., 2012; Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2012).
The baseline specification for a dynamic discrete response model is the 
following:
 y*it5 gyit211bxit1 ui1 eit (8.5)
where yit (with possible values 0,1) is the state indicator (that is, indicating 
whether a firm is in the top 15 per cent of the TFP growth rate distribution 
in its sector in year t).
The estimation of the above model is based on a strong assumption on 
the initial observations yi0 and their relationship with ui, the unobserved 
individual effects. If  the origin of the analysed process does not coincide 
with that of the available observations, yi0 cannot be treated as exogenous, 
and its correlation to the error term would give rise to biased estimates of 
the autoregressive parameter that represents the measure of persistence. In 
order to deal with this issue in this chapter we apply the method developed 
by Wooldridge (2005), which proposes specifying the distribution of ui 
conditional on yi0 and xi. In particular, we follow the approach used by 
Peters (2009) by using the first realization of the dependent variable (yi0) 
and the time-averaged covariates as predictors of the individual effect.
As previously mentioned, in order to identify true state persistence, it is 
necessary to account for the time-varying firm-level characteristics which 
are expected to be correlated to the observed outcome of the dichotomous 
dependent variable, and to control for the properties of the system in which 
firms operate. With respect to aspects related to firms’ strategies, we tested 
the relevance of three variables that are linked to management decisions to 
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sustain persistent higher productivity growth rates – that is, the indicator 
of vertical integration along the value chain (VERT_INT), the indicator of 
debt maturity composition (DEBT_MAT) and the indicator of intangible 
intensity (INTANG). As highlighted in Section 3, we claim that lower 
values of vertical integration can be attributed to the strategic decision of 
focusing on those segments of the value chain that are characterized by 
higher value added. Hence, a negative relationship with TFP growth rates 
is expected.8
Moreover, while in principle the capital structure should have a neutral 
or non-significant effect, it is here claimed that a higher incidence of 
long-term debt can be associated with the willingness of  managers to 
adopt a more long-term investment strategy. Since structural innovation 
investments require a stable commitment, we expect sustained higher 
performances in TFP growth rates to be observed for those firms that 
have longer debt maturity. This, in turn, is a signal that such firms have 
made significant investments in long-term infrastructures. Finally, intan-
gible assets intensity is expected to capture the effort of  a firm to build 
innovative competences by means of  both in-house R&D and external 
expenditures.
Additional firm-level variables that are likely to affect TFP growth used 
in the econometric analysis include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and 
an indicator of firm profitability, return on equity (ROE).9 With respect to 
the role of firm size, besides taking into account the direct effect of size on 
productivity performances by including this variable in the tested models, 
we will also test if  differences in the impact of previous TFP growth rates 
on current performances emerge for groups of firms of different size. All 
time-varying firm-specific factors have been used in the model specifica-
tions with a three-year lag.
Finally, in the analysis we take into account the effects of  the properties 
of  the system by testing our model after splitting the sample of  compa-
nies according to the categories used in the descriptive analysis – namely, 
two sub-periods (before and after 2001), two macro-regions (High R&D 
and Low R&D) and macro-sectors (High-Tech and Low-Tech indus-
tries). The time splitting should help us grasp the effects on persistence 
of  the macroeconomic cycle. The regional splitting should capture the 
effects of  the local intensity of  R&D expenditures, while the sectoral 
splitting should account for the role of  sectoral systems in productivity 
persistence. Consistently with the review of the literature and the set of 
hypotheses that we have developed, we expect to find systematic and 
significant differences between the sub-samples that indicate that the 
properties of  the system affect the strategy of  firms, with consequent 
effects on persistence.
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4.3.2 Results
In the following tables we show the results of the model tested on different 
samples for the evaluation of persistence along time of TFP growth rates. 
Results reported in Table 8.5 (column I) confirm the summary evidence 
Table 8.5 Dynamic probit model on the persistence of TFP growth rates
All years 1998–2000 1998–2000 2001–2005 2001–2005
All sectors High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech 
I II III IV V
HighGrowth t − 1 0.269*** 0.232*** 0.112*** 0.309*** 0.271***
(0.007) (0.047) (0.030) (0.013) (0.010)
SIZE t − 3 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 0.057*** 0.083***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
ROE t − 3 0.000 −0.018*** −0.009*** 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
INTANG t − 3 0.014 −0.015 0.060* −0.023 0.026
(0.017) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027)
VERT_INT t − 3 −0.270*** −0.187*** −1.006*** −0.316*** −0.298***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.064) (0.026) (0.024)
LEVERAGE t − 3 0.001 −0.007 −0.032*** 0.010 0.014
(0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
DEBT_MAT t − 3 0.096*** 0.114** 0.065** 0.060* 0.105***
(0.017) (0.046) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029)
AVGSIZE −0.068*** −0.058*** −0.081*** −0.053*** −0.079***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
AVGROE 0.001* 0.009** −0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
AVGINTANG 0.071*** 0.041 −0.038 0.132*** 0.088**
(0.020) (0.051) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034)
AVGVERT_INT 0.004* 0.031* 0.903*** 0.040*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.016) (0.067) (0.011) (0.003)
AVGLEVERAGE 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AVGDEBT_MAT −0.112*** −0.198*** −0.071 −0.023 −0.153***
(0.025) (0.068) (0.045) (0.047) (0.041)
HighGrowth t0 −0.009** 0.015 0.033** −0.007 −0.008
(0.005) (0.025) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 42,117 5268 8772 10,536 17,541
Chi2 3319.1*** 423.3*** 563.1*** 1036.7*** 1395.7***
LogLik −16,027.2 −1983.5 −3319.3 −3883.0 −6678.5
Notes: The dependent variable (HighGrowtht) is equal to 1 in year t for firm i if  
the corresponding growth rate of TFP falls within the top 15% of the related sectoral 
distribution of the TFP growth rates. Marginal effects are reported. Significance levels: * 
90% ** 95% *** 99%.
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reported in the previous TPMs and indicate the presence of substantial 
persistence. Being in the top 15 per cent of the distribution of TFP growth 
rates in year t – 1 has a positive and largely significant impact on the likeli-
hood of the firm still being in the top 15 per cent in year t, with a marginal 
effect at means of about 27 per cent.10 What is relevant in the proposed 
analytical framework is that, even after accounting for firm-level time-
varying factors, there is still a significant impact of the lagged dependent 
variable. This implies that the persistence detected in the descriptive 
analysis is not spurious.
Moreover, the results for the covariates provide interesting insights that 
can be used to qualify such persistence. First, the estimated relevance of 
contingent factors allows us to exclude the ergodic nature of the process 
under scrutiny. The evidence shows that the dynamics is influenced by the 
past; but it is not past dependent as it is sensitive to changes along the 
path. This confirms its path-dependent nature. Second, with respect to 
the analysis of firm-level control variables, the strategies pursued by com-
panies appear to have a significant effect on persistence dynamics. In this 
respect, the negative and significant effect of vertical integration can easily 
be interpreted. Those companies that have reduced their vertical integra-
tion on average had a significantly higher likelihood of being among the 
best performers in terms of TFP growth rates. This evidence confirms that 
specialization strategies in high value added enhances the possibility of 
obtaining long-lasting outperformance in productivity growth.
The variable related to debt management highlights how those com-
panies that have been able to finance long-term investments through 
credit channels show higher TFP growth rates. This may mean that this 
subsample of companies is less financially constrained and does not have 
to rely solely on internal cash flows to finance growth- and productivity-
enhancing assets. The summary statistics from the sample in fact reveal 
that a significant share of companies have a very limited incidence of 
long-term debt, meaning that these companies implicitly use (or are forced 
to use) external financial sources with a maturity of less than a year to sup-
port assets that are defined in the long run. While in this analytical setting 
it is not possible to assess whether such apparently irrational behaviour 
is determined totally by external constraints (that is, inefficiency of the 
credit markets), the data still provide a clear indication of the non-trivial 
effects of the sources of finance. Finally, we do not find a significant effect 
associated with the variable capturing intangible intensity whose effects are 
probably absorbed by past TFP growth or limited by the broad definition 
of this variable in companies’ financial accounts data.
With respect to other variables reflecting firm-level characteristics, as 
expected, size has a positive and significant effect, while we have identified 
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a non-statistically significant effect of past levels of return on equity on 
subsequent TFP growth rates. This latter result might be due to the fact 
that, in the present sample, companies within an industry tend to differ 
more in terms of operational efficiency than ROE along time.
In order to take into account the effects of system properties, regressions 
were run for different sub-samples of companies. Columns II–V of Table 
8.5 show the results for sub-samples referring to High-Tech and Low-Tech 
sectors during the expansion and contraction phases of the business cycle. 
The results confirm the descriptive evidence presented in the previous 
section on the relevance of system properties, and show differentiated 
dynamics of persistence across sectors and in time. In particular, after 
the year 2001, the magnitude of the coefficient associated with the lagged 
dependent variable significantly increases in both sector groups, suggesting 
that the macroeconomic cycle affects persistence dynamics in productivity 
growth. Moreover, sectoral systems appear to play an important role since, 
in more technology-intensive industries, persistence effects are always 
greater than in lower intensive ones.
Table 8.6 synthesizes all results obtained on the lagged dependent 
variable for all tests on different sub-samples including the regional split.11 
System properties are seen to be relevant in shaping persistence patterns 
also when the regional component is taken into account. There is in fact 
Table 8.6  Marginal effects of lagged dependent variable (HighGrowth 
t − 1) for different samples based on the model specification 
reported in Table 8.5
Region Sector Period HighGrowth t − 1 
Marginal effect 
Stand. error
ALL ALL 1998–2005 0.269*** (0.007)
ALL HITECH 2001–2005 0.309*** (0.013)
ALL HITECH 1998–2000 0.232*** (0.047)
ALL LOWTECH 2001–2005 0.271*** (0.010)
ALL LOWTECH 1998–2000 0.112*** (0.030)
LOW R&D HITECH 2001–2005 0.282*** (0.019)
LOW R&D HITECH 1998–2000 0.247*** (0.037)
LOW R&D LOWTECH 2001–2005 0.255*** (0.014)
LOW R&D LOWTECH 1998–2000 0.106** (0.042)
HIGH R&D HITECH 2001–2005 0.327*** (0.018)
HIGH R&D HITECH 1998–2000 0.188*** (0.066)
HIGH R&D LOWTECH 2001–2005 0.286*** (0.014)
HIGH R&D LOWTECH 1998–2000 0.126*** (0.046)
Note: Significance levels: ** 95% *** 99%.
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huge variance in the magnitude of marginal effects of the lagged depend-
ent variable, ranging from 0.327 for companies in High R&D regions, 
High-Tech sectors observed in the years 2001–2005 to 0.106 for companies 
in Low R&D regions, Low-Tech sectors observed in the years 1998–2000.
This result, interpreted in the context of the previous literature, sheds 
some light on how and why Italian economic systems may differ from those 
of other countries, in particular the US and the UK. The important role of 
external factors in supporting the persistence of productivity growth might 
be associated with the low levels of industrial concentration of the Italian 
economic system characterized by the pervasive role of small firms. Here 
system properties, and specifically knowledge externalities, play a much 
stronger role than in economic systems characterized by large corporations 
for which the persistence of productivity growth relies more on internal 
factors.12
Finally, we test the significance of size effects on the magnitude of the 
hysteretic influence on current TFP growth of past productivity perform-
ances by adding to the previous model specification an interaction term 
between the lagged dependent variable and a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 if  the company has more than 250 employees (LARGE FIRM 
DUMMY). As indicated by results reported in Table 8.7, the interaction 
term is not significant in all the specifications. This seems to suggest that 
after controlling for all firm-level characteristics, including the direct effect 
on productivity dynamics exerted by company size, there is no productivity 
growth ‘persistency premium’ for large companies, since the magnitude of 
the effect of the lagged dependent variable does not significantly change 
across firms of different size. This result points out that persistency pat-
terns can be independent of size, and that not only large corporations are 
capable of sustaining higher productivity performances in time.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the crucial role of the interplay 
between the internal characteristics of companies – including their size, 
management strategies and system properties (such as access conditions 
to local pools of knowledge and the dynamics of economic activity) – in 
assessing the path-dependent persistence of productivity growth. These 
results confirm the hypothesis that productivity persistence is an emergent 
system property that takes place when there is appropriate matching 
between the system properties and the characteristics of individual agents. 
The analysis of the persistence of total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
has was conducted through the use of transition probability matrices 
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Table 8.7  Dynamic probit model on the persistence of TFP growth rates 
(model specification with interaction between lagged dependent 
variables and LARGE FIRM DUMMY)
Sector 1998–2000 1998–2000 2001–2005 2001–2005
High-Tech Low-Tech High-Tech Low-Tech 
HighGrowth t − 1 0.224*** 0.112*** 0.304*** 0.266***
(0.047) (0.030) (0.014) (0.010)
HighGrowth t − 1 * 
LARGE FIRM 
DUMMY
0.070 0.027 0.022 0.042
(0.045) (0.041) (0.023) (0.026)
SIZE t − 3 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.057*** 0.083***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
ROE t − 3 −0.018*** −0.009*** 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
INTANG t − 3 −0.015 0.060* −0.022 0.027
(0.045) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027)
VERT_INT t − 3 −0.190*** −1.008*** −0.317*** −0.299***
(0.032) (0.064) (0.026) (0.024)
LEVERAGE t − 3 −0.007 −0.032*** 0.010 0.015
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
DEBT_MAT t − 3 0.113** 0.066** 0.061* 0.104***
(0.046) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029)
AVGSIZE −0.059*** −0.081*** −0.054*** −0.080***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
AVGROE 0.009** −0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
AVGINTANG 0.038 −0.039 0.130*** 0.084**
(0.051) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034)
AVGVERT_INT 0.031* 0.905*** 0.040*** 0.001
(0.016) (0.068) (0.011) (0.003)
AVGLEVERAGE 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AVGDEBT_MAT −0.188*** −0.070 −0.020 −0.149***
(0.069) (0.045) (0.047) (0.041)
HighGrowth t0 0.015 0.033** −0.007 −0.008
(0.025) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 5268 8772 10,536 17,541
Chi2 426.37*** 565.90*** 1037.47*** 1398.71***
LogLik −1981.9 −3319.01 −3882.71 −6677.0
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(TPMs) which were split according to different system property dimen-
sions, providing interesting results. The subsequent econometric analysis 
of firm-level TFP has shown that firms which have been able to improve 
the general efficiency of their production process at time t are more likely 
to sustain above-average performance in subsequent periods of time 
than firms with lower past rates of TFP growth. Moreover, our analysis 
identified persistency patterns that are independent of size, suggesting that 
not only large corporations are capable of sustaining higher productivity 
performances in time, hence confirming the significant role SMEs may 
have in enhancing productivity dynamics of economic systems.
The identified persistence turned out to be path dependent rather than 
past dependent since it is shaped by a number of complementary and 
contingent factors that affect locally the dynamics of the process. The 
identification of the path-dependent character of persistence in productiv-
ity growth helps us understand and appreciate the variety of results in the 
previous literature. The differences in the results of an increasing array of 
empirical investigations can be interpreted as follows: innovative activities 
have indeed potential hysteretic effects that only become actual persistence 
in productivity growth when a number of complementary and contingent 
factors concur to making the process actually non-ergodic. At each point 
in time, the creative reaction of firms and the probability of introduc-
ing, adopting and imitating further innovations and of outperforming 
competitors in TFP growth are in fact affected by the sequence of results 
in the past, but are also conditioned by the actual levels of their internal 
dynamic capabilities to accumulate and exploit technological knowledge 
and human capital. These in turn are influenced by the changing charac-
teristics of the system in which firms are embedded, confirming that the 
persistence of productivity growth shares the intrinsic characteristics of an 
emergent system property. Considering that not only the dynamics but also 
the structural characteristics of economic systems are relevant in shaping 
persistency patterns, differences across countries in the way system proper-
ties may influence firms’ productivity persistence might be relevant. This 
comparative aspect of the analysis can certainly represent an interesting 
issue to be scrutinized in further research.
The results of the investigation carried out through this chapter on 
the characteristics and determinants of the persistence of productivity 
growth contribute to the analysis of path dependency. A large body of 
literature has explored the path-dependent characteristics of the direction 
of dynamic processes. Relatively less attention has been paid to the path-
dependent character of the rate of dynamic processes. The results of our 
analysis confirm that the persistence of productivity growth at the firm 
level is a path-dependent dynamic process from several viewpoints:
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●● The persistence is clearly non-ergodic because dynamic perform-
ances in the past affect performance over time.
●● The rates of persistence are influenced by the past, but are also 
strongly sensitive to events that take place along the process.
●● ‘Small events’ along the process may change not only its direction 
but also its rate.
●● ‘Small events’ are internal to each firm, such as managerial practices, 
changes in routines and decision-making mechanisms.
●● ‘Small events’ are also external, such as changes in access and use 
conditions of the stock of technological knowledge available in the 
system and in the networks of relations among firms that qualify 
them.
The distinction between path and past dependence is once more fertile: the 
persistence of productivity growth is indeed a path-dependent process but 
not at all a past-dependent, deterministic one.
NOTES
 1. Our previous analyses studied persistence in innovation (Antonelli et al., 2012), whereas 
this chapter focuses specifically on the determinants of persistence in productivity 
growth, taking into account: i) the role of firm characteristics such as size, evolving 
internal capabilities and management strategies; and ii) system properties such as the 
macroeconomic, sectoral and regional contexts in which persistence displays its effects.
 2. The level of yearly depreciation of physical capital was chosen following the approach 
in previous studies that applied perpetual inventory techniques to estimate yearly fixed 
capital levels, adopting depreciation parameters in the 5–10 per cent range for physical 
capital. Since the adopted depreciation parameter is constant across industries, changes 
should not be expected in the significance of estimate coefficients for slight changes in 
d.
 3. This measure of persistence is substantially different from the one adopted in Antonelli 
et al. (2013). As in the previous study, the state variable simply reflected the existence of 
positive changes in TFP over time.
 4. Let Pij and Pˆij denote the population and sample probabilities of transition of a 
company from status i to status j. This transition can also be seen as the outcome of a 
binomial distribution. Hence, standard errors of the estimated transition probabilities 
can be calculated as a binomial standard deviation: !Pij3 (12Pij)/N where N equals 
the number of companies in status i. As N increases, Pˆij tends to Pij.
 5. Sectors were divided into High-Tech and Low-Tech according to the Italian three-digit 
ATECO industry classification.
 6. In order to simplify the description of results, we report only the probability associated 
with persistent top performers. Moreover, to be consistent with subsequent econometric 
models, controlling for the same system-level factors in productivity persistence, we 
consider the same selection criteria to identify top performers – that is, the first 15 
per cent in the sectoral distribution of TFP growth rates. Persistency patterns do not 
significantly change with respect to different thresholds. All results are available upon 
request from the authors.
 7. We carried out a sensitivity analysis to investigate whether, and to what extent, the 
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results are related to the selected threshold. Results are largely confirmed for different 
thresholds and are available upon request.
 8. This intuition is particularly relevant given that the sample is composed of manufactur-
ing companies that operate to a large extent in traditional sectors and that during the 
observed years have carried out significant restructuring outsourcing of production 
activities.
 9. The empirical evidence on the relationship between profitability measures and produc-
tivity is mixed, even when taking into account operative profitability (ROI or ROA). 
In general, the identification of linear effects appears to be difficult. See Antonelli and 
Scellato (2011) for a discussion.
10. We also tested different specifications for TFP growth rate, using both a two-year and a 
four-year interval. Results were not affected.
11. Given that the effects of relevant control variables do not largely differ across estimates 
produced on different samples, for reasons of space we do not report results for all 
estimated coefficients. All results are available upon request from the authors.
12. See Antonelli et al. (2014) and Antonelli and Scellato (2015) for complementary evi-
dence. This interpretation, for which we acknowledge the suggestion of an anonymous 
referee, might be the object of further empirical investigations on a comparative basis.
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APPENDIX: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Table 8A.1  TPM on quartiles of sectoral distribution TFP growth rates 
(all years and companies)
High  
Growth t
Mid–High 
Growth t
Mid–Low 
Growth t
Low  
Growth t
High Growth 
t − 1
0.4748
(0.0048)
0.2496
(0.0042)
0.1617
(0.0035)
0.1134
(0.0030)
Mid–High 
Growth t − 1
0.2472
(0.0041)
0.3343
(0.0045)
0.2585
(0.0042)
0.1595
(0.0035)
Mid–Low 
Growth t − 1
0.1576
(0.0035)
0.2624
(0.0042)
0.3356
(0.0045)
0.2442
(0.0041)
Low Growth 
t − 1
0.1169
(0.0031)
0.1563
(0.0035)
0.2471
(0.0042)
0.4795
(0.0048)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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9.  The endogenous dynamics of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities
Cristiano Antonelli and Gianluigi Ferraris
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contributes to the literature that impinges upon the approach 
elaborated by Schumpeter (1947), according to which innovation is the 
result of the creative reaction of firms facing unexpected changes in 
product and factor markets, contingent upon the availability of knowledge 
externalities. The availability of knowledge externalities, in turn, is the sto-
chastic result of the introduction of innovations. Its persistence depends 
upon the actual amount of knowledge externalities that are generated at 
each point in time. This dynamics is the result of the interaction between 
individual decision-making embedded in a system and the changing condi-
tions of the system (Antonelli, 2011, 2017a, b; Arthur, 2014).
The introduction of innovations requires the generation of technologi-
cal knowledge. In turn, the generation and dissemination of technological 
knowledge can only take place in organized contexts characterized by 
appropriate levels of knowledge connectivity qualified in terms of viability 
of knowledge interactions and transactions among heterogeneous and 
creative agents that act intentionally to innovate when their individual per-
formance is out-of-equilibrium. The generation of technological knowl-
edge is, in fact, based on the interactive and collective recombination of 
internal and external knowledge through the intentional interaction and 
participation of a variety of learning agents embedded in geographic and 
professional knowledge commons. Interaction is required for the acquisi-
tion and implementation of external knowledge, an essential input in the 
generation of new knowledge (Antonelli and David, 2016).
This process leads to the generation of knowledge stemming from inter-
nal research activities combined with knowledge externalities and strategic 
mobility across knowledge commons. The outcomes are determined by 
the structured contexts in which they are embedded; but they are also the 
cause of changes in the structure of the system, its knowledge connectivity 
and the pecuniary knowledge externalities available within the knowledge 
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commons, the likelihood of successful innovation and, ultimately, aggre-
gate productivity. Innovation and changes to productivity levels affect the 
system’s price levels and the performance of firms, promoting new out-of-
equilibrium conditions and new structures of the system (Antonelli, 2008, 
2011, 2015a, 2017a, b).
This open-ended feedback system is based on continual interactions 
between individual acts and endogenous knowledge externalities related to 
the structure of the system and its levels of knowledge connectivity. In this 
context, the decisions to both generate technological knowledge and intro-
duce technological innovations by exploiting the knowledge interactions 
and organized structures in which they take place are endogenous and are 
determined internally by the dynamics of the system. The individual and 
intentional actions of creative agents are central to the system dynamics; 
however, no single agent is solely responsible for or is able to forecast the 
eventual results of his or her actions because of the effects on the organiza-
tion of the system (Miller and Page, 2007).
The characteristics of the landscape in which knowledge interactions 
and transactions take place play a central role in assessing the viability of 
knowledge generation strategies. Thus, feasibility of knowledge generation 
depends on the knowledge connectivity of the system as measured by the 
levels of knowledge externalities, which, in turn, depend on the character-
istics of the knowledge landscape. These characteristics are neither static 
nor exogenous. They change continuously through time as a consequence 
of the activities of agents and their ability to generate knowledge and 
introduce innovations and freedom to search for new opportunities for 
the generation of new technological knowledge. Changes to the features 
of the landscape engender both positive and negative externalities which 
affect the ability of firms to innovate. The changing capabilities of firms 
to generate new technological knowledge affect their mobility and, ulti-
mately, the contours of the space. Moreover, knowledge landscapes and 
knowledge externalities are not given, but emanate from an endogenous, 
path-dependent collective process that includes institutional changes such 
as the introduction of new intellectual property right (IPR) regimes 
(Sorenson et al., 2006).
The present chapter draws on the above to build a synthetic account 
of the role of externalities in the economics of technological knowledge, 
implementing the notion of endogenous knowledge externalities, showing 
the dynamic endogeneity of the emergence and decline of knowledge 
externalities at the system level, and exploring their implications for the 
rates of introduction of innovations and productivity increases in the 
system. Section 2 reviews the changing attitudes to knowledge externali-
ties, and elaborates a theoretical framework to understand the endogenous 
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dynamics of pecuniary knowledge externalities. Section 3 presents an 
agent-based model of the innovation system. Section 4 presents the 
results of the simulation, focusing on alternative hypotheses related to the 
institutional and architectural features of the innovation system. Section 
5 concludes by summarizing the main results and discussing some policy 
implications of the analysis.
2.  KNOWLEDGE EXTERNALITIES AS INPUT AND 
OUTPUT OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Recent efforts to apply complex system analysis to the social sciences and 
to implement an economics of evolutionary complexity using agent-based 
simulation models (ABM) are particularly helpful to analyse the genera-
tion of technological knowledge as an endogenous collective process that 
is both the key causal factor and the outcome of system dynamics. In this 
approach, technological knowledge and innovation constitute the emer-
gent property of organized contexts characterized by qualified interactions 
among heterogeneous and creative agents able to react intentionally to 
innovate when their performance is out-of-equilibrium. The individual 
and intentional actions of creative agents are central to the system’s 
dynamics, which are determined by the structure of the system and the 
endogenous dynamics of knowledge externalities. No individual agent can 
claim responsibility for or forecast the eventual results of its actions. The 
complexity of the system is promoted by the interdependence between 
individual action and structural change (Lane, 2002; Lane et al., 2009; 
Page, 2011).
Following the knowledge recombinant approach, in order to generate 
new knowledge firms need to combine internal sources of knowledge, 
such as in-house research and development (R&D) activities and learning 
processes, with the systematic (as opposed to the occasional, additive) use 
of external knowledge, which is acknowledged to be an indispensable input 
for the production of new knowledge. Its criticality for the generation 
of recombinant knowledge to produce new technologies forces learning 
agents to search for and access it intentionally. No firm can innovate in 
isolation. External and internal knowledge sources are substitutes only 
to a limited extent: complete substitution between internal and external 
knowledge is impossible. External and internal knowledge, both tacit 
and codified, are complementary inputs – neither can be dispensed with 
(David, 1993; Weitzman, 1996; Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001; Cowan and Jonard, 2004, Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b).
The limited appropriability of knowledge engenders flows of knowledge 
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spillovers. Their actual absorption and eventual use in the generation of 
new technological knowledge, however, is determined by the knowledge 
connectivity of the system. In turn, the knowledge connectivity of the 
system is influenced by: i) the actions of learning agents that affect the 
structure of the system; ii) the knowledge interactions combined with 
internal learning efforts that affect the distribution of the knowledge pos-
sessed by each agent and made accessible through knowledge interactions. 
Similarly, mobility across the knowledge commons affects the density of 
agents and, hence, the amount of knowledge absorption costs.
Knowledge spillovers, in fact, do not automatically benefit all potential 
recipients (Griliches, 1979, 1992; Romer, 1990). Systematic and intentional 
efforts are required to exploit knowledge spillovers. This requires a 
knowledge exploration strategy to search, screen and identify knowledge 
sources, and to assess whether and to what extent the firm can rely on that 
source combined with the stock of internal knowledge to produce new 
knowledge. The firm must be able to fully combine and coordinate the 
relevant learning and research conducted within its boundaries with the 
relevant sources of tacit and codified external knowledge for the successful 
generation of new knowledge (Beaudry and Breschi, 2003; Bresnahan et 
al., 2001; Antonelli and Colombelli, 2015a, b).
Identifying and accessing external knowledge are expensive pursuits 
due to direct purchasing costs, whether there are markets for the knowl-
edge and, especially, the costs of knowledge absorption. Knowledge 
interactions are required to access external knowledge – especially its 
tacit components – to reduce the risks to the vendor of opportunistic 
behaviour and knowledge leakage. It is difficult and costly to detail all the 
ingredients, necessary procedures, possible applications and implications 
of knowledge, and transfer of technological knowledge requires systematic 
codification efforts (Arrow, 1969; Mansfield et al., 1981; Lundvall, 1988).
Knowledge is sticky; it is embedded in organizations, protocols and 
procedures. External knowledge acquisition and sharing can be achieved 
only via direct and purposeful interactions to create the appropriate 
institutional context, which entail specific costs. The capacity of agents 
to access external technological knowledge depends on the fabric of the 
relevant institutional relations, and on shared codes of understanding that 
help reduce information asymmetries, limit the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour and build a context that allows reciprocity and the building 
of trust and generative relationships (Antonelli and David, 2016). The 
receptivity of firms to knowledge generated elsewhere is not obvious. Its 
absorption requires dedicated activities that have a cost and vary across 
firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Antonelli, 2011).
The use of external knowledge as an input in the generation of new 
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knowledge entails knowledge absorption costs related to: i) knowledge 
transactions, communication and interaction costs associated with explo-
ration activities such as search, screening, processing, contracting and 
interacting with competitors, suppliers and customers; and ii) the process-
ing costs associated with the access and actual use of external knowledge 
(Griffith et al., 2003; Guiso and Schivardi, 2007). In some specific loca-
tions heavy knowledge absorption costs make access to external knowledge 
expensive. In others, knowledge absorption costs are low because of ease 
of access to the knowledge commons. These conditions are highly idiosyn-
cratic and localized (Bischi et al., 2003; Zhang, 2003).
Pecuniary knowledge externalities are defined by the gap between 
the equilibrium cost of knowledge as an input in knowledge generation 
and its actual cost, taking into account its limited appropriability and 
 exhaustibility.1 Because of its limited appropriability knowledge cannot be 
fully appropriated and spills. Because of its limited exhaustibility it can be 
used again and again as an input in the generation of further knowledge. 
Its secondary use requires dedicated activities, and hence absorption costs. 
The costs of the secondary use of knowledge may be – in appropriate 
circumstances and favourable conditions of knowledge governance within 
economics systems – lower than the equilibrium levels of knowledge as a 
standard good. Pecuniary knowledge externalities are defined by the gap 
between the cost of knowledge as a standard good and the actual cost of 
knowledge, taking into account its limited appropriability as well as its 
absorption costs.
The levels of the pecuniary knowledge externalities available within the 
knowledge commons, the resulting amount of knowledge that the overall 
system can generate and the aggregate outcomes of the dynamics related to 
productivity levels are simultaneously endogenous and unpredictable, and 
subject to the changing interplay between individual action and structural 
change. In this approach, neither interactions nor the organized structures 
in which they take place are exogenous; they are determined internally 
by the system dynamics (Arthur et al., 1997; Lane et al., 2009; Antonelli, 
2011).
The levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities vary across commons 
and time. They depend on the density of the co-localized innovation agents 
in the region. The density of knowledge commons yields, in fact, both posi-
tive and negative effects on the actual levels of knowledge absorption costs, 
and hence on the levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities. Density has 
negative effects on the amount of resources that are necessary to perform 
the exploration and search of external knowledge: the larger the density, 
the more expensive the identification of the external knowledge items 
that are necessary to generate new knowledge. Density, however, has also 
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positive effects in terms of information processing. The larger the density, 
the lower the unit costs of the commons within which each firm is located. 
Total knowledge absorption costs, as a consequence, decline with density 
until a minimum is reached. Beyond a threshold level of density, where 
knowledge absorption costs hit a minimum, knowledge absorption costs 
increase along with the density of the commons. The relationship between 
density and net pecuniary knowledge externalities exhibits the typical traits 
of a U-shaped functional form.
At each point in time, the actions of agents, including the generation of 
new knowledge and the introduction of innovations, affect: the structure 
of the system; the architecture of networks; the density and quality of 
commons; the organization of communication flows; and, ultimately, the 
determinants of external knowledge availability and its governance costs. 
Specifically, the mobility of agents in the regional space, related to accessing 
external knowledge available within a rich knowledge commons, has a direct 
effect on location costs as well as on knowledge governance costs. Both too 
little and too much density of agents can be detrimental to the accumulation 
and creation of firms’ technological knowledge and innovation capabilities. 
This refers to the notion of endogenous knowledge externalities.
The characteristics of the system into which knowledge flows matter in 
relation to knowledge governance costs, which include transaction, interac-
tion, absorption and communication costs (Arrow, 1969). Because of the 
intrinsic non-exhaustibility and non-divisibility of knowledge, and its tacit 
and sticky characteristics, the cost of external knowledge may differ from 
the long-run equilibrium cost defined by matching marginal costs with 
marginal production. This important U-relation is strongly influenced by 
the level of knowledge governance costs that reflect the structure of the 
system. Only if  the costs of external knowledge are below the equilibrium 
level will firms react by innovating. The introduction of innovation is 
clearly an emergent property of the system, which occurs only in specific 
and positive geographic, institutional and sectoral contexts. However, the 
structural characteristics that yield net positive knowledge externalities 
and the resulting introduction of technological innovations are local rather 
than global, are far from being static or exogenous, and are determined by 
strong endogenous and localized dynamics (Krugman, 1994).
As a result, net positive knowledge externalities are a transient property 
of the system in which firms are embedded. Schumpeter (1942: 28) com-
mented that: ‘Surplus values may be impossible in perfect equilibrium, but 
can be ever present because that equilibrium is never allowed to establish 
itself.’ The quality of the knowledge governance mechanisms in place is 
important when assessing the size of the net positive effects of knowledge 
externalities.
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Pecuniary knowledge externalities are endogenous to the system in 
reflecting the changing distribution of co-localized members of the 
knowledge commons. They are inherently path dependent in stemming 
from elements of past dependence demonstrated by the stock of firms in 
the knowledge commons at each point in time, through the pervasive role 
of contingent factors such as local interactions, feedback and strategic 
mobility of firms. The mobility of firms affects the net positive externali-
ties available in each location. The entry of new firms is likely to increase 
the overall levels of knowledge governance costs and, the same time, may 
increase the opportunities for knowledge sharing. On the other hand, firms’ 
exit indeed helps reduce overall levels of knowledge governance costs, but 
also affects the opportunities for knowledge sharing. The mobility of firms 
is fully endogenous; it arises from the search for better opportunities to 
generate new technological knowledge, promoted by out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. At the same time, firms’ mobility, by changing the structural 
conditions of the system and its knowledge connectivity, affects the actual 
opportunities for generating new technological knowledge.
The ruggedness of the system in which firms are localized is not an 
exogenous characteristic, as it is assumed in NK models; it is intrinsically 
endogenous and determined by firm mobility.2 The dynamics of the system 
feeds continuously on the interplay between out-of-equilibrium condi-
tions, firms’ reactions, enhanced learning processes, external knowledge 
search, mobility in the knowledge space, structural changes, a new balance 
based on knowledge externalities, the generation of new technological 
knowledge, introduction of productivity-enhancing technological innova-
tions, price reductions and eventual new out-of-equilibrium conditions. 
Endogenous knowledge externalities are at the heart of the innovation 
system.
At each point in time there may be several solutions, but each will 
be different in its standard characteristics of stability and replicability. 
Equilibrium points are erratic. Small shocks engendered by the mobility 
of firms seeking to absorb higher levels of external knowledge have major 
effects at both the aggregate and disaggregate levels, and may push the 
system far beyond any given values – although not back to levels experi-
enced in a previous phase. The performance of individual agents, and of 
the system at large, depends on the distribution within the system of agents 
across the knowledge commons, their density and interactions, and their 
knowledge endowments. Each of these elements is interdependent, and 
each stems from the dynamics of constantly changing collective dynamics.
Path dependence, because of the roles of learning and interdependence, 
exerts powerful effects. The stock of available knowledge and the systems 
of knowledge communication in place at each point in time catch the 
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effects of past dependence. However, small events can change the direction 
and affect the rates of these changes so as to alter the trajectories set at the 
origin of the process (David, 2007).
3. AN ABM EXERCISE
3.1 The Building Blocks of the Simulation Model
ABM allows exploration of the workings of the interactions, transactions 
and feedback between individual actions and the system structure that 
make up the simple but articulated economic system outlined in the previ-
ous section. ABM provides a tool to grasp the dynamics of the complex 
interactions among agents, through and between the environment and 
the agents within it, that arise from the simulation (that is, the model 
computation), without the need for extensive and detailed descriptions of 
the dynamics investigated. This approach models, in a parsimonious and 
simple way, the intrinsic complexity of the knowledge interactions that are 
allowed to affect the structure of the environment in which they take place 
(Axtell, 2005; Terna, 2009).
The ABM implemented in this section operationalizes, through the 
interactions among a large number of objects representing the agents in 
the system, the functioning of a typical complex process characterized 
by: i) a key role of knowledge externalities; ii) augmentation by the 
Schumpeterian notion of creative reaction conditional on the availability 
of knowledge externalities (Schumpeter, 1947; Antonelli, 2017a, b); and 
iii) enrichment by the explicit assumption that the actions of agents affect 
the structure of the environment, including the amounts of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities (Lane, 2002; Lane et al., 2009).3
The model assumes bounded rationality of firms, and is based on 
appropriate criteria of conduct related to procedural rationality. Firms 
are endowed with the abilities to learn and react that enable procedural 
rationality augmented by the inclusion of potential creative reactivity. 
Firms are credited with the ability to try to react: their reactions are 
determined by the out-of-equilibrium conditions when profitability levels 
are far from the average. Their reactions are creative and, when and if  
positive knowledge externalities are available, lead to the introduction 
of productivity-enhancing innovations rather than only adaptations or 
adjustments between quantities and prices (Antonelli, 2008, 2011).
In the ABM, demand and supply meet in the market place, production 
is decided ex ante and firms try to sell their output in the product market, 
where customers spend their revenue. The matching of demand and supply 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   210 19/02/2018   13:42
 The endogenous dynamics of pecuniary knowledge externalities  211
sets temporary prices that define the performance of firms. Firms are 
heterogeneous both with respect to their productivity levels and ultimate 
profitability, and with respect to their location. The economic system is 
represented as a collection of regions, or commons, across which firms are 
distributed at the start of the simulation process.
In the simulation, heterogeneous firms produce homogeneous prod-
ucts that are sold into a single market. In the product market, 
households expend the revenue derived from wages (including research 
fees) and the net profits of  shareholders. In input markets, the derived 
demand from firms matches the supply of  labour provided by work-
ers, including researchers. For simplicity, no financial institutions are 
activated, and payments cannot be postponed. Firms’ capital is supplied 
solely by shareholders, and all the commercial transactions are cleared 
immediately. Market clearing mechanisms based exclusively on prices 
maintain a perfect equilibrium between demand and supply. This 
equilibrium is ensured for both product and factor markets: quantities 
determine the correct price, enabling the whole production to be sold. 
No friction or waiting times are simulated; factors are assumed to be 
immediately available.
The production function is very simple and avoids issues related to 
different kinds of production processes, input availability, warehouse 
cycles and so on: outputs depend exclusively on the amount of employed 
labour and its productivity. Both labour and productivity vary among 
firms. Labour depends on the entrepreneur’s decision about the growth of 
production; productivity is a function of the technological level achieved 
by the firm via innovation.
The whole output is sold in the single product market, where the revenue 
equals the sum of wages, dividends and research expenses, and the price 
depends on liquidity. According to the temporary price levels, profits are 
computed as the difference between income and costs, no taxes are paid 
and no part of the profit is retained by the enterprise. Shareholders either 
receive profits or reintegrate losses. Firms can support their losses only up 
to a certain threshold beyond which they leave the market and are replaced 
by new entries, after a parametric number of production cycles.
Firms are learning agents that are able to react to out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. According to their performance levels and the availability 
of external knowledge, firms can fund research activities dedicated to 
innovation. Firms learn internally by doing, and externally by interacting. 
Internal learning processes are intrinsic to the firm and occur spontane-
ously over time. External learning involves two aspects. First, the rate of 
internal learning is influenced by the local conditions of the commons. 
The accumulation of competences via the firm’s learning processes is 
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greater the greater the average productivity of all the other competitors 
co-localized in the commons.
Second, we assume that localization in a knowledge commons provides 
the opportunity to absorb technological knowledge from co-localized 
firms with higher levels of productivity. External learning entails specific 
knowledge governance costs required to carry out the necessary activities 
of knowledge networking and communication among all the members 
of the commons. Knowledge governance costs depend on the number of 
firms within each commons by means of both fixed and variable costs. 
Fixed costs stem from the administration of the commons: the level 
increases with the size of the commons, but unit costs for each firm decline 
as the fixed costs are shared with the other members of the commons, 
independently of the need and opportunity for external learning. Next to 
fixed costs there is the variable part of the knowledge absorption cost that 
is proportional to the number of firms in the commons. In this way the 
cost function that relates the amount each firm has to bear to participate 
in and take advantage of a commons, to the population of the commons, 
becomes a U-shaped curve.
The whole system is represented as nested collection of agents; they are 
grouped in commons that are constituted by a simple collection of agents; 
the collection of commons constitutes the whole system (a collection of 
collections of agents). The simulation process shows that the localization 
of the agents in different commons is the result of their past activities, 
although these can change at each point in time. The results from a 
production and consumption cycle influence the strategies adopted by the 
agents during the next cycle. Hence, the dynamics of the model is typically 
characterized by path dependence: the dynamics is non-ergodic because 
history matters, and irreversibility limits and qualifies the alternative 
options at each point in time. However, at each point in time, the effects 
of the initial conditions may be balanced by occasional events that could 
alter the ‘path’, that is, the direction and the pace of the dynamics (David, 
2007).
Firms perform basic search functions and acquire information about the 
levels of profitability of neighbouring firms in the same commons. As a 
result of bounded rationality, the firms in the model are not able to observe 
the entire economic system, but only the average levels of profitability 
of the other firms. Individual transparency is clearly local: the spectrum 
within which firms can observe the conduct of other firms is limited to the 
particular commons.
The further profitability lies outside the local average, the stronger the 
out-of-equilibrium conditions. If  profitability results are below average, 
firms can innovate in order to improve their performance; when results are 
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above average, they can take advantage of abundant liquidity and reduce 
the opportunity costs of risky undertakings. Innovation is viewed as the 
possible result of intentional decision-making that takes place in out-of-
equilibrium conditions. The further the firm from equilibrium, the more 
likely it will innovate. Hence, we assume a U-shaped relationship between 
levels of profitability and innovative activity, measured by rates of increase 
of total factor productivity (TFP).
To summarize, the firm’s motivation to innovate increases each time its 
performance is found to be far enough from the local average. The motiva-
tion becomes progressively stronger if  the enterprise’s relative position 
remains outside the band for several and consecutive production cycles: 
after a parametrically set number of consecutive cycles the enterprise 
performs an innovation trial.
Out-of-equilibrium conditions push firms to try to react by generating 
technological innovations that will increase their productivity. Attempts 
to generate new technological knowledge and to innovate are based on 
internal research and learning efforts, and access to external knowledge 
available within and across commons. Search for and access to external 
knowledge can be both local and global. When the neighbourhood in 
which each firm is embedded does not provide sufficient opportunities 
to generate additional technological knowledge, firms can move within 
knowledge space across commons to get closer to firms with high levels of 
technological knowledge. The absorption of external knowledge requires 
dedicated resources and specific costs, as does mobility across commons to 
achieve proximity to firms with higher levels of productivity.
Building on the growing empirical evidence on the intrinsic character-
istics of agents’ dynamics, we characterize the search activities at the base 
of the innovation process in our learning firms as typically displaying 
Lévy flight traits. We suppose that firms alternate extended phases of 
local search within their own commons with long jumps that take them to 
other commons (Barabasi, 2010). Hence, we assume that the generation of 
additional technological knowledge takes place when the learning firm is 
able to master a three-step sequence consisting of: i) valorization of inter-
nal competence based on learning processes; ii) local (within commons) 
absorption of external knowledge; and iii) entry into a new commons 
characterized by higher levels of net pecuniary knowledge externalities.
The successful generation of new technological knowledge at the same 
time yields new knowledge externalities and enables the introduction of 
productivity-enhancing innovations. Their introduction, in turn, reduces 
the overall price levels in the product markets (affects the working of factor 
markets) and creates new out-of-equilibrium conditions. The micro–macro 
dynamics loop is closed, and engenders continuous growth and change 
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 provided that changes to the system structure do not promote provision 
of positive net knowledge externalities. The interaction between individual 
action and systemic change includes the new knowledge externalities that 
spill from the limited appropriability of the new knowledge and the structural 
changes determined by the mobility of firms across the knowledge commons, 
and its effects on knowledge governance costs. Endogenous knowledge 
externalities are the engine of system dynamics. Their level is not given and 
static: it can increase and decrease according to the amount of innovation 
being introduced at each point in time, and hence the amount of knowledge 
generated at each point in time, taking into account the changing levels of 
knowledge connectivity determined at each point in time by the changing 
structural landscape of the system (Anderson et al., 1988; Rosser, 2004).
3.2 A Detailed Presentation of the Innovation Process Simulation
Since the chapter aims to identify the changing role of endogenous knowl-
edge externalities in the innovation process, here we explore the ABM 
of the innovation process in detail, and stress analytically the role of the 
external factors that shape the recombinant generation of technological 
knowledge. Firms are characterized as learning agents. Learning is both 
internal and external to the firm:
●● Internal learning is a routine that includes typical processes of learn-
ing by doing and learning by using. Internal learning enables the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge and potentially competence that 
requires a specific action to be eventually mobilized and transformed 
into concrete technological knowledge.
●● External learning influences the rates of accumulation of each firm. 
It is also a routine and consists of monitoring activity that enables 
firms to assess the profitability and productivity of the other firms 
co-localized within the commons. External learning relies on interac-
tions with other firms in the same commons. Bounded rationality 
confines firms to observing only other firms in their particular 
commons. External learning provides information on the availability 
of external knowledge that can be tapped if  and when the firm tries 
to upgrade its productivity level. External learning encompasses two 
processes: i) faster learning rates, influenced by the average produc-
tivity of the commons; and ii) the possibility to absorb technological 
knowledge from co-localized firms with higher productivity levels.
Agents follow a satisficing approach in their decision to try to innovate. 
At each point in time, learning firms assess their own profitability against 
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that of co-localized firms within the commons. If  their profitability is 
either below or above the local average, the firm will react. Their reaction 
may be adaptive or creative according to the availability of knowledge at 
a cost that is below the marginal product: innovation efforts are expensive 
because innovation is not free. Firms are short-sighted and can expend, in 
one unit of time, all their innovation budget (including absorption costs) 
even when the productivity gains obtained from absorption extend over 
more than one unit of time. Innovation efforts can fail if  the innovation 
costs exceed the productivity gains. In this case the reaction of agents 
will be adaptive. This takes place when the knowledge connectivity of 
the system is small and the levels of knowledge externalities are low. If  
knowledge is available at costs below its marginal product, the innovation 
efforts may be successful, resulting in a creative reaction.
The innovation process consists of three sequential phases. In the first, 
firms try to mobilize their internal slack competence. In the second, firms 
with insufficient potential competence based on past learning processes 
will try to absorb external technological knowledge spillovers from neigh-
bouring firms in their own commons. If  this is not possible, the third phase 
consists of a random move to another location in a different commons. Let 
us consider each of these in turn.
●● Firms consider the possibility to change their production technology 
when their performance is out-of-equilibrium and differs from the 
average. Out-of-equilibrium conditions are the result of mismatches 
between expected and actual product and input market conditions. 
Firms in out-of-equilibrium conditions try to innovate. To innovate 
firms mobilize internal slack competence accumulated through learn-
ing processes and access to external knowledge. The firms in our 
model are endowed with the ability to improve their production 
cycles. With each production cycle, the firm acquires and cumulates 
some technological potential. This potential requires intentional and 
dedicated research activities for its transformation into innovation. 
Competence can be transformed into innovation at a cost. Internal 
slack competence however is not sufficient to support the recombinant 
generation of new technological knowledge and the introduction of a 
productivity-enhancing innovation: external knowledge is an indis-
pensable, complementary input. In order to access and use external 
knowledge firms will try to access and absorb knowledge spilling from 
other firms. The search for external knowledge takes place locally 
within their own commons and at distance in neighbouring commons.
●● Local absorption enables exploitation of technology introduced 
by other firms. Firms can take advantage of their information 
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acquisition from external learning processes, and can identify more 
profitable, co-localized firms. Absorption requires dedicated activi-
ties; and, due to absorption costs, it is not free. Effective access to 
external technological knowledge requires substantial resources for 
exploration, identification, decodification and integration into the 
internal knowledge base. The absorption of knowledge from firms 
with higher levels of productivity is neither free nor unlimited. 
First, absorption of external knowledge requires specific activities 
and resources that have a cost. The level of these costs depends on 
the productivity gap between knowledge recipient and possessor. 
Second, the knowledge connectivity of the system plays a major role. 
When knowledge absorption gives poor or null results, firms move 
to another location in order to better address their technological 
conditions.
●● The third way to improve productivity levels involves moving around 
the physical space in order to identify more interesting commons 
(mobility across commons). When mobilization of competences and 
within-commons knowledge absorption are not viable solutions, 
firms can try to move randomly to another location in the hope of 
finding superior knowledge and a higher stochastic possibility to 
absorb technological knowledge from firms with high productiv-
ity levels. Since firms have access to individual information only 
about firms in their own commons and not all the other firms in 
the system, the Lévy flight is blind. This random move can lead to 
superior as well as inferior commons. Thus, firms decide to move 
only if  the profitability of their commons is below the system 
average. If  it is above the average, the chances of finding a superior 
commons will be low. The conduct of firms shapes the structure of 
the system and, at the same time, the structure of the system influ-
ences the innovation chances of firms in several ways. Localization 
in an advanced commons is beneficial because learning is faster 
and prospective recipients have higher possibilities to observe and 
absorb technological knowledge that high-productivity firms cannot 
fully appropriate. However, at the same time, localization in a dense 
commons engenders high costs of search and interaction, with the 
possible reduction of net pecuniary knowledge externalities.
3.3 Analytical Representation of the Simulation Model
This section presents the analytical organization of the simulation model 
and the founding equations.4 The production activity is specified following 
a simple linear function:
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 Oi = AiLpi. (9.1)
Where the output (O) of a generic i-th enterprise depends on the labour 
employed in the production cycle (Lp) and its productivity (A). The latter 
can vary between 0 and +∞. Customers (that is, workers, shareholders and 
researchers) spend the whole amount they earn in buying goods, so the 
selling price for goods is simply computed as:
 p = Y/∑Oi. (9.2)
where Y represents the whole amount earned by the customers and 
the sum computes the total production of enterprises operating in the 
simulated economy. The amount of wages represents the full costs of the 
enterprises: research costs, as well as moving ones and costs related to 
the exploration of the commons (that depend on the size of the common), 
are simply computed as work units to be bought. The number of work 
units the enterprises demand for each cycle is determined as:
 Li = Lpi + CCi + Ti + Mi. (9.3)
where Ti represents the work units required to transform accumulated 
knowledge in technological innovation (either for internal learning or 
spillover from other firms into the commons); CCi measures the work units 
needed to access the common knowledge base, including the research costs 
to increase the technological level by means of the external knowledge 
spilling in the commons where each firm is located (external learning); 
and Mi represents the work units needed for mobility across commons. 
Note that Lpi represents a firm’s entire input; in this way the whole stylized 
economy becomes quite simple.
The unit wage (w) for a single work unit is the same for each enterprise; 
it is centrally computed as a constant value equal to one, assuming an 
unlimited supply of labour:
 w = 1 (9.4)
Each firm pays its workers a total amount of wages (W) of:
 Wi = wLpi. (9.5)
The total amount of wages is simply computable as:
 W = ∑Wi. (9.6)
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   217 19/02/2018   13:42
218 The evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation
Firms decide to try to change their technology when their performance 
differs from the average in both cases of profits or losses. The resources 
invested to try to change their technology are defined in the former case 
by the amount of extra profit (this will be the maximum affordable invest-
ment), whereas in the latter such amount is measured by the savings the 
enterprise realizes by reducing its input (labour) acquisition. In this way 
the adaptive response of enterprises is driven by profits: with a loss they 
reduce the amount of factors demanded (and vice versa when they enjoy 
profits), whereas the reactive response is driven by the difference between 
the results of each single firm and the average results of the firms in the 
shared commons. The amount a firm invests, in case of internal learning 
or spillover, is computed as:
 Ii1 = min (Ti0, profiti0) | profiti0 > tolerance (9.7)
or as:
 Ii1 = min (Ti0, (− ΔLi1 * labour price)) | profiti0 < – tolerance (9.8)
For enterprises that perform moving strategies equations (9.7) and (9.8) 
work as well by simply substituting Mi0 with Ti0.
Note that one action only can be taken in each cycle. Firms invest their 
resources in three ways: i) to transform their accumulated competence 
and access external knowledge; ii) to transform spilled over technolo-
gies obtained by exploiting the information retrieved by belonging to a 
common organization; iii) to move to another commons in the hope – the 
flight is blind – of finding better conditions. Let us analyse these in detail.
The transformation of accumulated knowledge in new technology (so-
called internal learning) can be performed only if  a firm has accumulated a 
minimum amount of knowledge specified through the parameter ‘produc-
tivityUpgrade’ and could be performed for every amount greater than this 
amount at a time. The cost of the process is fixed in value, in work units, 
specified for the parameter ‘transformationCost’:
 Ti = transformationCost * internalLearning / productivityUpgrade | 
internalLearning > productivityUpgrade (9.9)
To access external knowledge, firms search in the knowledge commons and 
bear the knowledge absorption costs (CCi) that are related to the size of the 
commons and included in the costs each enterprise has to pay to be part 
of it. The relationship between density and knowledge absorption costs is 
U-shaped. For low levels of density, the larger the density of the common, 
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the lower the knowledge absorption costs. Beyond a threshold, after the 
minimum, knowledge absorption costs are larger the larger the density: the 
costs incurred to access and process information about the knowledge spill-
ing from the other firms increase with density. These types of costs are com-
puted, each cycle (in work units) and have the same value for each enterprise.
The knowledge absorption costs (CC) are parametrically determined 
in each simulation through the parameter ‘commonCost’, and depends 
on the number of firms in the commons (N). First, the fixed component 
is computed as commonCost times the theoretical maximum number of 
components – that is, the number of agents in the whole economy (N); 
this is spread evenly among the firms belonging to each commons (ni). 
The variable part of the knowledge absorption cost is proportional to the 
effective number of firms that belong to the common (ni). The following 
formula summarizes the costs each component of the i-th common has to 
bear to belong to it:
 costi = (commonCost * N) / ni + commonCost * ni (9.10)
The amount of external knowledge each firm can access depends on its dis-
tance from the ‘spilling’ firm. This distance (delta) is computed as follows:
 delta = (Aj – Ai) / Aj (9.11)
where i is the enterprise trying to access external knowledge spilling from 
firm j. Note that it is possible to take advantage only of technologies whose 
patent licence has expired. In order to transform spilled technologies the 
firm has to bear the transformation cost, in the same measure it has to 
bear to transform internal learning. To tackle the spillover each firm has to 
invest an amount in working unit that is:
 Ti = transformationCost * (Aj – Ai) / productivityUpgrade (9.12)
Actual access to external knowledge takes place with a probability defined 
as spilloverMinProb. The probability the spillover was successful (Ss) is:
 Ss = (1 – spilloverMinProb) * (1 – delta) + spilloverMinProb (9.13)
If  no local knowledge pecuniary externalities are available either because 
spillover is not allowed or no firm provides suitable spillover in the com-
mons (included the special case when the firm is unique in the commons), 
firms try to move to another commons. This activity has a fixed cost set to 
the value (in units of work) specified by the parameter ‘movingCost’:
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 Mi = movingCost (9.14)
The outcome of their move will be positive so as to fuel a creative reaction 
and introduce innovations when and if  the cost of knowledge – after 
taking into account knowledge absorption costs and moving costs – is 
below equilibrium levels. The dynamics of the system is now fully set. 
Firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions, with performances that 
are below or above average, try to react by means of the introduction of 
innovations. In order to introduce innovations they try to take advantage 
of pecuniary knowledge externalities. To do so they may move from one 
knowledge commons to another. Their entry and exit affect the amount of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities available in each commons.5
3.4 The System Dynamics of Endogenous Knowledge Externalities
Let us summarize the key points of the ABM to stress the relevance of 
endogenous knowledge externalities for the system dynamics. Appreciation 
of the endogeneity of knowledge externalities captures the characteristics 
of endogenous growth shaped by the intrinsic path-dependent dynamics of 
the system at both the structural and macroeconomic levels.
At the start of the simulation, heterogeneous firms, localized in differ-
ent commons, are endowed with different levels of productivity that are 
randomly distributed in the range]0,0.25[following a uniform probability 
distribution. Firms start the production process at their particular produc-
tivity level, try to sell their goods on the product market, and experience 
different levels of profitability. They compare their profitability with the 
average in the commons to which they belong. If  their profitability is either 
below or above the local average in their commons, these firms will try to 
change their knowledge base and introduce technological innovations. 
These innovation efforts are deemed successful if  their costs are below 
the value of their gains in terms of productivity in one unit of time. The 
costs of knowledge have a major influence on assessing the viability of 
innovation efforts.
Innovation efforts consist of a sequence that starts with the valorization 
of their internal competences based on internal learning processes influ-
enced by local average productivity levels. If  the internal competence is not 
sufficient to introduce a new technology in order to increase productivity, 
firms move on to the second step and build on the information gathered 
through knowledge governance activities to try to absorb knowledge from 
co-localized firms (within the same commons) with higher profitability. If  
no such firms exist locally, then they move to the third step and attempt 
to move out of the original commons. Bounded rationality prevents 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   220 19/02/2018   13:42
 The endogenous dynamics of pecuniary knowledge externalities  221
assessment of whether the level of the knowledge governance costs in the 
new commons is lower than the advantages stemming from the external 
knowledge. The leap is blind. In the case of a negative outcome, the firm 
will continue to move across the system, to other commons.
This mobility of firms has important consequences for the system’s struc-
tural landscape and the endogenous generation of knowledge externalities. 
Location in a knowledge commons is expensive due to the knowledge 
governance costs entailed in the resources required for searching, screening 
and assessing the levels of knowledge of the neighbours, and the costs 
involved in activating communication channels and networking interac-
tions with them. The density of firms in a knowledge commons determines 
the level of knowledge governance costs, with the result that the mobility of 
firms across commons affects the knowledge governance costs of all other 
commons members. Firm exits impact on knowledge governance costs too. 
Entry and exit impact may be either positive or negative depending on the 
number of firms belonging to the commons, that is, to the current position 
of the commons on the U-shaped cost curve. The levels of net pecuniary 
knowledge externalities available in a knowledge commons are strictly 
endogenous to the local system, with important dynamic effects.
The distribution in space of agents, scattered randomly at the beginning 
of the process, becomes fully endogenous as agents move across knowledge 
commons in the regional space in the search for access to external knowl-
edge from the spillovers of proximate high-productivity firms. At the same 
time, since pecuniary knowledge externalities are endogenous, the actual 
level of net positive pecuniary knowledge externalities available at each 
point in time, within each knowledge commons, change over time as a 
consequence of the mobility of learning agents and the consequences – in 
terms of knowledge governance costs – for all the members of the knowl-
edge commons.
Hence, the dynamics of the regional distribution of agents exhibits 
traits typical of path dependence. The process is non-ergodic, but not 
past dependent: small variations may exert important effects in terms of 
emergence of a strong commons, or determine its decline and force firms 
to exit with their progressive dissemination in space. At the system level, 
excess entry in a ‘fertile’ knowledge commons may halt the generation of 
new technological knowledge and affect the rate of increase of productiv-
ity: excess knowledge governance costs reduce net positive pecuniary 
knowledge externalities to zero. This is most likely in commons populated 
by high-productivity firms since their higher levels of technological knowl-
edge are likely to benefit firms that are willing to innovate and, having 
casually landed in such commons, will enjoy the possibility to exploit their 
new position.
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The introduction of productivity-enhancing innovations affects the 
position of the supply curve and modifies the conditions of the product 
markets: prices as well as the profitability of all incumbents will fall. Firms 
will reassess their profitability levels with respect to the local average, and 
the process will keep going provided that changes to the structural condi-
tions of the system promoted by the mobility of firms in the space have not 
engendered the provision of knowledge externalities. The mobility of firms 
is the prime internal factor in the endogenous dynamics of the landscape 
and, hence, in the endogenous determination of the levels of knowledge 
externalities that shape the viability of the innovation process at firm level 
(Antonelli, 2011). This loop affects the system in four ways. Specifically we 
expect to see the following:
●● At the firm level, the levels of endogenous knowledge externalities 
may inhibit or foster the successful introduction of innovation.
●● At the structural level, the dynamics exerted by the interplay between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces changes the structure of the system 
and the attractiveness of different commons. When knowledge 
governance costs exceed the benefits from external knowledge, 
centrifugal forces are at work: the density of commons declines with 
the exit of firms. Centripetal forces are at work when the benefits 
of external knowledge are greater than the sum of the knowledge 
governance costs: the size and density of the commons increases. 
The structure of the system is characterized by changing het-
erogeneous ‘stains’, indicating commons where the introduction of 
productivity-enhancing innovations takes place and commons where 
no innovation is possible. The distribution of these ‘stains’ changes 
continuously over time.
●● At the commons level, the dynamics of output and productivity 
is characterized by typical Schumpeterian waves as the changing 
interplay between centrifugal and centripetal forces engenders differ-
ent phases that affect the overall, aggregate rates of productivity and 
output growth which exhibit both growth and decline.
●● At the macro-system level, the dynamics of the system is likely 
to exhibit a step-wise process of output and productivity growth. 
The wave-like change at commons level in aggregate engenders a 
positive outcome, with phases of fast growth shaped by the upsides 
determined by the prevalence of centripetal forces, and phases of 
slow growth where the downsides are due to the stronger impact of 
centrifugal forces.
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4. RESULTS
The results of the simulation confirm that the model is consistent, and is 
able to mimic the workings of a complex system based upon a large number 
of heterogeneous agents – both on the demand and the supply side – that are 
price takers in product markets where they are able to make efforts to react 
to changing market conditions. Replication of the temporary equilibrium 
price in the long term confirms that the model is appropriate to explore the 
general features of the system when the reaction of firms is adaptive and 
consists only of price to quantity adjustments. In the extreme case where 
firms cannot innovate due to lack of internal competence to mobilize and 
lack of external knowledge to be absorbed, the system effectively mimics 
a static general equilibrium in conditions of allocative and productive 
efficiency, with no dynamic efficiency. The markets sort out the worst-per-
forming firms and drive prices down to the minimum production costs. This 
result is important because it confirms static general equilibrium as a simple 
and elementary form of complexity that emerges when agents are unable to 
innovate. As soon as positive levels of knowledge externalities allow agents 
to react successfully to changing market conditions, by innovating, the equi-
librium conditions turn dynamic and key system elements (such as price, 
quantities, efficiency and structure) keep changing (Antonelli, 2011, 2017a, 
b). The dynamics, however, is not steady: the action of firms may engender 
negative effects on the knowledge connectivity of the system that, in turn, 
reduces the levels of net pecuniary knowledge externalities.
The results of the simulations of the model confirm the crucial role 
of endogenous knowledge externalities: with no positive externalities, 
productivity growth is much lower compared to when externalities are at 
work. The dynamics of the simulated system exhibit a wave-shaped trend 
describing firms’ continuous search for more profitable commons. These 
results were achieved using a plausible but not fully calibrated parameter 
configuration and, thus, need to be confirmed by a deeper investigation.
The simulation results confirm the existence of different areas within an 
economic system, where productivity grows at different rates and profits 
follow different distributions over time as an outcome of the endogenous 
effects of each firm’s relocation decision. In this process, commons are 
continuously augmented and reduced: new firms arrive and existing firms 
move to other commons, with the balance between incoming and leaving 
agents mostly unable to maintain the commons’ population stable. Thus, 
their size varies with each simulation step.
Depending on the capability of commons to retain agents, a single 
commons could operate as an attractor, dramatically expanding its size. As 
already mentioned, since the Lévy flight is blind, agents move randomly to 
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a new commons, but do not move if  their profits are close to the average 
profit at the macro commons level or their commons profitability is greater 
than the average profitability of the whole economy. The more a commons 
grows, the more the knowledge governance costs for firms increase. When 
the costs overcome the benefits due to net positive knowledge externalities, 
profits start to fall, inducing firms to relocate to try and find more profit-
able commons.
Simulations demonstrate that the distribution of firms and, conse-
quently the actual levels of net positive knowledge externalities, are the 
product of an endogenous process. Starting from a uniform distribution of 
firms across ten commons, the continuous relocation of agents produces 
a sequence of growth and decay of the commons according to the level of 
net positive pecuniary knowledge externalities their aggregation is able to 
engender.
The high technological and productivity levels achieved by more-
developed commons tend to become diffused as firms in these commons 
decide to move to less-developed locations. Average productivity levels are 
very similar among commons because, in less-developed commons, the 
higher knowledge brought by new entries from more-developed commons 
rapidly spills over due to centrifugal forces. The decay of a former extensive 
commons is the means of sharing the effect of knowledge externalities with 
other commons, and provides valuable opportunities for less-developed 
firms to make the leap towards higher productivity.
Specific simulations have been done to focus a number of key issues, 
such as the existence and effectiveness of positive externalities. The find-
ings come from comparing the results for four scenarios differing in the 
intensity of externalities: i) Alpha represents the benchmark scenario, with 
full deployment of both types of knowledge externalities: internal learning 
enhanced by the average productivity of the commons, and opportunities 
to absorb external knowledge at low knowledge governance costs; ii) Beta 
excludes knowledge governance costs and enhanced internal learning, 
but includes the cheap absorption of external knowledge; (iii) Gamma 
excludes knowledge governance costs, but includes internal learning at 
a fixed rate based on accumulation of experience, and independent of 
the average productivity of the commons; (iv) Iota excludes knowledge 
governance costs and allows only internal learning at a fixed rate based on 
accumulated experience.
1. Alternative dynamics with respect to the benchmark scenario, Alpha, 
are where the accumulation of experience proceeds at a faster pace in 
more developed commons but knowledge governance costs increase 
more proportionally than population.
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2. Alternative dynamics with different numbers of commons (Theta sce-
nario).
In order to enable full comparability of the results, all the simulations in 
the second group were computed using very similar parameter set-ups (few 
values change among the different scenarios), the same number of agents, 
same duration, same number of commons and same random distribution. 
Specifically, each scenario simulation was run for 2000 production cycles 
involving 1000 agents. Scenarios Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Iota used ten 
commons, while in scenario Theta agents are grouped in only four com-
mons because this scenario studies the influence of a different dispersion 
of agents.
At the onset of the simulation, levels of productivity are scattered 
randomly for each firm between 0 and 0.25, following a uniform random 
distribution; firms are endowed with initial accumulated knowledge ran-
domly distributed between zero and 0.1 – the minimum knowledge level 
that can be transformed into increased productivity.
Information flows among agents are allowed only within each commons, 
where agents are able potentially to observe at each moment all the other 
agents in that commons even when their number becomes quite large. 
Agents have no information on other commons, but do know the average 
profitability of the whole economy (macro-system level) and that of the 
commons they belong to (macro-commons level).
When an agent’s cumulated losses exceed a parametrically fixed thresh-
old, the agent exits the market and goes out of business. After a few cycles 
(another parameter) it is replaced by another agent endowed with technol-
ogy equal to the average level in the commons. In order to exclude results 
that were simply due to random events, simulations sub 1 and 3 were run 
100 times by varying the random seed – used to set up pseudo-random 
distributions – and their results are presented as average figures of the 100 
runs, confirmed by the low level of the related variance.
4.1 Existence and Effectiveness of Externalities
As outlined above, the investigation compares the results obtained from 
running simulations of four scenarios (Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Iota), 
based on varying values of several key parameters – knowledge governance 
costs, the negative effects of knowledge appropriability on the price of 
innovated goods, and external opportunities – which influence the effects 
of localization in a commons on the accumulation of competence and the 
capability to absorb external knowledge.
In more detail, knowledge governance costs are computed for each 
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firm according to the density of the commons to which they belong. 
Density exerts a non-linear effect so that knowledge governance costs vary 
according to the number of firms belonging to each commons following 
a U-shaped relation. In the first scenario (Alpha) this dynamic is fully at 
work, whereas in the other three (Beta, Gamma and Iota) the knowledge 
governance cost is set to zero. The external opportunity parameter meas-
ures the effects of productivity external to each agent, which adds to each 
agent’s internal knowledge stock, at each production cycle.
According to our model, firms localized in a high-productivity commons 
accumulate more competence than firms in a low-productivity one. This 
parameter takes three values: i) in the Alpha and Theta scenarios it is set to 
0.001 times the average productivity of the agents in the commons plus one; 
ii) in the Beta scenario the experience accumulated in each production cycle 
is set to zero, that is, there is no cumulated experience; iii) in the Gamma 
and Iota scenarios, which mainly test the effectiveness of different set-ups 
for this parameter, the firms accumulate 0.001 of experience for whatever 
productivity levels are achieved in the commons. Table 9.1 presents the 
experimental set-ups, where N is the total number of enterprises in the 
economy; n is the number of enterprises belonging to a single common; 
and cp is the average productivity of all the firms belonging to a commons.
As Table 9.1 shows, knowledge governance costs are set to zero in the 
Beta, Gamma and Iota scenarios, and in the Alpha scenario are allowed 
to vary according to the magnitude of each commons’ population by fol-
lowing a U-shaped relation. In the Alpha scenario firms achieve a larger 
accumulation of competence that reflects both the average productivity 
of the commons in which they are localized and its productivity peaks. 
However, in the Alpha scenario firms are liable for knowledge governance 
costs that vary according to the density of the commons (Table 9.2).
The main simulation result is based on a comparison of productivity 
growth across the three sets of parameters. We expect the Alpha scenario to 
exhibit the best performance. The interpretation of the results is straight-
Table 9.1 Alpha versus others: set-up of the different scenarios
Scenario Number of 
commons
Common cost Internal learning External learning
Alpha 10 (0.01*N)/n + 0.01*n 0.001*(1 + cp) Yes
Beta 10 zero zero Yes
Gamma 10 zero 0.001 Yes
Iota 10 zero 0.001 No
Theta 4 (0.01*N)/n + 0.01*n 0.001*(1 + cp) Yes
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forward: i) the Beta scenario tests the generic importance of knowledge 
in determining the dynamics of productivity and production – we expect 
the poorest results from the Beta scenario; ii) the Gamma scenario will 
negate our hypothesis if  its results are close to those from the Alpha 
scenario; and iii) the Iota scenario underlines the dramatic importance 
of spillovers for the growth of knowledge and productivity. We observe 
that the three alternative scenarios do not overtake the performance of the 
Alpha scenario where knowledge externalities are fully at work. Table 9.3 
shows the average results of 100 simulations for each scenario: the evidence 
confirms that the results are not dependent on random distribution due to 
the meaningless level of variance among the 100 trials even when they were 
based on different random seeded distributions.
After 2000 production cycles, in the Alpha scenario the system, as a col-
lection of commons, reaches an average productivity of 22.717; in the same 
number of simulation steps, in the Gamma, Iota and Beta scenarios the 
system reaches, respectively 16.805, 1.416 and 0.25. The Theta scenario, 
based on the same parameter configuration of Alpha, differs only in the 
number of commons: its results are very close to those of Alpha. The number 
of commons seems to have very little influence on the results at the macro-
system level.
Table 9.2 Alpha versus others: population and knowledge governance costs
Scenario Population of the common
1 50 100 150 250 500 750 1000
Alpha 10.01 0.70 1.10 1.57 2.54 5.02 7.51 10.01
Beta zero zero zero zero zero zero zero zero
Gamma zero zero zero zero zero zero zero zero
Iota zero zero zero zero zero zero zero zero
Theta 10.01 0.70 1.10 1.57 2.54 5.02 7.51 10.01
Table 9.3 Alpha versus others: macro-system level productivity
Scenario Min.  
productivity
Average 
productivity
Max.  
productivity
Variance
Alpha 17.569 22.717 24.083 0.6003078
Beta 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.0000000
Gamma 16.195 16.805 17.209 0.0430414
Iota 1.395 1.416 1.449 0.0001804
Theta 20.002 22.829 24.175 0.7206033
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A batch of 100 simulations was run for the Alpha and Gamma scenarios, 
with a higher cost of labour (wages were set to 10 instead of 1) in order 
to test that the Alpha scenario led to higher productivity levels than the 
Gamma scenario, independent of labour cost. Comparison of these two 
scenarios confirms the importance of knowledge externalities; even the 
distance between the final productivity achieved by the two scenarios was 
less: whereas the Alpha scenario reached an average productivity of 20.585 
(over the 100 simulations) the Gamma scenario stopped at 16.626.
Table 9.4 reports the minimum and maximum population achieved 
during the first 2000 production cycles across the ten commons, as well as 
the dynamic due to moving across commons by means of minimum and 
maximum turnover – that is, the sum of enterprises that had entered and 
exited the commons.
Again, the interpretation is straightforward: the structure of the system 
is endogenous. There is a clear technological and structural change loop. 
We see that the pace of productivity at system level is affected by the 
distribution of firms across commons. At the same time, the structure 
of the system is affected by the different dynamics of productivity. The 
loop encompasses historic time and leads to strong non-ergodic path 
dependence. The Alpha scenario, with strong positive knowledge exter-
nalities fully at work, shows lower levels of concentration of firms across 
commons. Concentrations are greater in the scenarios where the effects of 
externalities on competence are smaller, and naturally where the number 
of commons is limited, as in the Theta scenario. Commons-to-commons 
flows are dramatically higher for the Iota scenario, where firms cannot 
engage in external learning so react to out-of-equilibrium conditions by 
moving continuously from commons to commons.
Sensitivity to the key parameters does not raise concern. A few simula-
tions have been devoted to test the sensitivity to four parameters that were 
expected to have (or might have) a strong influence on the results of the 
simulations. Table 9.5 briefly summarizes the Pearson’s index values com-
Table 9.4  Alpha versus others: commons minimum and maximum 
population and turnover
Scenario Min. size Max. size Min. turnover Max. turnover
Alpha 24 265 3768 9695
Beta 0 529 145 1190
Gamma 27 277 7054 13,319
Iota 66 141 29,095 31,555
Theta 57 537 11,501 24,440
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puted through 100 simulations run under random values for the following 
parameters:
●● Tolerance – the equilibrium condition; an agent is considered ‘in 
equilibrium’ if  its results are different from the average more than 
tolerance, either in negative or positive terms;
●● IPR duration – the number of production cycles a technology 
enhancement is hidden from other firms due to IPR protection;
●● Internal learning – the knowledge an enterprise accumulates each 
step due to learning by doing; iv) Commons cost – the base value 
for commons costs, both knowledge management and exploration.
The Pearson ratios have been computed between the random value of 
the parameter and the productivity level achieved after 2000 production 
cycles at the macro-system level, under constant values for each other 
parameter and the same distribution of the random events.
As Table 9.5 shows, the longer the IPR protection lasts the less productiv-
ity the system achieved after 2000 production cycles; the same effect is shown 
for the Commons costs, but even stronger. A correlation has been found 
with the learning capability that is a trivial but highly plausible observation. 
The tolerance level was demonstrated to have a very weak correlation; levels 
tested were from 0 to 0.001 – the level usually employed for the simulations – 
in order to demonstrate that even smaller-set up for this parameter would 
have added very little to the meaningfulness of the simulations.
The essential observation in Table 9.5 is that the strong correlation 
between achieved productivity and IPR duration and Commons cost (that 
is, knowledge governance cost) demonstrates that under poor or null knowl-
edge externalities the behaviour of enterprises is doomed to be simply 
adaptive. This observation constitutes the ultimate answer to this chapter’s 
research question: the results confirm the claim for the dramatic effects of the 
endogenous dynamics of knowledge externalities. The analysis of productiv-
ity growth in the different scenarios highlights the dramatic gaps between 
them for average firm output, which is highest in the Alpha scenario.
The Alpha scenario exhibits faster rates of productivity growth and a 
typical step-wise pattern of growth, with periods of fast growth followed 
by phases of slow growth. Figure 9.1 shows that the availability of net 
Table 9.5 Sensitivity to key parameter values
Scenario Tolerance IPR duration Internal learning Commons cost
Alpha 0.060 −0.873 0.510 −0.962
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positive knowledge externalities within each commons-cum-mobility of 
firms across commons, stylized in the Alpha scenario, are able to push 
the whole economy to far higher productivity values. Consistent with 
this, output at the macro-system level shows larger growth in the Alpha 
scenario compared to the others.
Figure 9.2 highlights the typical step-wise pattern of growth when 
knowledge externalities are fully at work – that is, Alpha scenario – with 
periods of fast growth followed by phases of slow growth.
4.2 The Dynamics of the Commons in the Alpha Scenario
As mentioned, the Alpha scenario represents our benchmark, validated 
by the results of the simulations. It is interesting to explore the dynamics 
of structural change engendered by the model of creative response-cum-
knowledge externalities at the commons level.
At commons level, the results of the simulations show that, although 
selection of a new commons is a blind activity for agents, their mobility 
strongly affects the structure of the system and the size of each commons. 
Figure 9.3 provides a general representation of the phenomenon at com-
mons level by showing the number of firms in the first three commons 
during 1000 production cycles. It shows clearly that each commons under-
goes a typical Schumpeterian wave, with phases of growth and subsequent 
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Figure 9.2 Output levels during 50 production cycles
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decline along the process. The long-term pattern of growth is punctuated 
by waves where, after rapid take-off, the commons enters a contraction 
phase due to the rising knowledge governance costs for excessive crowding. 
As one commons contracts, others increase in size – of output and number 
of firms.
Over the long term, the oscillations level out and the size of commons 
becomes increasingly homogeneous, with a clear decline in concentration. 
Variety among commons seems to exert a strong and positive effect on 
the overall increase in productivity at system level. This evidence warrants 
further analysis, but could be considered to hint at the powerful effects of 
replicator dynamics according to which the rate of growth of a system is 
positively influenced by its variety (Metcalfe, 2002).
The Schumpeterian waves at commons level affect overall aggregate pat-
terns of productivity growth at system level, which show a typical step-wise 
pattern (see Figure 9.2). The evidence from these simulations hints at an 
innovation process conceived as a Schumpeterian creative reaction enabled 
by knowledge externalities, engendering structural change and ‘disorder’ at 
commons level, with marked Schumpeterian waves of output growth and 
firm populations which positively affect the system-level dynamics where 
both output and productivity show continuous step-wise growth. Creative 
destruction occurs at the firm and commons levels, but benefits the system 
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at large. The locus of innovation shifts along time from one commons 
to another in a punctuated sequence that closely parallels the long-term 
historic trends identified by Mokyr (1990a).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The understanding of the pervasive role of the Arrovian properties of 
knowledge as an economic good – non-appropriability, non-exhaustibility, 
and cumulability and complementarity stemming from its indivisibility – 
makes it possible to grasp the recombinant character of its generation 
process. This process involves external knowledge as an indispensable 
input in the generation of new knowledge and the eventual introduction of 
innovations. The creative reaction of firms caught in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions and the necessary generation of knowledge are enabled by the 
pecuniary knowledge externalities stemming from the quality and structure 
of the networks of synchronic and diachronic complementarities among 
firms linked by formal and informal ties. However, pecuniary knowledge 
externalities are not always available. The success of the creative reactions 
of firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions to generate new tech-
nological knowledge and introduce productivity enhancing innovations 
depends on the availability of pecuniary knowledge externalities.
In these intrinsically localized circumstances, innovation is a highly 
specific and idiosyncratic emerging property that takes place only when the 
complexity of the local system is properly organized and adequate levels of 
knowledge connectivity are reached and maintained. The success of such 
creative reactions, in turn, changes the organization of the system and its 
knowledge connectivity, and may reinforce the availability of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities, feeding a self-sustained process of growth and 
change as well as endangering it. The process is far from deterministic: 
excess density, with the consequent decline of knowledge connectivity, in 
fact, is a possible outcome of the generation of additional knowledge and 
the changes in the structure of the system that stem from the introduction 
of innovations.
Knowledge externalities are endogenous: there is a causal loop link-
ing the amount of knowledge that each firm can generate with the cost 
of available external knowledge, including knowledge governance costs, 
which, in turn, depend on the – changing – structure of interactions and 
transactions, and density of co-localized firms. The larger the pecuniary 
knowledge externalities, the stronger are the incentives for firms to try to 
enter knowledge-rich commons. Their entry affects the knowledge connec-
tivity of the system, and hence its knowledge governance costs as well as 
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the supply of technological spillovers, and changes the level of the available 
pecuniary knowledge externalities.
The stock of external knowledge available at any point in time, and in 
regional and technological space, is not determined by exogenous factors, 
but is strongly influenced by the conditions of knowledge governance 
costs within the knowledge commons, as well as by the amount of creative 
reactions that have been taking place at each point in time.
The use of an ABM allows us to articulate the relations between the 
basic ingredients of the dynamic processes, and to elaborate a coherent 
analytical framework that helps explain, and mimics, the endogenous 
long-term dynamics of technological and structural change that are at the 
heart of economic growth. Thus, the ABM can be considered a type of 
artificial cliometrics, providing the opportunity to test a set of hypotheses 
about the role of endogenous knowledge externalities. The results of the 
ABM confirm that endogenous knowledge externalities have powerful 
effects on the equilibrium conditions of the system dynamics at the micro-, 
meso- and macro-levels.
At the micro-level we show that the reaction of firms caught in out-of-
equilibrium conditions yields successful effects, with the introduction of 
productivity-enhancing innovations, when pecuniary knowledge exter-
nalities provide by high levels of knowledge connectivity are available. 
Innovation is the result of matching individual and intentional learning 
efforts in reactive agents with the characteristics of the system in which 
the firm is embedded. Innovation is an emerging property of the system 
in which individual action is as indispensable as the availability of positive 
pecuniary knowledge externalities. Endogenous knowledge externalities 
generate endogenous growth characterized intrinsically by an out-of-
equilibrium state. The introduction of innovation affects the transient 
equilibrium of product and factor markets, exposes each firm to changes 
in its relative profitability and induces new innovation efforts. Equilibrium 
occurs only if  and when innovation is impossible because of lack of pecu-
niary knowledge externalities. Innovation and equilibrium are antithetical.
At the meso-level, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of endogenous 
knowledge externalities affect the structural characteristics of the com-
mons and the aggregate system. Endogenous centrifugal and centripetal 
forces continually reshape each commons and the structure of the system, 
and produce ever-changing heterogeneity characterized by the creation and 
decline of knowledge commons. The process exhibits the typical traits of 
a third-order emergence where microprocesses lead to aggregate changes 
that, in turn, may affect the likelihood of the microdynamics (Martin and 
Sunley, 2012). To try to access pecuniary knowledge externalities, firms 
can move across commons. This mobility may have the twin effect to: a) 
M4479-ANTONELLI_9781788113786_t.indd   234 19/02/2018   13:42
 The endogenous dynamics of pecuniary knowledge externalities  235
increase their chances to innovate; and b) change the structural landscape 
and the consequent levels of knowledge connectivity of each commons 
and, hence, of the system, viewed as a collection of commons. Within 
commons, mobility across commons affects local knowledge governance 
costs and changes the levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities and, 
thus, the likelihood that co-localized firms can generate new technological 
knowledge and introduce technological innovations that will increase their 
productivity. A knowledge commons endowed with firms that enjoy high 
levels of productivity may attract many learning firms willing to improve 
their productivity. Their entry, however, may affect the local levels of 
knowledge governance costs and reduce the levels of net positive pecuniary 
knowledge externalities, reducing the overall attractiveness of the location 
and the aggregate dynamics of the system. Local systems may experience 
a transition from high levels of organized complexity able to generate high 
levels of net positive knowledge externalities, to low levels of organized 
complexity where congestion and governance costs make access to knowl-
edge spillovers more expensive.
At the single commons level, the out-of-equilibrium process leads to 
non-linear patterns of economic growth characterized by significant 
oscillations in the firm population levels, and rates of output, profit-
ability and productivity growth that take the form typical of long waves in 
Schumpeterian analyses of business cycles.
At the system level, the dynamics of productivity growth exhibits a typi-
cal step-wise pattern, with long periods of time characterized by smooth 
rates of increase and sudden, sharp jumps. When the distribution of firms 
within the knowledge commons is particularly effective and the local 
system is able to promote high levels of knowledge externalities, the rate 
of generation of new knowledge and the rate of productivity-enhancing 
innovation increase. At the aggregate level, the system experiences fast 
rates of output and productivity growth. In the opposite case, the distribu-
tion of firms across knowledge commons reduces the opportunities to 
benefit from net positive knowledge externalities. Crowded knowledge 
commons command high levels of knowledge governance costs; peripheral 
knowledge commons with low levels of productivity involve few opportu-
nities for knowledge dissemination, and the system experiences low rates 
of innovation introduction and productivity growth.
The endogenous dynamics of knowledge externalities engenders multiple 
equilibria as well as micro–macro feedback such that the dynamics of the 
system becomes very sensitive to small and unintended shocks. In the case of 
a single attractor, prices perform as vectors of reliable signals about markets 
conditions, and competition restores the equilibrium conditions. In the 
opposite case, in a dynamic context based on out-of-equilibrium conditions, 
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the consequences of individual action on the structural characteristics of 
the system are difficult to foresee. In the local context, and over a short time 
span, only procedural rationality will apply. There is no countervailing force 
that can identify a real attractor. Therefore, entrepreneurial action may have 
major consequences at the economic system level, with either positive or 
negative effects. Access to external knowledge and dissemination of knowl-
edge generally are far from automatic. They are stochastic not deterministic 
processes and may or may not occur, depending on the characteristics of the 
system that are not given only once and are not exogenous, but rather are 
constantly changing through time as a consequence of agents’ actions.
The endogenous dynamics of pecuniary knowledge externalities is 
intrinsically path dependent. The existing structure of the system affects 
the dynamics, but at each point in time firms can change the amount of 
resources invested in the generation of knowledge; new governance mecha-
nisms can be introduced; and the mobility of firms across the knowledge 
and regional space changes the structure of the system and the levels of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities.
The policy implications of these results are important in highlighting the 
endogenous dynamics of knowledge externalities. Knowledge externalities 
do not fall like manna from heaven, and are not given once and forever. 
There has been an extreme focus on knowledge generating policies to the 
detriment of policies for knowledge governance. Careful policy interven-
tions to promote intentional changes to the system parameters in order 
to improve knowledge governance could have long-lasting and positive 
effects (Ostrom and Hess, 2006; Ostrom, 2010).
Knowledge dissemination should become the topic of dedicated poli-
cies aimed at favouring the access and use of external knowledge as an 
indispensable input in the successful recombinant generation of new 
technological knowledge. The design of specific applications of new IPR 
regimes that favour knowledge dissemination and yet enable appropriate 
levels of knowledge appropriability could be very effective for knowledge 
dissemination. Systematic introduction of measures that would reduce 
exclusive property rights based on compulsory licensing with fair royalties 
would likely have strong positive effects on the rates of generation of new 
technological knowledge. We would stress here that, although the imple-
mentation of interventions affecting the basic architecture of IPR regimes 
might seem rather controversial, our argument becomes more realistic and 
palatable when considered as the introduction of non-exclusive IPR for 
patents stemming from public interventions, ranging from public procure-
ment to research activities supported by public funding. Interventions that 
support the purchase of patents and, more generally, interactions between 
knowledge producers and knowledge users and all public subsidies would 
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help the dissemination of knowledge both within core regions and among 
regions (Reichman, 2000).
Support for mobility of skilled personnel can be a very effective tool for 
knowledge dissemination. In core regions it would help reduce knowledge 
absorption costs, and across regions support for mobility of skilled per-
sonnel, academics and inventors from core regions can make (re)location 
in a semi-core region more attractive. This type of support would favour 
interregional knowledge dissemination from core to non-core regions.
The strengthening of effective interactions between firms and the 
academic system both within and across commons is likely to reduce 
substantially the costs of external knowledge. The entry of the public 
research infrastructure in the market for knowledge outsourcing can help 
the effective absorption of knowledge generated by the public research 
infrastructure, increasing the actual amount of net positive knowledge 
externalities. The public research infrastructure can take advantage of the 
signals provided by firms so as to better direct the internal interdisciplinary 
allocation of resources. Firms can access the research capabilities of large 
and effective public R&D labs to perform R&D activities taking advantage 
of substantial increasing returns and low unit fixed costs. The implementa-
tion of effective systems of interaction can improve the matching between 
the public research infrastructure and the business community so as to 
increase the amount of net positive knowledge externalities available in the 
system favouring its growth dynamics.
Support for the creation of academic networks between strong academic 
institutes in core regions linked by strong institutional ties and peripheral 
universities located in non-core regions would help the dissemination of 
knowledge across regions. Within regions, dissemination of academic 
knowledge would be increased by reducing the exclusivity in academic 
employment contracts to allow individual academics to participate in 
knowledge-consulting activities. Especially for small firms, using academ-
ics as consultants would allow them to build contractual relations in 
knowledge typical of large corporations. All interventions that increase 
access to external knowledge and reduce knowledge interaction costs are 
likely to exert positive effects on the dynamics of economic systems.
NOTES
1. We define the equilibrium cost of knowledge as the cost of a standard divisible input, 
traded in a competitive market, that can be fully appropriated, wear and tear because has a 
clear exhaustibility, and is used to produce an output that is traded in a competitive market.
2. NK models assume the reverse, defining density of the components in the landscape and 
their knowledge to be exogenous (Levinthal, 1997).
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3. See Antonelli and Ferraris (2011, 2017) for complementary specifications of this model.
4. See Antonelli and Ferraris (2011, 2017) for other complementary specifications of this 
simulation model.
5. Note that the system is analytically consistent. Naming Π the profit of a generic enterprise 
and D the dividend it will pay to its shareholders, and remembering equations (9.1), (9.2) 
and (9.5), it is possible to write the following equations:
 Di = Πi = pOi − Wi (9.15)
 where D could be less than zero if  a loss had to be reintegrated. The amount of dividends 
paid to the whole system is:
 D = ∑Di (9.16)
 At the aggregate level the system could be summarized as follows:
 Y = ∑Wi + ∑Di (9.17)
 By specifying Di using equation (9.16) it is possible to obtain:
 Y = ∑Wi + ∑pOi − ∑Wi (9.18)
 By operating simple compensations, equation (9.18) becomes:
 Y = ∑pOi (9.19)
 Recalling equation (9.2), it is evident that the whole system can reach equilibrium and the 
amount of money in the system remains constant.
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